James Cameron
@jjjcameron.bsky.social
Associate Prof of Modern North American History at the University of Oslo, Norway. Nuclear strategy and arms control.
I'm not a big fan of the Munich analogy, but this is real Munich stuff -- probably worse.
www.ft.com/content/f411...
www.ft.com/content/f411...
November 22, 2025 at 7:18 AM
I'm not a big fan of the Munich analogy, but this is real Munich stuff -- probably worse.
www.ft.com/content/f411...
www.ft.com/content/f411...
Sadly no. From CNN. Border Patrol chief Gregory Bovino leads Chicago immigration crackdown | CNN Politics share.google/MwZpwldP8AOs...
October 28, 2025 at 6:54 PM
Sadly no. From CNN. Border Patrol chief Gregory Bovino leads Chicago immigration crackdown | CNN Politics share.google/MwZpwldP8AOs...
Oslo is quite nice.
October 26, 2025 at 3:38 PM
Oslo is quite nice.
Where could the government get more money from? It really is a mystery. www.ft.com/content/0e92...
October 21, 2025 at 5:34 AM
Where could the government get more money from? It really is a mystery. www.ft.com/content/0e92...
Trading federal land for "compute." That doesn't sound sketchy at all. www.ft.com/content/0e92...
October 21, 2025 at 5:31 AM
Trading federal land for "compute." That doesn't sound sketchy at all. www.ft.com/content/0e92...
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991 is out today!
Huge congratulations to @jamesgrahamwilson.bsky.social and the rest of the team at the State Department's Office of the Historian. history.state.gov/historicaldo...
Huge congratulations to @jamesgrahamwilson.bsky.social and the rest of the team at the State Department's Office of the Historian. history.state.gov/historicaldo...
September 30, 2025 at 2:54 PM
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991 is out today!
Huge congratulations to @jamesgrahamwilson.bsky.social and the rest of the team at the State Department's Office of the Historian. history.state.gov/historicaldo...
Huge congratulations to @jamesgrahamwilson.bsky.social and the rest of the team at the State Department's Office of the Historian. history.state.gov/historicaldo...
Nice little paragraph in the UK SDR on strengthening "political, technical and policy" cooperation with France on nuclear deterrence.
June 2, 2025 at 6:01 PM
Nice little paragraph in the UK SDR on strengthening "political, technical and policy" cooperation with France on nuclear deterrence.
Thanks a lot to the @tnsr.org team for the fantastic job they did on the latest issue. It looks great. tnsr.org/latest-print...
April 30, 2025 at 3:30 PM
Thanks a lot to the @tnsr.org team for the fantastic job they did on the latest issue. It looks great. tnsr.org/latest-print...
3. The story shows how the superpowers not only didn't follow Schelling & Halperin's cooperative theory of arms control, but adapted their ideas to legitimate competitive arms control strategies. This further complicates our understanding of how classic arms control theory has influenced policy. END
April 22, 2025 at 5:04 PM
3. The story shows how the superpowers not only didn't follow Schelling & Halperin's cooperative theory of arms control, but adapted their ideas to legitimate competitive arms control strategies. This further complicates our understanding of how classic arms control theory has influenced policy. END
2. A deeper understanding of START I gives us a more profound appreciation of how late Cold War arms control laid the groundwork for the era of US military primacy. Many of arms control issues that continue to divide Washington & Moscow have their roots in US-Soviet talks more than 3 decades old.
April 22, 2025 at 5:00 PM
2. A deeper understanding of START I gives us a more profound appreciation of how late Cold War arms control laid the groundwork for the era of US military primacy. Many of arms control issues that continue to divide Washington & Moscow have their roots in US-Soviet talks more than 3 decades old.
1. Analysis of the competitive dynamic of late Cold War US-Soviet arms control casts further doubt on the image of the Reagan/Bush-Gorbachev relationship as a cooperative partnership focused on ending the arms race. The relationship remained highly competitive to the very end. 12/x
April 22, 2025 at 4:12 PM
1. Analysis of the competitive dynamic of late Cold War US-Soviet arms control casts further doubt on the image of the Reagan/Bush-Gorbachev relationship as a cooperative partnership focused on ending the arms race. The relationship remained highly competitive to the very end. 12/x
This came to nothing. By Dec 1991 the Soviet Union had ceased to exist & Gorbachev was out of office. US officials were concerned that he might not survive long enough to sign START I & were increasingly alarmed by the nuclear risks of a Soviet collapse.
