will read it with great interest. @nebahattanriverdi.bsky.social and I have an unpublished piece on exactly the same topic. would be great to exchange views at some point.

END> (I have some thoughts about reducing the CHP's decision not to go to Imrali to party ideology, but that is for another thread.)

And lastly, as long as Demirtas (and other political prisoners) remain in prison and a rights-based approach is lacking in broad terms (incl. the repression against the CHP), I don't know if the entire DEM's voter base is thrilled with the process.

Secondly, today there are more reasons for the secularist nationalist constituency to fear that DEM will contribute to authoritarian consolidation.

For DEM, too, the disadvantages are manifold. Firstly, the party, intentionally or unintentionally, reduced the Kurdish issue to a large extent to the centrality of Ocalan.

Not a favourable image for the regime because the pressure to settle on a solution in Syria concerning the SDF is now higher. It is not a good image bec. the regime actors' stated desire to expand a "domestic front" continues to face challenges.

Thirdly, the fact that other parties, including the main opposition party CHP, the Yeni Yol Group (consisting of DEVA, Saadet and Gelecek), and, interestingly, also Huda-Par, chose not to join the delegation is neither good optics for the regime nor for DEM.

So the three parties that have a member in the parliamentary delegation tasked with a visit to Imrali, i.e., AKP, MHP, and DEM, have already been operating on the basis that Ocalan is the central actor leading this process representing the PKK and the political components of the Kurdish movement.

Second, the regime and the DEM Party have already been in talks with Ocalan. Regime actors, first and foremost, are in touch with him through the National Intelligence Service (MIT, led by a prominent AKP member) and DEM, via the so-called Imrali Committee.

What are the government's priorities?

As I see it:

1. Secure DEM support for Constitutional changes.
2. Secure al Sharaa's rule in Syria.
3. Be able to declare victory to a domestic audience.