Sinem Adar
sinemadar.bsky.social
Sinem Adar
@sinemadar.bsky.social
Associate (CATS/SWPBerlin & CATS Network), Co-Head of the Autocratisation Thematic Group @SWP. Views personal. Writes in EN/TR
Pinned
I find the argument that the Imrali visit has given Ocalan political legitimacy to be misleading for three reasons. First, the regime's intent to confer the PKK's founder legitimacy was already put on the table when Bahceli called Ocalan to declare the PKK's dissolution at the Turkish parliament.
Reposted by Sinem Adar
I am probably naive, but it reads like there is logic behind the NSD document. It might not be a coherent and well-thought-out one. Yet, it is simple and accessible: i) the US has the privilege to use force (of different sorts) to protect its interests,
December 5, 2025 at 3:59 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
DAANES prohibits public gatherings throughout the northeast tomorrow and on Dec 8 (year anniversary of the fall of the regime), citing security concerns
December 6, 2025 at 9:36 AM
"I can tell you, being a user
of the system, that President Erdoğan is doing a very good job of managing a very difficult situation. And
our belief, the US belief, is he's not interested in extending the Ottoman Empire. Taking care of Istanbul
and Ankara is enough."
December 6, 2025 at 8:46 AM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
The thing that gets me is how they expect tribute from allies as a matter of right, in return for...???? Nothing.
If you run a mafia protection racket then you actually have to offer protection from the other rival mafia racketeers. Otherwise your entire protection racket model collapses.
December 5, 2025 at 4:59 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
Thread in relation to the new US National Security Strategy. 👇
Basically European allies are subordinate to Trumpian interests and should become far-right racist societies that pay tribute to the US in return for very, very vague and noncommittal mutterings about security (not promises).
I am probably naive, but it reads like there is logic behind the NSD document. It might not be a coherent and well-thought-out one. Yet, it is simple and accessible: i) the US has the privilege to use force (of different sorts) to protect its interests,
December 5, 2025 at 4:52 PM
I don‘t see the document as a declaration of intent to retreat as much as to redefine priorities, challenges and instruments to tackle these so that the US remains on top of the pyramid. The section on Europe is revealing in this respect.
That's not really consistent with what the document actually outlines in terms of structure though - which is the US retreating to the western hemisphere. I'd say the vision of the document is deliberately abandon US superiority in favor of a fortress white supremacism approach.
December 5, 2025 at 4:54 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
Very interesting take by @sinemadar.bsky.social ! The new US NSS miscalculation, however, to me lies in the implied retreat from Europe. It would mean that the US no longer is a European/Eurasian power & strategically much diminished as a consequence. A move to assure the loss of global superiority.
For me, the document is an official acknowledgement of the Trump administration's revolutionary mindset to remake the international system so that the US maintains its superiority.
December 5, 2025 at 4:30 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
Great short thread on the National Security Strategy.
I am probably naive, but it reads like there is logic behind the NSD document. It might not be a coherent and well-thought-out one. Yet, it is simple and accessible: i) the US has the privilege to use force (of different sorts) to protect its interests,
December 5, 2025 at 4:10 PM
I am probably naive, but it reads like there is logic behind the NSD document. It might not be a coherent and well-thought-out one. Yet, it is simple and accessible: i) the US has the privilege to use force (of different sorts) to protect its interests,
December 5, 2025 at 3:59 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
Lurking underneath the differences btw Ankara&Ocalan regarding the scope and extent of disarmament are also the issues such as i) control of resources in Syria (and the SDF's withdrawal from Arab-majority areas), and ii) control of the border between TR and the Autonomous Administration.
December 5, 2025 at 8:35 AM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
This may surprise some, but for Yeğen, even the Kurdish movement in Turkey (admittedly a vague term) is not fully prepared for this new Kurdish question, as evidenced by the ambiguity of the concept of democratic integration.
December 5, 2025 at 10:38 AM
Lurking underneath the differences btw Ankara&Ocalan regarding the scope and extent of disarmament are also the issues such as i) control of resources in Syria (and the SDF's withdrawal from Arab-majority areas), and ii) control of the border between TR and the Autonomous Administration.
December 5, 2025 at 8:35 AM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
This week's issue covers the re-closing of the Deir Hafir and Tabqah crossings, comments to the media on talks from PYD and Govt officials, al-Houl's Iraqi pop continues to drop, 1 year anniverary demos, latest in Coalition + gov't relations

