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thebjps.bsky.social
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
@thebjps.bsky.social
5.5K followers 990 following 290 posts
Latest issue:
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/bjps/current

BJPS Review of Books:
https://www.thebsps.org/reviewofbooks/

BJPS Short Reads:
https://www.thebsps.org/short-reads/

Podcast:
https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/bjps
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · Nov 11
Welcome new followers! Some of the content we post will be behind a paywall (boo! hiss!)—but that wall is, like, two inches high. Join the BSPS for $20 ($4 for students) to get complete access to everything as well as the warm glow of supporting the society working for your discipline!
Journal subscriptions for The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science from the University of Chicago Press website.
Journal subscriptions for The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science from the University of Chicago Press website.
press.uchicago.edu
thebjps.bsky.social
New from the BJPS Review of Books

Fruitfulness: Science, Metaphor, and the Puzzle of Promise
– Chris Haufe

Reviewed by Samuel Schindler & Patrick Duerr

www.thebsps.org/reviewofbook...

#philsci #philsky
Chris Haufe, Fruitfulness | BJPS Review of Books
Samuel Schindler and Patrick Duerr review Fruitfulness, by Chris Haufe
www.thebsps.org
November 25, 2025 at 11:00 AM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
jeroenvanbouwel.bsky.social
The European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ENPOSS) invites submissions to its 15th Conference at the University of Helsinki, 26-28 August 2026. More info here: enposs.eu
European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ENPOSS)
enposs.eu
November 21, 2025 at 9:00 AM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
wiglet1981.bsky.social
any filmmakers on here interested in remaking Falling Down (1993) but instead of a traffic jam on a hot day the catalyst is trying to log in to editorial manager on literally any sort of day whatsoever?
November 23, 2025 at 12:53 PM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
thebjps.bsky.social
New on the BJPS Review of Books:

A Drive to Survive
– Kathryn Nave

Reviewed by Matteo Colombo

#philsci #philsky

www.thebsps.org/reviewofbook...
Kathryn Nave, A Drive to Survive | BJPS Review of Books
Matteo Colombo reviews A Drive to Survive, by Kathryn Nave
www.thebsps.org
November 18, 2025 at 11:09 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Free to read: Max Dresow & Alan Love, The Interdisciplinary Entanglement of Characterization and Explanation 👇
chicagojournals.bsky.social Chicago Journals @chicagojournals.bsky.social · 4d
To what degree are the concepts of characterization and explanation entangled? An Open Access article from The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science uses the Cambrian explosion as a case study to answer this question: https://ow.ly/LsZx50XrrRZ. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
November 22, 2025 at 1:22 PM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted

Do First-Class Constraints Generate Gauge Transformations? A Geometric Resolution
– Clara Bradley

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. In the Hamiltonian formalism, a gauge transformation is typically defined as a transformation generated by an arbitrary combination of first-class constraints. But gauge transformations are also understood as marking physical equivalence: they relate states or solutions that represent the same physical situation. Whether these two characterizations coincide has been a matter of debate. Pitts, for example, contends that first-class constraints can generate a 'bad physical change'. This article defends the standard view, arguing that it correctly identifies both states and solutions that are equivalent from the perspective of the geometric structure of the Hamiltonian formalism. In doing so, it clarifies the relationship between mathematical and interpretational perspectives on gauge transformations.
November 20, 2025 at 10:15 AM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
marcoalmada.com
A big day for alliterative philosophers of science!
thebjps.bsky.social British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 6d
Just accepted

Limiting Reduction and Modified Gravity
– Antonis Antoniou & Lorenzo Lorenzetti

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Modified Newtonian dynamics (MOND) is a framework of theories that adjust Newton's laws of gravity to explain effects such as galactic rotation anomalies, offering an alternative to dark matter. We examine the justification of MOND by assessing its relationship to established theories, in particular its connection to Newtonian gravitation. We argue that MOND fails a key condition for a theory's justification—'reduction-wise justification'—as it does not adequately reduce to Newtonian gravity in a fully non-arbitrary way. This case study provides crucial results for the debate on inter-theoretic reduction: MOND's failure as a case of reduction highlights limits to standard accounts of limiting reduction. We respond with a refined framework that introduces two additional criteria to better distinguish successful from pathological reductions, showing how analysing reduction-wise justification allows us to evaluate the validity of novel theories not yet empirically established.
November 19, 2025 at 10:17 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted

Limiting Reduction and Modified Gravity
– Antonis Antoniou & Lorenzo Lorenzetti

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Modified Newtonian dynamics (MOND) is a framework of theories that adjust Newton's laws of gravity to explain effects such as galactic rotation anomalies, offering an alternative to dark matter. We examine the justification of MOND by assessing its relationship to established theories, in particular its connection to Newtonian gravitation. We argue that MOND fails a key condition for a theory's justification—'reduction-wise justification'—as it does not adequately reduce to Newtonian gravity in a fully non-arbitrary way. This case study provides crucial results for the debate on inter-theoretic reduction: MOND's failure as a case of reduction highlights limits to standard accounts of limiting reduction. We respond with a refined framework that introduces two additional criteria to better distinguish successful from pathological reductions, showing how analysing reduction-wise justification allows us to evaluate the validity of novel theories not yet empirically established.
November 19, 2025 at 10:15 AM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
psadeicaucus.bsky.social
"...Nave’s A Drive to Survive has two main goals... to show that the free-energy principle cannot constitute an adequate theoretical foundation for understanding the nature and dynamics of living systems ..[and] that a bioenactivist approach fares better ... in affording such a foundation."
November 18, 2025 at 12:27 PM
thebjps.bsky.social
New on the BJPS Review of Books:

