G) Model predicts rich will have higher saving as share of income -- rich get more capital which is where saving comes from. This is in empirically true (and holds in Ramsey).
With heterogenous saving propensity, classic result of Becker appears: highest saver will own all capital in long run.
10/n

E) [Note: “countries” can be interpreted as "individuals" in closed economy] Model provides, to my knowledge, first analytical explanation of the “elephant curve” of global income growth, particularly the trunk part (hollowing out of middle-income).
Figure from Alvaredo et al. (2018).
8/n

D) Growth is U-shaped in initial level of development. This is since, when opening for foreign investment, poor countries see very high growth in wages. Initially very rich countries see very high growth in capital income. Middle-income countries see a little but less of both, thus less in total.7/n

This has a number of implications:
A) When opening for FDI poor countries get boost to wage and income. But their long-run income will be lower than if they hadn’t opened up as they then would’ve owned more capital themselves. (See figure).
4/n

This chart made the rounds with the general take that respondents are stupid. Just want to note that respondents are not necessarily inconsistent (without further information).

For instance, I can answer Yes on first Q if I think 20% of Americans would be better off and rest not worse off.
->

And here's some american car makers. They say thank you to Elon and Donald for the great policies.

I think it has.

Is Elon saving VW?

The same mechanism -- finite horizons -- can explain downward biased expectations/plans in capital accumulation, thus applies to the green energy rollout. I showed this in an earlier paper version (not in published), but it was a point made originally by Goldman (1968, REStud).
3/n

The unshakable-pessimism graph in the post below is fascinating. It reminds me of a graph I created some years ago: the solid black line is the actual oil price and each of the colored lines is the forecast of a particular year.
1/n

This is largely due to an increase in extremism, esp in the republican party – both in terms of numbers but also in their positions.

But for large (hypothetical) majorities, the effects have withered. And for majorities of 58 the filibuster could actually be extremizing on net (in figure, when blue is below zero and red is above zero).

But this moderating effect has partly been driven by the number of seats the majority controls.
And when controlling for this we find that:
-          for small majorities, the effects of the moderating effects of the filibuster have generally grown.

We find:
With some exceptions, the filibuster has had a moderating effect through the period.

We show this isn’t true. How? A corollary of that argument is that left and right extremists never vote alike, but we show that they _do_ vote the same way in as much as 20% of all votes in some senates.

I wish Leon Simmons was here, but at least I can copy-paste his tweets:

It really looks like the Antartic sea ice melting season has started with a million km² of sea ice below the previous record low!