For these charts, data, and other analysis of the exchange of fire between Israel and Iran, read JINSA’s daily Operation Rising Lion Update: t.co/EnflgCuZfp

Iran has continued to launch smaller waves before a larger barrage. It launched fewer waves & total missiles and put more time between attacks during the evening of 6/18 than 6/17. This may reflect Iran wanting to coax complacency before larger attacks or lost launch capacity.

Iran launched 20% more ballistic missiles per wave during the early morning today than it did during the early morning yesterday. Iran launched 2 waves during the early morning hours of both days.

If Israel degrades Iran’s launch capabilities at the current rate, by June 19, Iran will have lost half of the total 360 launchers that it had before Operation Rising Lion.

With a trend in decreased ballistic missile launches, Iran has increased its use of drones. Iran may increasingly look to supplement its ballistic missiles with drones or cruise missiles as its capacity of missiles and launchers continues to decrease.

Although Iran has retaliated repeatedly against Israel, the number of ballistic missiles it has launched during each wave has decreased by at least 66 percent compared to Iran’s 2024 attacks because of Israeli strikes eliminating missile launchers and stockpile.

The longer the exchange of fire continues, the more likely Iran will be unwilling or unable to mount large barrages as it loses missile launchers & stockpile or seeks to preserve capabilities. My estimate for future Iranian ballistic missile launches: t.co/sSGp3eAAaI

Iran retaliated against Israel with only 50% as many projectiles as it did in October. Iran may not have launched ballistic missiles because:
🔥Israel targeted Iranian launch capabilities,
💀Israel killed its senior leadership,
🦥Iran was not prepared, or
⏰Iran may fire later.

The coordinated operation between the Israeli Air Force and Mossad struck over 400% more targets than during Israel's last attack against Iran in October.

The objectives of the operation include neutralizing:
🪖High ranking military commanders,
⚛️Nuclear engineers and facilities,
✈️Iranian air defenses, and
🚀Ground-to-ground capabilities, including drones and missiles.

[email protected] is reporting the US is reforming the regional coalition that helped defend Israel when Iran attacked in April 2024.

A key recommendation from JINSA’s report was to move from an ad hoc coalition to a formal one that doesn’t need to be rebuilt before every attack.

Reports indicating Iran pressured the Houthis to end their fire to help nuclear talks suggest US strikes built diplomatic leverage, but by reaching an agreement with the Houthis, the Trump administration conceded that advantage before achieving any concessions from Iran. 10/10

With the details of the truce murky, it is also unclear whether Trump would restart the US campaign against the Houthis—and to what level of intensity—if it continues its attacks on Israel and/or commercial shipping. 9/10

Without persistent strikes against the Houthis, the Trump administration may soon redeploy US aircraft and aircraft carriers away from the region, enabling them to serve key functions across the globe, but decreasing deterrence against the Houthis and Iran. 8/10

The Houthis’ ability to maintain high levels of fire during the US campaign and achieve operational successes against US ships, US aircraft, and Israel indicates it remains a potent threat—suggesting the US campaign had not significantly eroded their will & ability to fight. 7/10

The Trump administration launched 1,200% more strikes per day once it began targeting the Houthis compared to the period when the Biden administration conducted strikes against the group in Yemen. 6/10