Nils Redeker
@nilsredeker.bsky.social
Acting Co-Director of Jacques Delors Centre at the Hertie School Berlin| think-tanking on European economic policy | wwww.delorscentre.eu | www.nilsredeker.net
Great rundown by @martinsandbu.ft.com on the complex roots of Germany’s economic malaise - plus a very welcome shout-out to our proposal with @sandertordoir.bsky.social and @lucasguttenberg.bsky.social for coordinated Buy European EV clauses as part of the fix.
on.ft.com/4plaPvt
on.ft.com/4plaPvt
November 20, 2025 at 7:40 PM
Great rundown by @martinsandbu.ft.com on the complex roots of Germany’s economic malaise - plus a very welcome shout-out to our proposal with @sandertordoir.bsky.social and @lucasguttenberg.bsky.social for coordinated Buy European EV clauses as part of the fix.
on.ft.com/4plaPvt
on.ft.com/4plaPvt
And a European eco-bonus could become a springboard for negotiating reciprocal access to EV subsidies with allies.
80% of EU car exports go to a handful of advanced economies like Japan, South Korea, Norway, and others.
80% of EU car exports go to a handful of advanced economies like Japan, South Korea, Norway, and others.
October 23, 2025 at 8:04 AM
And a European eco-bonus could become a springboard for negotiating reciprocal access to EV subsidies with allies.
80% of EU car exports go to a handful of advanced economies like Japan, South Korea, Norway, and others.
80% of EU car exports go to a handful of advanced economies like Japan, South Korea, Norway, and others.
And home demand isn’t helping either.
EU car sales collapsed during the pandemic - and never really bounced back.
In 2024, registrations were still 20% below pre-crisis levels, with even deeper slumps in key markets like Germany.
EU car sales collapsed during the pandemic - and never really bounced back.
In 2024, registrations were still 20% below pre-crisis levels, with even deeper slumps in key markets like Germany.
October 23, 2025 at 8:04 AM
And home demand isn’t helping either.
EU car sales collapsed during the pandemic - and never really bounced back.
In 2024, registrations were still 20% below pre-crisis levels, with even deeper slumps in key markets like Germany.
EU car sales collapsed during the pandemic - and never really bounced back.
In 2024, registrations were still 20% below pre-crisis levels, with even deeper slumps in key markets like Germany.
Things don’t look better across the Atlantic.
For years, exports to the US helped offset Europe’s losses in China. Car exports to America nearly doubled between 2019 and 2024.
Now, Trump’s 15% tariffs and EV subsidy cuts are turning that lifeline into another pain point for Europe’s carmakers.
For years, exports to the US helped offset Europe’s losses in China. Car exports to America nearly doubled between 2019 and 2024.
Now, Trump’s 15% tariffs and EV subsidy cuts are turning that lifeline into another pain point for Europe’s carmakers.
October 23, 2025 at 8:04 AM
Things don’t look better across the Atlantic.
For years, exports to the US helped offset Europe’s losses in China. Car exports to America nearly doubled between 2019 and 2024.
Now, Trump’s 15% tariffs and EV subsidy cuts are turning that lifeline into another pain point for Europe’s carmakers.
For years, exports to the US helped offset Europe’s losses in China. Car exports to America nearly doubled between 2019 and 2024.
Now, Trump’s 15% tariffs and EV subsidy cuts are turning that lifeline into another pain point for Europe’s carmakers.
This breathtaking rise has drastic consequences for EU producers.
EU car exports to China are down 28% since 2021. European manufacturers are losing ground in third markets like the UK.
And at home, they face growing competition - only partly cushioned by last year’s anti-subsidy tariffs.
EU car exports to China are down 28% since 2021. European manufacturers are losing ground in third markets like the UK.
And at home, they face growing competition - only partly cushioned by last year’s anti-subsidy tariffs.
October 23, 2025 at 8:04 AM
This breathtaking rise has drastic consequences for EU producers.
EU car exports to China are down 28% since 2021. European manufacturers are losing ground in third markets like the UK.
And at home, they face growing competition - only partly cushioned by last year’s anti-subsidy tariffs.
EU car exports to China are down 28% since 2021. European manufacturers are losing ground in third markets like the UK.
And at home, they face growing competition - only partly cushioned by last year’s anti-subsidy tariffs.
So what’s actually going wrong? The industry is facing a perfect storm.
China is hammering the sector powered by massive state support.