akmckeever.substack.com/p/this-week-...
This Week in Northern Syria [46.2025]
November 26 - December 2: Gov't/SDF crossings closed again, integration talks remain frozen, Iraq repatriates 800+ from al-Houl, and more...
akmckeever.substack.com
December 4, 2025 at 2:46 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
Some great stuff from this year's @foreignpolicy.com Holiday Gift guide foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/26/h...
November 26, 2025 at 8:27 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
Both might be possible at the same time: The distance btw the CHP and DEM elites will increase, while the CHP's efforts to save what is left of competitive elections (in Ozel's words, "to establish the democracy front") might bring the two parties' respective electorate close to one another.
It is still too early to discuss the possible consequences of the CHP's decision not to participate in the Imrali visit. On the one hand, it might be a critical turning point in distancing the CHP and DEM from one another.
November 30, 2025 at 6:55 PM
Both might be possible at the same time: The distance btw the CHP and DEM elites will increase, while the CHP's efforts to save what is left of competitive elections (in Ozel's words, "to establish the democracy front") might bring the two parties' respective electorate close to one another.
It is still too early to discuss the possible consequences of the CHP's decision not to participate in the Imrali visit. On the one hand, it might be a critical turning point in distancing the CHP and DEM from one another.
November 30, 2025 at 6:55 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
Turkey recap is out with comments by @sinemadar.bsky.social and more:

1. Peace process hinges on secrecy and Syria
2. CHP prepares 4th congress in 2 years
3. Domestic and diplomatic wraps
4. Serbs dunk on sultan, lose anyway
5. Holiday. Celebrate. A 25% discount!
A Closed Encounter Of The First Kind
Issue #283
www.turkeyrecap.com
November 27, 2025 at 3:00 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
Thread!
I find the argument that the Imrali visit has given Ocalan political legitimacy to be misleading for three reasons. First, the regime's intent to confer the PKK's founder legitimacy was already put on the table when Bahceli called Ocalan to declare the PKK's dissolution at the Turkish parliament.
November 26, 2025 at 4:06 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
I wanted to write about this, but Sinem has said it all (and said it well, too).

The Imrali affair is now over, and that's a good thing, because it was exhausting (a lot of noise for what was ultimately a very symbolic meeting...).
I find the argument that the Imrali visit has given Ocalan political legitimacy to be misleading for three reasons. First, the regime's intent to confer the PKK's founder legitimacy was already put on the table when Bahceli called Ocalan to declare the PKK's dissolution at the Turkish parliament.
November 26, 2025 at 1:31 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
Really interesting conversation!

Can't wait to read the book!
November 26, 2025 at 12:48 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
I find the argument that the Imrali visit has given Ocalan political legitimacy to be misleading for three reasons. First, the regime's intent to confer the PKK's founder legitimacy was already put on the table when Bahceli called Ocalan to declare the PKK's dissolution at the Turkish parliament.
November 26, 2025 at 7:53 AM
I find the argument that the Imrali visit has given Ocalan political legitimacy to be misleading for three reasons. First, the regime's intent to confer the PKK's founder legitimacy was already put on the table when Bahceli called Ocalan to declare the PKK's dissolution at the Turkish parliament.
November 26, 2025 at 7:53 AM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
First sign reads "We have been, we are, we will be"
international day against violence against women in istanbul
November 25, 2025 at 7:21 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
What are the government's priorities?

As I see it:

1. Secure DEM support for Constitutional changes.
2. Secure al Sharaa's rule in Syria.
3. Be able to declare victory to a domestic audience.
November 25, 2025 at 2:46 PM
Reposted by Sinem Adar
Mazloum Abdi's emphasis (in his most recent interview with Mezopotamya) on the need for him to visit Ocalan should, IMO, also be considered against this background.
At the end of the day, for Ankara, the whole process has been, since from the beginning, about the PKK and its affiliates laying down arms. I do not see much disagreement among regime actors on this broad point. Remember Bahceli calling Ocalan two months ago to make a call to the SDF.
From this point onwards, as the Imrali visit is also realized, I believe the fate of the rapprochement process with Ocalan is entirely dependent on what will happen with the SDF in Syria.
November 25, 2025 at 6:36 AM