Avishay BSG (Ben-Sasson-Gordis)
@avishaybsg.bsky.social
9.7K followers 2.3K following 10K posts
Normative Theory of Civ-Mil especially under democratic backsliding | Liberalism Rekindled Postdoctoral Fellow @Hebrew U | Ruderman Scholar in Residence and Senior Researcher at the INSS | Napper extraordinaire | Kartofellophile
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avishaybsg.bsky.social
Things about politics I’ve come to believe strongly:

1. Less bad is better than more bad
2. Nostalgia is generally incorrect. Things weren’t better
3. Still, things can get much worse
4. Democracy is an outlier in human political history
5. Optimism is rooted in agency, not positive predictions
Reposted by Avishay BSG (Ben-Sasson-Gordis)
tompepinsky.com
This is really good. But stepping back, it is also a sign of where comparative politics and political theory are going these days, towards productive engagement on basic questions of civilian rule, republicanism, and the politics of order. The field needs more work like this.
avishaybsg.bsky.social
🧵 I'm excited to share that my article "Democratic Backsliding and the Limits of Civilian Control of the Military" has been accepted @thejop.bsky.social.

It answers the question "how ought militaries act when civilian leaders turn on democratic institutions?"

1/
#CivMilSky #PolTheory
avishaybsg.bsky.social
P.S. if you're an academic with an interest in this, hit me up and I'll send you a version
avishaybsg.bsky.social
Not directly, since the article moves pretty quickly past the assumption that illegal orders shouldn't be obeyed, and I was facing a strict word limit. But maybe in the book version
avishaybsg.bsky.social
כחול, עם המילה "הליכוד" מתנופפת מעליו
avishaybsg.bsky.social
I conclude with some grim thoughts. Still, at least in the US and Israel, things haven't progressed to the point I describe here. They could, because no democracy is safe from collapse, but there's still a ways to go as Hirschman teaches us. And so we think, argue, and do politics. 26/26
avishaybsg.bsky.social
And the word of usually cautious and isnstitutional members of the military profession, preferably, ones who are usually known to disagree. (And if you'd like to read more about the wisdom of the profession and disobedience I highly recommend @queenofthinair.bsky.social's book on the topic. 25/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
There are two more helpful signs. One is the existence of a cross cutting coalition objecting to the move, comprised of social elements who don't usually collaborate and some who are usually suspicious of the military. This indicates military fears aren't just about organizational interests. 24/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
So how will military leaders know? There's no cut and dry answer, but we can offer some heuristics. By this point we've seen democratic backsliding happen enough times, experts can call some of the signs. Also leaders are often happy to announce it.
23/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
That may be dissappointing for those who were hoping for an argument in favor of democratic military coups. Not here. I think CMR scholars got that right. To quote myself: "Democracy will not survive a military that turns against it, but it also cannot depend on the military to uphold it".
22/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
Doesn't that make the military the guardian of the constitution? I'm glad you asked. No. The military is *A* guardian of the competitive democratic system, but not *The* guardian. It can't step out of it's way if it wasn't ordered to save other institutions. Not on my argument at least. 21/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
This should immediately raise questions. For example "who's to judge?" My answer is" military leaders who receive the orders from the civilians. Further down the chain of command the moral grounds for obedience are different and so the perversly self undermining nature of the order isn't present 20/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
Military leaders aren't immediately obligated to disobey every democracy-undoing order, but they are not required on my account to obey them.
I argue that this avoids the problem with the standard view, but also doesn't veer into Milburn-style voluntarism. 19/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
To argue that democratic leaders can invoke their democratically based authority (as civilian control asserts) in order to dismantle the same processes that produce this legitimacy would be pervese. Hence what I call democarcy-undoing orders (defined in the image below) are non-binding. 18/
I define an order as democracy-undoing if it is: 
1)	An order to the military by a duly authorized civilian leader, to intervene or facilitate intervention in the operation of free and fair elections (or of institutions or processes constitutive of the freedom and fairness of elections),  that can be,
2)	Reasonably interpreted as part of a broader campaign to disable the ability of democratic institutions to provide legitimacy, accountability, and trust across power transitions in the future.

avishaybsg.bsky.social
Civilian control by elected officials is justified because elections provide legitimacy, accountability, and trust in government across transitions in power. When democartically elected governments issue orders that are meant to degrade competitive democratic insitutions, they act w/o authority. 17/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
Is there a way to justify CoS Halevy's actions that amounted to a refusal to help Netanyahu quash opposition to his government's actions to consolidate power? On the standard view it's not clear that there is, but I argue that in fact there is a defense. 16/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
Netanyahu and his government were fuming and demanded that the Chief of Staff act decisively against the protests. The CoS on the other hand acted more cautiosly. Now, punishing reservists who don't report for duty is legal, and morally permissibile, and in this case the debate was political. 15/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
The far reaching plan would strengthen the already strong executive, and weaken the judiciary and legal advice systems, that in the absence of a strong parliament, are the only real check on power.
A very wide social protest ensued that included threats by reservists not to come serve. 13/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
I run through the Brazilian (h/t @charig.bsky.social) and Trump 1.0 cases in the article, but let me focus on the Israel in 2023 case here.
Back in January 2023, Netanyahu's government, often quoted as a case of democratic backsliding, announced a judicial overhaul. 12/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
It's going to take some time to make it through copy editing and all that jazz, but DM me your email and I'll send you a copy.
avishaybsg.bsky.social
Why? Because they are presumptively legal, or at least not clearly illegal, not inherently immoral, and very very political. But that seems to trigger moral discomfort, or at least it does for me. It also seems to run against our intuitions in real world cases. 11/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
All of this means that the military is likely to both become a target, and a component in the legalistic-autocrats toolbox. But if the standard CMR view is correct, many orders from duely elected executives to militaries to become involved in such efforts, should be obeyed. 10/
avishaybsg.bsky.social
Populism scholars like @jwmueller-pu.bsky.social note that charectaristically, populists will attack elites in the name of the "real people", and elites include beureaucracies, including military elites (see: @donmoyn.bsky.social's blogs work on this effort under T2.0). 9/