In 2020, China wasn’t a net car exporter. Today, it’s the world’s largest - pumping out 8 million cars a year, almost four times Germany’s pre-pandemic peak.
China is hammering the sector powered by massive state support.
In 2020, China wasn’t a net car exporter. Today, it’s the world’s largest - pumping out 8 million cars a year, almost four times Germany’s pre-pandemic peak.
October 23, 2025 at 8:04 AM
So what’s actually going wrong? The industry is facing a perfect storm.
China is hammering the sector powered by massive state support.
In 2020, China wasn’t a net car exporter. Today, it’s the world’s largest - pumping out 8 million cars a year, almost four times Germany’s pre-pandemic peak.
China is hammering the sector powered by massive state support.
In 2020, China wasn’t a net car exporter. Today, it’s the world’s largest - pumping out 8 million cars a year, almost four times Germany’s pre-pandemic peak.
For context: EU car industry still carries enormous economic and political weight
It employs 13.6 million people, drives 32% of all private R&D spending - and four of the ten sectors with the fastest productivity growth lately were in automotive and transport.
It employs 13.6 million people, drives 32% of all private R&D spending - and four of the ten sectors with the fastest productivity growth lately were in automotive and transport.
October 23, 2025 at 8:04 AM
For context: EU car industry still carries enormous economic and political weight
It employs 13.6 million people, drives 32% of all private R&D spending - and four of the ten sectors with the fastest productivity growth lately were in automotive and transport.
It employs 13.6 million people, drives 32% of all private R&D spending - and four of the ten sectors with the fastest productivity growth lately were in automotive and transport.
Stunning chart from a great paper by @joseph-s-shapiro.bsky.social: the IRA’s “leasing loophole” - which let foreign-made EVs qualify for tax credits - sent US leasing numbers soaring.
EU exporters were likely among the main winners - and will be among the first to feel the hit as the IRA unravels.
EU exporters were likely among the main winners - and will be among the first to feel the hit as the IRA unravels.
August 6, 2025 at 9:04 AM
Stunning chart from a great paper by @joseph-s-shapiro.bsky.social: the IRA’s “leasing loophole” - which let foreign-made EVs qualify for tax credits - sent US leasing numbers soaring.
EU exporters were likely among the main winners - and will be among the first to feel the hit as the IRA unravels.
EU exporters were likely among the main winners - and will be among the first to feel the hit as the IRA unravels.
Finally: none of this will fly without a bigger budget.
The debate around the proposal’s actual size has been confused - and unpacking the numbers of a seven-year framework is never easy.
But whichever way you slice it, the proposed increase in actual spending power remains miniscule.
The debate around the proposal’s actual size has been confused - and unpacking the numbers of a seven-year framework is never easy.
But whichever way you slice it, the proposed increase in actual spending power remains miniscule.
August 1, 2025 at 9:08 AM
Finally: none of this will fly without a bigger budget.
The debate around the proposal’s actual size has been confused - and unpacking the numbers of a seven-year framework is never easy.
But whichever way you slice it, the proposed increase in actual spending power remains miniscule.
The debate around the proposal’s actual size has been confused - and unpacking the numbers of a seven-year framework is never easy.
But whichever way you slice it, the proposed increase in actual spending power remains miniscule.
At the same time, direct EU-level spending on innovation, infrastructure, defence, and industrial policy would rise from 18% to 30%.
It’s a much-needed shift - and resisting the well-oiled interest group machinery that defends traditional spending patterns will be a key yardstick for success.
It’s a much-needed shift - and resisting the well-oiled interest group machinery that defends traditional spending patterns will be a key yardstick for success.
August 1, 2025 at 9:08 AM
At the same time, direct EU-level spending on innovation, infrastructure, defence, and industrial policy would rise from 18% to 30%.
It’s a much-needed shift - and resisting the well-oiled interest group machinery that defends traditional spending patterns will be a key yardstick for success.
It’s a much-needed shift - and resisting the well-oiled interest group machinery that defends traditional spending patterns will be a key yardstick for success.
First: negotiatiors should fiercely defend the relative shift towards more EU-level spending on shared priorities.
The proposal cuts the budget share spent on old staples like cohesion and regional policy from for 62% to 44%.
The proposal cuts the budget share spent on old staples like cohesion and regional policy from for 62% to 44%.
August 1, 2025 at 9:08 AM
First: negotiatiors should fiercely defend the relative shift towards more EU-level spending on shared priorities.
