Finding #4: No part of the brain responded to causal inferences across domains (i.e., illness AND mechanical inference), including in individually-localized language and logical reasoning networks. Check out the paper to learn more! 6/

Finding #3: Peak responses to illness inferences are adjacent to but separate from peak responses to mental state inferences (i.e., theory of mind reasoning), suggesting a neural mind/body distinction. 5/

Finding #2: We observed a parallel effect for mechanical causal inferences. A semantic network previously implicated in thinking about inanimate objects (i.e., places; anterior PPA), is sensitive to causal inferences about mechanical breakdown. 4/

Finding #1: A semantic network previously implicated in thinking about animate entities (e.g., people, animals; precuneus) is sensitive to causal inferences about illness. This effect is observed across individual-subject fROI and group analyses. 3/

Using causal knowledge about illness as a test case, we asked participants to read short stories that elicited causal inferences about illness or mechanical breakdown (=causal control). They also read stories containing illness-related language that weren't causally linked (=non-causal control). 2/

New paper with Marina Bedny out in eLife (elifesciences.org/articles/101...). Main takeaway: Different kinds of causal knowledge are supported by different semantic brain networks - consistent with the "intuitive theories" framework from developmental psychology. 1/

Excited to share new work with @hleemasson.bsky.social , Ericka Wodka, Stewart Mostofsky and @lisik.bsky.social! We investigated how simultaneous vision and language signals are combined in the brain using naturalistic+controlled fMRI. Read the paper here: osf.io/b5p4n
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hi!!