A Drive to Survive
– Kathryn Nave

Reviewed by Matteo Colombo

#philsci #philsky

www.thebsps.org/reviewofbook...
Kathryn Nave, A Drive to Survive | BJPS Review of Books
Matteo Colombo reviews A Drive to Survive, by Kathryn Nave
www.thebsps.org
November 18, 2025 at 11:09 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted

Localizing the Singular Structure of Spacetime
– Franciszek Cudek

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. I argue that the singular structure of spacetime is best conceptualized as an extrinsic, non-local, but localizable, property of spacetime regions (of any size), and that there is no unique, best definition of a singular region of spacetime. There is, however, a schema that any adequate definition instantiates. Moreover, the question of what kind of incomplete curves witness singular structure is intimately connected to the question of what kind of curves represent possible trajectories of observers in physically reasonable motion.
November 17, 2025 at 10:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
One of the best #philsci conferences in one of the best cities: the 2026 BSPS Annual Conference is taking place in Leeds 21–23 July.

Keynotes by Robin Hendry, Tarja Knuuttila & Eleanor Knox.

More info: www.thebsps.org/news/bsps-an...

#philsky
BSPS Annual Conference 2026
The BSPS Annual Conference takes place on 21–23 July 2026 at the University of Leeds
www.thebsps.org
November 12, 2025 at 2:53 PM
thebjps.bsky.social
New Letter to the Editors

Gijsbers on Jacobs on Gijsbers on Presentist Velocities…

#philsci #philsky
On Gijsbers, Presentist Velocities | BJPS Letters to the Editor
Correspondence from Caspar Jacobs, with a reply from Victor Gijsbers
www.thebsps.org
October 31, 2025 at 10:45 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Scepticism about Post Hoc Explainability and Idealized Models
– Aleks Knoks & Thomas Raleigh

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Deep neural networks and other AI systems engineered using advanced machine learning techniques can tackle a wide range of tasks with proficiency that seems to match and even surpass human ability. Yet they are also notoriously opaque and worries surrounding their opacity have given rise to the burgeoning field of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), with its large variety of explainability methods. This includes post hoc explainability methods that purport to explain opaque AI systems on the basis of their input–output behaviour alone, without looking into their inner workings. But many have expressed deep scepticism about post hoc explainability. We explore the two main objections that the sceptics have raised and argue that we shouldn’t be swayed by them. Using ideas from recent literature on scientific explanation, we draw a parallel between post hoc explainability methods and idealized models in science, and use the parallel in reply to the sceptics.
October 30, 2025 at 10:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Scientific Contributions and Scientific Authorship
– Mikkel Gerken

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci
ABSTRACT. As a non-consensually enlisted contributor to the article ‘What’s the Point of Authors?’, who has made virtually no contribution to it, I argue against its proposed re-conception of authorship. In particular, I argue that a core component of the account—namely, the conception of contributorship—is implausible, infeasible, undesirable, and, in far too many cases, unethical.
October 29, 2025 at 10:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Explanatory Understanding in the Metaphysics of Science
– Peter Tan

Abstract in alt text or read the paper here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. This article develops a novel account of metaphysics’ explanatory contributions to the philosophy of science. A recent objection alleges that explanations of features of science in metaphysical terms are nothing more than rephrases of their target explananda. That is, these explanations are alleged to fail with respect to what has recently been called ‘explanatory distance’. In response, I show that putative explanations of the scientific image in metaphysical terms often exemplify an explanatory strategy found elsewhere in science, which I call type–token explanations. If successful, these explanations would achieve appropriate explanatory distance. Additionally, because this mode of explanation coheres with a pre-existing explanatory strategy in science, my account implies that the metaphysics of science can generate understanding about its target phenomena in the same way that scientific explanations can provide scientific understanding of their target explananda
October 24, 2025 at 9:45 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Determinism and Asymmetry in General Relativity
– J B Manchak, Thomas Barrett, Hans Halvorson & James Weatherall

Abstract in alt text or read the paper here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. This article concerns the question of which collections of general relativistic spacetimes are deterministic relative to which definitions. We begin by considering a series of three definitions of increasing strength due to Belot. The strongest of these definitions is particularly interesting for spacetime theories because it involves an asymmetry condition called `rigidity' that has been studied previously in a different context by Geroch. We show how Belot's strongest definition is connected to a formal result emphasized by Weatherall. We then go on to explore other (stronger) asymmetry conditions that give rise to other (stronger) forms of determinism. We introduce a number of definitions of this type and clarify the relationships between them and the three considered by Belot. We show that there are collections of general relativistic spacetimes that satisfy much stronger forms of determinism than previously known. We also highlight a number of open questions.
October 23, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

