Finding #4: No part of the brain responded to causal inferences across domains (i.e., illness AND mechanical inference), including in individually-localized language and logical reasoning networks. Check out the paper to learn more! 6/

Finding #3: Peak responses to illness inferences are adjacent to but separate from peak responses to mental state inferences (i.e., theory of mind reasoning), suggesting a neural mind/body distinction. 5/

Finding #2: We observed a parallel effect for mechanical causal inferences. A semantic network previously implicated in thinking about inanimate objects (i.e., places; anterior PPA), is sensitive to causal inferences about mechanical breakdown. 4/

Finding #1: A semantic network previously implicated in thinking about animate entities (e.g., people, animals; precuneus) is sensitive to causal inferences about illness. This effect is observed across individual-subject fROI and group analyses. 3/

Using causal knowledge about illness as a test case, we asked participants to read short stories that elicited causal inferences about illness or mechanical breakdown (=causal control). They also read stories containing illness-related language that weren't causally linked (=non-causal control). 2/

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