Moreover, using panel data from the UK (@britishelectionstudy.com), I examine policy preferences of three voter types:

1️⃣Regular voters: they vote consistently
2️⃣Peripheral voters: they vote intermittently
3️⃣Perpetual non-voters: they almost never vote

They differ in their policy preferences. 8/10

Bias that disparities induce ultimately depends on turnout level. Biases are stronger when turnout is lower.

This is also why compulsory voting might make sense! 7/10

Nevertheless, when differences *do* emerge, they are not trivial.

Using Cohen's d, most significant differences (in black) can be considered small but meaningful. 6/10

But, here's the thing: Disparities are not the norm.

At the survey level, voters and non-voters usually hold similar policy views. Most differences are sporadic and do not reach statistical significance. 5/10

Do policy preferences of voters and non-voters differ in European democracies?

My new article in @ejprjournal.bsky.social finds: Yes, sometimes, but this is not the norm.

Let's break it down. 🧵 1/10

Proof that political scientists do leave the conference center. Granville Island, Vancouver - APSA 2025 🇨🇦🍁

I probably relate to this quote more than I should.

Schnitzel and great company (@rdassonneville.bsky.social @zeynsom.bsky.social )—can’t go wrong! Always such a pleasure to catch up with these two amazing mentors 🍽️🍾

While this shows that parties have limited leeway in shaping the preferences of their bases, it does not mean they have no influence.

Ideologically out-of-touch Labour partisans adjusted their positions to align more closely (i.e., ideological sorting).

Could the expected effects simply be lagged?

Nope! There is no evidence of a lagged effect either. Over the long run, neither a follow-the-party effect nor a backlash effect occurred, even though they perceived the Labour Party as having shifted to the left.

So, how did in- and out-partisans respond?

Comparing their LR self-placement before and after the leadership change, I found:

🔹Labour partisans did not follow the party.
🔹Conservative partisans did not backlash.

If anything, there was moderation among both groups.

I test these by examining the UK Labour Party’s sudden leftward shift under Jeremy Corbyn, using data from the British Election Study Internet Panel.

Key observations:
🔹Experts confirm Labour shifted significantly to the left.
🔹Citizens widely perceived this shift.

🚨 Does elite ideological polarization lead to mass ideological polarization?

My latest article in European Journal of Political Research provides **limited** evidence that it is the case.

Let's break it down. 🧵