Brian Weatherson
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bweatherson.bsky.social
Brian Weatherson
@bweatherson.bsky.social

Philosopher at University of Michigan. https://brian.weatherson.org/

Brian Weatherson is the Marshall Weinberg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. He specializes in epistemology and philosophy of language.

Source: Wikipedia
Philosophy 47%
Psychology 20%
Pinned
This is a thread of things I've recently published, starting with my book from last year, with Open Book Publishers, defending the claim that knowledge is interest-relative.

I'll continue this thread when new stuff comes out.

www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.116...
Knowledge: A Human Interest Story
In this book the author argues for a groundbreaking perspective that knowledge is inherently interest-relative. This means that what one knows is influenced not just by belief, evidence, and truth, bu...
www.openbookpublishers.com

Reposted by Brian Weatherson

Yes we are! Since our rebrand in 2024 @openlibhums.org is working with the brilliant designer Carly Murphy Merridew in Brighton (where I live - our kids go to the same school!): www.keepingthewolvesatbay.co.uk
KTWAB
I'm lucky enough to keep the wolves at bay doing what I love. Design.
www.keepingthewolvesatbay.co.uk

Reposted by Brian Weatherson

New experimental paper on intuitions about whether people have obligations *to themselves*

From philosopher Laura Soter (@laurasoter.bsky.social) in JPSP

psycnet.apa.org/record/2027-...

I think they *did* consent. Not sure whether it’s best to use a different concept or to say that whether past consent plus the interests of other passengers suffices for what the airline does.

I'd say that in these cases, once consent ceases, the only obligation is to release the person as soon as reasonably possible.

Nicolai Knudsen argues that loosely structured groups, like bystanders at an accident, can be held accountable when they jointly have the capacities to sympathize, to act on that sympathy, and to feel self-reactive attitudes like guilt.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
Groups and Second-Person Competence
Some moral philosophers argue that we hold others and ourselves morally responsible for acting on second-personal reasons. This article connects this idea with the emerging literature on the moral res...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Reposted by Paul Franco

Shawn Tinghao Wang argues that angry blame is counterproductive not because it's inherently bad, but because it faces a tension. To achieve its protest function it must not the target as a peer, and this undermines its dialogue function.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
What Is Counterproductive About Angry Blame?
Theorists are divided concerning the productivity of angry blame. Some argue that it has tremendous instrumental values or serves crucial social functions. But some argue that it is counterproductive,...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Samuel Reis-Dennis argues that the problem with blaming someone for what you've also done isn't hypocrisy. It's that specific blaming emotions like righteous indignation and resentment become unfitting when you lack the requisite moral standing.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
Blame's Topography: Standing on Uneven Ground
Attempts to illuminate the nature of “blame” have shaped recent philosophical discussion of free will and moral responsibility. In this paper I show how, in at least one context, this search for a the...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Jonathan Brink Morgan argues that we know we're seeing things not by inferring from beliefs about our environment, but through a perfectly reliable non-inferential transition from visual experience to belief.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
Non-Inferential Knowledge of Perception
Those who take visual perception to be transparent face a puzzle: How does one know that she sees given that seeing is not itself an object of awareness? Most solutions to this puzzle are inferentiali...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Christopher Register argues the body has "depth": some objects are too microphysically specific to count as genuine body parts. This matters for brain-computer interfaces. The software is part of your body, but the implementing hardware isn't.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
The Depth of the Body
A person's body is extended in space, and parts of their body occupy spatial regions. In that way, the body has a dimension of breadth in space. Yet, there is another, less appreciated dimension of th...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Richard Healey and Angie Pepper argue that pet keeping involves illegitimate relations of power. Pets have moral complaints: our power disrespects their independence, thwarts their interests in self-determination & subjects them to risks of harm.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
Pets, Power, and Legitimacy
This article argues that the relations of social and political power that obtain between humans and pets are illegitimate. We begin by showing that pets, a largely neglected population in political ph...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

