My brother sent me this on instagram like a 10min ago lol

I'm not saying that I consider this to be the more likely explanation btw. But if our entire analysis is based on a single tweet and we assume that weapons are platforms because it is addressed to the DoW and not the DOE, then we must seriously consider this alternative as well.

It is a completely logical application of Clausewitz's ideas (and, well, the non-prescriptive, deductive, almost Averroes-que approach he uses), but everyone focuses only on the perceived absolute war fallacy.

Thanks kindly🙏
2/2

Yeah, same here. Personally, very sceptical towards the (cap)ability to prosecute left of launch effort. It actually isn’t seen as a main priority of COMAOs (in case of OWAs for sure), just a subset of AOs and it would depend on the priorities of the command in the designated MTW.

Addendum - I did not mean to say that things are good and sufficient. There is much to be done, and the current state of affairs is not sufficient. It is just a short (well, not that short) explanation of the approach and a thought.

The conflict phase only means that the deterrence failed (in which case both defensive (AD/ABM) and offensive means would be employed).
FIN
14/14

For this discussion, it is IMO important that a) the approach is based on denial and b) it is flexible and calibrated and conventional (and nuclear) deterrence are an integral part of it, and the execution of the mission begins already in the competitive phase.
13/14

All that combined with offensive counterstrikes led by air and ground based units, and passive measures to minimise the impact of SVNO.
12/14

Note that brigades and battalions must be capable of operating fully independently (being fully autonomous) for relatively short periods of time - it is doctrinally designed for a high degree of saturation for a relatively short period of time.
11/14

GBAD-BDE-HQ must be able to operate without support or replenishment for at least 5 days, and sustaining attached units during the same period, GBAD-BN-HQ must be capable of operating without support or replenishment for at least 3 days.
10/14

NATO IAMD is essentially focused on two tasks: defending military related infrastructure and protecting manoeuvring forces. The dispersion (and hardening) in the event of crises would significantly reduce Russia's ability to guarantee the destruction of targets.
9/14

That is why there is such an emphasis on strengthening IAMD. This was reflected in the adoption of new CTs in June this year (already exceeding the already strengthened targets for 2023 and 2024).
8/14

The goal would be to completely paralyse NATO's defence, disrupt command and control chain, and disrupt communications. In the second echelon, there is manned tactical and strategic aviation, airborne operations, and similar fun.
7/14

SVNO is another matter. A ***huge*** mass of drones would be used to saturate and suppress NATO's IAMD in the strategic theatre of operation in the first echelon, combines with a use of ballistic, cruise (and various hypersonic) missiles and other PGMs for killing.
6/14

The strategic depth of the European part of NATO is relatively large, and Russia's campaign in Ukraine has not proved very effective. SODCIT is also scalable and iterative in nature (it really depends on the scenario)
5/14

When discussing this type of threat, it is necessary to define it – SODCIT, which is the focus of the almost entire debate (how we would survive continuous all-azimuth (drone and missile) raids with a mass similar to or greater than that in UA), is not the primary concern.
4/14