How Do We Know If Animals Remember? Proximal Functions and the Distribution of Episodic Memory
– Arieh Schwartz & Alexandria Boyle

Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Which animals have episodic memory? One reason this is difficult to answer is that episodic memory could be expected to vary across species, making it hard to give a principled account of what ‘counts’ as an episodic memory system. In this article, we propose that the investigation of episodic memory in animals should be guided by an account of its proximal proper functions: its most basic selected effects. In short, an animal has episodic memory if it has a memory system with the proximal functions of episodic memory. While there are many accounts of episodic memory’s distal functions, little attention has been paid to its proximal functions. To remedy this, we develop a preliminary account of episodic memory’s proximal functions and use this to evaluate existing evidence about episodic memory in animals.
October 20, 2025 at 9:15 AM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
lsephilosophy.bsky.social
🚨We're hiring! 🚨

👉Open Position: Assistant Professor of #Philosophy with focus on #AI

🗓️ Application deadline: 3 November 2025

Apply via: jobs.lse.ac.uk/Vacancies/W/...

#PartOfLSE #LSEPhilosophy #Jobs
August 19, 2025 at 2:08 PM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
philsci.bsky.social
PSA is in the process of launching a subdivision focused on postdoctoral scholars! Help shape its mission and priorities—take our 5-minute survey here, All interested PSA members are welcome to join the conversation!
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October 16, 2025 at 4:31 PM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Entanglement Swapping for Entanglement Realists
– Jørn Kløvfjell Mjelva

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Delayed-choice entanglement swapping experiments have been argued to undermine realism about entanglement. One response has been to argue that the correlations displayed in delayed-choice entanglement swapping experiments have a different physical interpretation than the correlations in the non-delayed case. This strategy runs into problems when applied to cases of spacelike entanglement swapping, as it would appear to require one to either posit a privileged foliation of spacetime or otherwise accept that whether entanglement obtains is frame dependent. In this article, I present a realist-friendly account of entanglement swapping that circumvents this dilemma, in which entanglement is explicated via the notion of a common ground. The issue of frame dependence is resolved by adopting the past light-cone criterion for property attribution, and the correlations displayed in the spacelike entanglement swapping experiments are attributed to a joint common ground.
October 8, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Are you a phd student? Are you in the vicinity of one and want to help them with their bad life choices? Then this is for you! #philsci
philsci.bsky.social Philosophy of Science Association @philsci.bsky.social · Oct 6
✨Don't forget✨ PSA Office Hours are back! Join us this Thursday, October 9 at 12 PM EST with S. Andrew Schroeder. Sign up at the link below to save your spot!

www.philsci.org/psa_...
October 6, 2025 at 7:57 PM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
alisabokulich.bsky.social
#Postdoc at U. of Vienna in philosophy of science, with focus on scientific modeling, interdisciplinarity &/or philosophy of engineering, w/ Prof. Tarja Knuuttila. English & German language proficiency required.
Deadline: Oct 9th
#philsci

jobs.univie.ac.at/job/Universi...
University Assistant postdoctoral, in the research area of Philosophy of Science
University Assistant postdoctoral, in the research area of Philosophy of Science
jobs.univie.ac.at
October 1, 2025 at 1:04 PM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Algorithmic Randomness and Probabilistic Laws
– Jeffrey Barrett & Eddy Keming Chen

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. We apply recent ideas about complexity and randomness to the philosophy of laws and chances, developing two ways to use algorithmic randomness to characterize probabilistic laws of nature: a generative chance law that employs a non-standard notion of chance, and a probabilistic constraining law that imposes relative frequency and randomness constraints that every physically possible world must satisfy. This removes an obstacle to a unified governing account of non-Humean laws, whereby laws govern by constraining physical possibilities; it also offers independently motivated solutions to problems for the Humean best-system account. On either approach, probabilistic laws are tied more tightly to corresponding sets of possible worlds: some histories permitted by traditional probabilistic laws are now ruled out as physically impossible. Consequently, the framework avoids one variety of empirical underdetermination while bringing to light others that are typically overlooked.
October 1, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Kinematical Equivalence and Cosmic Conspiracies
– Caspar Jacobs & Eleanor March

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Discussions of theoretical equivalence typically only concern a theory's dynamically possible models. Recently, however, March has shown that a theory's kinematically possible models are also relevant to questions of theoretical equivalence. We apply March's notion of kinematic equivalence to the difference between reduced and sophisticated theories introduced by Dewar. Although Dewar claims that these are equivalent, Jacobs has argued that only sophisticated theories can explain what are otherwise `cosmic conspiracies'. We show that this is a consequence of the kinematical inequivalence of reduced and sophisticated theories. Furthermore, we use Caulton's `downwards Hume's dictum' to show that kinematically inequivalent theories are also ontologically inequivalent.
September 29, 2025 at 9:15 AM