The proposal cuts the budget share spent on old staples like cohesion and regional policy from for 62% to 44%.
The proposal cuts the budget share spent on old staples like cohesion and regional policy from for 62% to 44%.
Und das ist eben gerade der Bereich des EU-Haushalts, aus dem traditionell besonders viele Mittel nach Deutschland fließen.
Kein anderes Mitgliedsland profitiert beispielsweise so sehr wie Deutschland von Horizon Europe Projekten.
Kein anderes Mitgliedsland profitiert beispielsweise so sehr wie Deutschland von Horizon Europe Projekten.
July 17, 2025 at 12:05 PM
Und das ist eben gerade der Bereich des EU-Haushalts, aus dem traditionell besonders viele Mittel nach Deutschland fließen.
Kein anderes Mitgliedsland profitiert beispielsweise so sehr wie Deutschland von Horizon Europe Projekten.
Kein anderes Mitgliedsland profitiert beispielsweise so sehr wie Deutschland von Horizon Europe Projekten.
Viel wichtiger aus deutscher Perspektive ist aber, wo dieser Anstieg stattfinden soll - nämlich vor allem im neuen Europäischen Wettbewerfonds.
De facto heißt das die Kommission schlägt vor mehr für gemeinsame europäische Industriepolitik und für Forschung und Entwicklung auszugeben.
De facto heißt das die Kommission schlägt vor mehr für gemeinsame europäische Industriepolitik und für Forschung und Entwicklung auszugeben.
July 17, 2025 at 12:05 PM
Viel wichtiger aus deutscher Perspektive ist aber, wo dieser Anstieg stattfinden soll - nämlich vor allem im neuen Europäischen Wettbewerfonds.
De facto heißt das die Kommission schlägt vor mehr für gemeinsame europäische Industriepolitik und für Forschung und Entwicklung auszugeben.
De facto heißt das die Kommission schlägt vor mehr für gemeinsame europäische Industriepolitik und für Forschung und Entwicklung auszugeben.
Die Bundesregierung sagt, Sie könne den Kommissions-Vorschlag zum neuen EU-Haushalt nicht akzeptieren, weil ein "umfassender Aufwuchs" in Zeiten der Konsolidierung nationaler Haushalte nicht vermittelbar sei.
Ich halte das aus ein paar Gründen für keine kluge deutsche Position:
Ich halte das aus ein paar Gründen für keine kluge deutsche Position:
July 17, 2025 at 12:05 PM
Die Bundesregierung sagt, Sie könne den Kommissions-Vorschlag zum neuen EU-Haushalt nicht akzeptieren, weil ein "umfassender Aufwuchs" in Zeiten der Konsolidierung nationaler Haushalte nicht vermittelbar sei.
Ich halte das aus ein paar Gründen für keine kluge deutsche Position:
Ich halte das aus ein paar Gründen für keine kluge deutsche Position:
Second - and this is the real headline - the proposal reshuffles spending priorities.
Agriculture and cohesion take moderate relative cuts, while funding for joint investments in competitiveness, decarbonisation, and defence gets a major boost.
Agriculture and cohesion take moderate relative cuts, while funding for joint investments in competitiveness, decarbonisation, and defence gets a major boost.
July 16, 2025 at 7:31 PM
Second - and this is the real headline - the proposal reshuffles spending priorities.
Agriculture and cohesion take moderate relative cuts, while funding for joint investments in competitiveness, decarbonisation, and defence gets a major boost.
Agriculture and cohesion take moderate relative cuts, while funding for joint investments in competitiveness, decarbonisation, and defence gets a major boost.
Finally, on defence, Poland’s position remains a bit fuzzy.
It frames defence as a top new priority - and one where others, including the EU level, should step up and spend more.
It frames defence as a top new priority - and one where others, including the EU level, should step up and spend more.
July 2, 2025 at 10:04 AM
Finally, on defence, Poland’s position remains a bit fuzzy.
It frames defence as a top new priority - and one where others, including the EU level, should step up and spend more.
It frames defence as a top new priority - and one where others, including the EU level, should step up and spend more.
And as for the proposed Competitiveness Fund - the Commission’s big idea to channel money more effectively into shared EU investment priorities - Poland’s main concern seems to be that it might not get a big enough slice of the pie.
July 2, 2025 at 10:04 AM
And as for the proposed Competitiveness Fund - the Commission’s big idea to channel money more effectively into shared EU investment priorities - Poland’s main concern seems to be that it might not get a big enough slice of the pie.
