Thoughts welcome!
Sanctions are a cat-and-mouse game. Fixing the price-cap will be hard due to the shadow fleet. So the above is an option for how to replace it.
Formally, the price cap is an exemption from a service ban. So deleting the price cap automatically implements our suggestion.
END

- Russia could possibly circumvent the sanction by ship-to-ship transfer. But since, for the EU not to detect this, it would need to happen far away from Europe’s (and its allies’) waters, such evasion would necessarily be quite limited.

Risks and avoidance?
- The shadow fleet could become somewhat rustier. This could potentially somewhat increase the already large environmental risks due to the shadow fleet. But importantly, it will not increase the amount of oil transported through European waters.

- Its upholding is based on geography (EU can observe all tankers serving Russia’s western ports) and market fundamentals (EU is a large buyer of oil, so painful for a tanker to be left out of such trade).
- Its upholding does not rely on the US, though of course it’s better if they joined.

A tanker would essentially need to choose if it wants to serve Russian oil trade (10% of seaborne trade) or European (23% of seaborne trade).
- It will reduce Russia’s oil profits by increasing transport costs.
- It will not reduce Russia’s oil production, thus no risk of a oil-price spike.

Nej precis. Det är ju mestadels bara redan extremister som tittar på dessa samtal på X.

En annan konstig grej är när dessa ledande politiker väljer att göra sina egna utspel på X. Journalister har ju som uppdrag att rapportera vad tex dadgostar säger, oavsett var hon säger det.

Mycket bra. Är helt enig. Är framförallt förvånad att ledande politiker utanför tidöpartierna är kvar där. T.o.m. om man bortser från moralen så förstår jag inte den kalkylen. Vem når de på X som de inte når på andra ställen och varför är dessa personer relevanta för dom.

Makes sense. Another, much simpler, reason negative campaigning would be prevalent in two-party systems is that any reduction in the opponent’s popularity and vote share translates into an increase in your vote share. In multiparty, if you attack an opponent the gains are spread over many parties.

Här är soundtracket till denna dag:

open.spotify.com/track/2z1uVu...

So the places most hurt by the policy started voting more for the parties that pushed the policy that hurt them in the first place?!

The electoral version of the Stockholm syndrome.

I'm not sure the above would come out of rational updating of signals (I'm often wrong on that intuition). But if it does, then negative campaigning would have the effect of increasing the prior of % rotten politicians.

How you interpret the signal should depend on your prior. If your prior is, say, 1 in 100 are rotten then the signal is very informative about the individual being that one rotten person. But if your prior is that 80 in 100 are rotten, then this does not move your prior on that person much.
->

to dig up dirt, blame the other side or generally go into negative campaigning. I would think that scandals are perceived as general rot if it happens following a period of negative campaigning.

Formally, when you see a scandal I think you infer two things: the person is bad and the system is bad->

These are super-interesting thoughts Jacob.
Theoretically it makes a lot of sense. But I have a nagging feeling that reality is not what you describe -- that scandals in non-presidential systems are perceived more as general rot.

I guess(!) it may be because the perpetrator has a counter-strategy

Slarvigt att han pratar om dessa saker. Också synd utifrån förhandlingarna.

Skönt att vi inte har det där systemet med pardons i Sverige.