John Proios argues that in Philebus, Socrates uses the metaphysical structure of determinables and determinates to challenge hedonism. What makes pleasures different is also what makes them pleasures, so one pleasure being good doesn't entail all are.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
Identity and Difference in Kind: The Metaphysics of Pleasure at the Beginning of Plato’s Philebus
The beginning of Plato's Philebus contains a puzzling argument: Socrates says that pleasures are different, and that this somehow supports the contention that not all pleasures are good (contrary to w...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Devin Lane argues that when experts disagree about key political issues, citizens have no duty to vote. Since voting well requires justified beliefs and expert disagreement requires suspending judgment, voters can't discharge the duty to vote well.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
Expert Disagreement and the Duty to Vote
In this paper, I argue that widespread expert disagreement about sufficiently many issues central to a democratic decision-making procedure can nullify the duty to vote. I begin by drawing a distincti...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Sam Baron and colleagues argue that causation doesn't come in degrees. While we can measure necessity, sufficiency, or amounts of harm caused, there's no single "degree of causation" that does all the work we need.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
How much did each of the authors of this paper causally contribute to its writing?
Some philosophers argue that in order to accommodate a range of our practices we must suppose that causation is not an all or nothing matter: it comes in degrees. We argue for two key claims. First, w...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Ezra Rubenstein argues that conjunctions simply are their conjuncts: 'snow is white and grass is green' just is the propositions that snow is white, that grass is green. This explains why conjunction is unique, unrestricted, and innocent.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
Conjunction as Identity
How do conjunctions relate to their conjuncts? How, for example, does <Snow is white and grass is green> relate to the propositions <Snow is white> and <Grass is green>? This paper e...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Raimund Pils argues that scientific realism debates should focus on balancing believing truths against avoiding errors. Starting with a focus on explanatory power or empirical gain will either beg questions or lead to flawed reasoning.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
Navigating the Meta-Epistemology of the Scientific Realism Debate: In Defense of Truth
This article examines the meta-stance choice in the scientific realism debate. I propose that the epistemological aspect of this debate be reframed within an epistemological framework that views our c...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Katharina Stevens argues that argumentation theory wrongly assumes we should explore all potentially relevant topics. Standing norms against impertinence protect privacy and autonomy, and these values matter even during arguments.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
Standing Norms in Argumentation
Normative argumentation theory is a field dedicated to the normative study of argumentation in real-life contexts and to the development of norms meant to guide arguers in the attempt of arguing well....
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Chloé de Canson examines Colin Howson's claim that Bayesian conditionalisation solves the problem of induction and objects that justifying conditionalisation as an updating rule requires justifying priors but Bayesianism offers no such justification.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
Bayesianism and the Inferential Solution to Hume's Problem
I examine Howson’s alluring suggestion that Bayesianism, by supplying a logic of inductive inference—conditionalisation—solves the problem of induction. I draw on his historical heritage, especially H...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Angela Sun argues that consent must always be revocable. Even when someone intends their consent to be binding "no matter what," revocation dissolves the permission. This protects bodily integrity even when we're not in a "sound state of mind."

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
Can Consent Be Irrevocable?
This article argues that consent must be revocable. I present two arguments for this conclusion. On the argument from informed consent, irrevocable consent lacks validity because it cannot be sufficie...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

Robbie Kubala (@rkubala.bsky.social) argues that when we hold artists responsible for their work, we're responding to their aesthetic judgment, their capacity to be guided by aesthetic value, not their technical skill or moral attitudes.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/articl...
Aesthetic Reactive Attitudes and Artistic Responsibility
In addition to praising and criticizing works of art, we can and do hold artists responsible for their artistic productions. Building on a suggestion from Susan Wolf, this paper develops a Strawsonian...
journals.publishing.umich.edu

We just published 15 new papers at @philimprint.bsky.social. Here's a thread on what's just come out.

journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/
Philosophers' Imprint
journals.publishing.umich.edu

In my high school the biggest racial tension was between the "whites" and the people whose parents and grandparents had migrated from places like Palermo. It's all so silly.

Reposted by Brian Weatherson

New article:

Christopher Register “The Depth of the Body”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 47. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Reposted by Brian Weatherson

New article:

Chloé de Canson, “Bayesianism and the Inferential Solution to Hume's Problem”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 39. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

First Bluey, now shoeys. Australian culture really is taking over everything.
New article , together with Salvatore Barbaro, in Public Choice: On the prevalence of Condorcet's Paradox.

Analyzing 253 national elections, we show that Condorcet Paradoxes virtually never occur. This raises an important question: who is the Condorcet winner?

link.springer.com/article/10.1...

Fifteen new articles going up at @philimprint.bsky.social tomorrow morning.

I hope you're all as excited as a kid on Christmas Eve.
I mean, the Penn student newspaper isn't wrong, but www.instagram.com/p/DSH1X4EDwP...

There's a new master of the last Go Betweens album up on the streaming services that takes out some of the glitches on the previous releases. It sounds great now.

music.apple.com/us/album/fin...
Finding You by The Go-Betweens on Apple Music
Song · 2005 · Duration 4:02
music.apple.com

Reposted by Brian Weatherson

I'm interested in different methodologies in the humanities, so I wrote a review of Jonathan Kramnick's *Criticism and Truth: On Method in Literary Studies* for the British Journal of Aesthetics, which is now in an issue:

philpapers.org/archive/HANC...