But that cautious support only extends to cohesion funds.
When it comes to the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, Poland clearly wants it left under the traditional CAP structure - and largely untouched.
When it comes to the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, Poland clearly wants it left under the traditional CAP structure - and largely untouched.
July 2, 2025 at 10:04 AM
But that cautious support only extends to cohesion funds.
When it comes to the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, Poland clearly wants it left under the traditional CAP structure - and largely untouched.
When it comes to the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, Poland clearly wants it left under the traditional CAP structure - and largely untouched.
Second ask - and no shocker - Poland wants cohesion and farm funding to keep their current share of the pie (or even grow).
No surprise there, but it’s a demand that will throw serious sand in the gears of any push to modernise EU spending.
No surprise there, but it’s a demand that will throw serious sand in the gears of any push to modernise EU spending.
July 2, 2025 at 10:04 AM
Second ask - and no shocker - Poland wants cohesion and farm funding to keep their current share of the pie (or even grow).
No surprise there, but it’s a demand that will throw serious sand in the gears of any push to modernise EU spending.
No surprise there, but it’s a demand that will throw serious sand in the gears of any push to modernise EU spending.
The problem is that countries like FR and DE are on the record for not wanting a bigger budget.
And Poland’s conditions for new EU taxes - not regressive, real fresh money - sound fair, but will make it hard to find enough candidates to bring in serious additional cash.
And Poland’s conditions for new EU taxes - not regressive, real fresh money - sound fair, but will make it hard to find enough candidates to bring in serious additional cash.
July 2, 2025 at 10:04 AM
The problem is that countries like FR and DE are on the record for not wanting a bigger budget.
And Poland’s conditions for new EU taxes - not regressive, real fresh money - sound fair, but will make it hard to find enough candidates to bring in serious additional cash.
And Poland’s conditions for new EU taxes - not regressive, real fresh money - sound fair, but will make it hard to find enough candidates to bring in serious additional cash.
First up: Poland wants a bigger EU budget.
Repaying the NextGenEU debt shouldn’t come at the expense of existing EU programmes. Instead, the money should come from new EU level taxes or higher national contributions - and Warsaw is even open to discussing fresh debt.
Repaying the NextGenEU debt shouldn’t come at the expense of existing EU programmes. Instead, the money should come from new EU level taxes or higher national contributions - and Warsaw is even open to discussing fresh debt.
July 2, 2025 at 10:04 AM
First up: Poland wants a bigger EU budget.
Repaying the NextGenEU debt shouldn’t come at the expense of existing EU programmes. Instead, the money should come from new EU level taxes or higher national contributions - and Warsaw is even open to discussing fresh debt.
Repaying the NextGenEU debt shouldn’t come at the expense of existing EU programmes. Instead, the money should come from new EU level taxes or higher national contributions - and Warsaw is even open to discussing fresh debt.
Europe needs a summer break!
June 27, 2025 at 7:46 AM
Europe needs a summer break!
According to BloombergNEF, 1 in 4 cars sold globally in 2025 is going to be electric - and Chinese EV sales alone are about to surpass *total* car sales in the US.
Hard to shake the feeling that the scale of this shift hasn’t really sunk in for EU policymakers.
Hard to shake the feeling that the scale of this shift hasn’t really sunk in for EU policymakers.
June 18, 2025 at 3:11 PM
According to BloombergNEF, 1 in 4 cars sold globally in 2025 is going to be electric - and Chinese EV sales alone are about to surpass *total* car sales in the US.
Hard to shake the feeling that the scale of this shift hasn’t really sunk in for EU policymakers.
Hard to shake the feeling that the scale of this shift hasn’t really sunk in for EU policymakers.
The German government just put forward a 75% tax write-off for corporate EV purchases.
Not a bad bit of industrial policy - company cars make up 60% of new registrations in the EU and are still trailing private households on electrification.
Not a bad bit of industrial policy - company cars make up 60% of new registrations in the EU and are still trailing private households on electrification.
June 4, 2025 at 9:43 AM
The German government just put forward a 75% tax write-off for corporate EV purchases.
Not a bad bit of industrial policy - company cars make up 60% of new registrations in the EU and are still trailing private households on electrification.
Not a bad bit of industrial policy - company cars make up 60% of new registrations in the EU and are still trailing private households on electrification.