So why should we care about this story? 11/x
So why should we care about this story? 11/x
April 22, 2025 at 3:42 PM
This came to nothing. By Dec 1991 the Soviet Union had ceased to exist & Gorbachev was out of office. US officials were concerned that he might not survive long enough to sign START I & were increasingly alarmed by the nuclear risks of a Soviet collapse.
So why should we care about this story? 11/x
So why should we care about this story? 11/x
Gorbachev used strategic stability to save face. It preserved the image of balanced reductions despite Soviet concessions. Soviet officials hoped to use the concept to address asymmetries in new talks. Gorbachev had ideas about US-Soviet cooperation based on a new version of strategic stability.10/x
April 22, 2025 at 2:53 PM
Gorbachev used strategic stability to save face. It preserved the image of balanced reductions despite Soviet concessions. Soviet officials hoped to use the concept to address asymmetries in new talks. Gorbachev had ideas about US-Soviet cooperation based on a new version of strategic stability.10/x
Given these circumstances, US use of strategic stability to describe the START I treaty's achievements is a no-brainer: Washington got most of what it wanted! Continued Soviet use of the term to characterize START I is harder to explain. 9/x
April 22, 2025 at 2:00 PM
Given these circumstances, US use of strategic stability to describe the START I treaty's achievements is a no-brainer: Washington got most of what it wanted! Continued Soviet use of the term to characterize START I is harder to explain. 9/x
So how did the US and USSR sign START I at the July 1991 Moscow Summit? To cut a (very long) story short, the USSR gave way on the majority of issues. In the article, I identify 5 key US-Soviet disagreements. The US "won" 3, got a US-tilted compromise on 1, and only gave way on 1. 8/x
April 22, 2025 at 12:54 PM
So how did the US and USSR sign START I at the July 1991 Moscow Summit? To cut a (very long) story short, the USSR gave way on the majority of issues. In the article, I identify 5 key US-Soviet disagreements. The US "won" 3, got a US-tilted compromise on 1, and only gave way on 1. 8/x
So both the US & USSR described their START objectives as strengthening strategic stability. But instead of forming the basis for cooperation as arms control theory contends, they selectively applied strategic stability to legitimize competing positions based on their preferred force structures. 7/x
April 22, 2025 at 12:39 PM
So both the US & USSR described their START objectives as strengthening strategic stability. But instead of forming the basis for cooperation as arms control theory contends, they selectively applied strategic stability to legitimize competing positions based on their preferred force structures. 7/x
The USSR also adopted strategic stability. But it criticized the US for undermining stability based on mutual vulnerability with its SDI missile defense project & first-strike offensive systems.
It argued its heavy ICBMs were no more destabilizing and shouldn't be singled out for deep cuts. 6/x
It argued its heavy ICBMs were no more destabilizing and shouldn't be singled out for deep cuts. 6/x
April 22, 2025 at 12:22 PM
The USSR also adopted strategic stability. But it criticized the US for undermining stability based on mutual vulnerability with its SDI missile defense project & first-strike offensive systems.
It argued its heavy ICBMs were no more destabilizing and shouldn't be singled out for deep cuts. 6/x
It argued its heavy ICBMs were no more destabilizing and shouldn't be singled out for deep cuts. 6/x
As well as emphasizing the stabilizing characteristics of new technologically advanced US systems, the Reagan admin attacked Soviet forces as destabilizing, particularly heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles. Soviet heavy ICBMs, the US argued, should be a key focus for START reductions. 5/x
April 22, 2025 at 12:11 PM
As well as emphasizing the stabilizing characteristics of new technologically advanced US systems, the Reagan admin attacked Soviet forces as destabilizing, particularly heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles. Soviet heavy ICBMs, the US argued, should be a key focus for START reductions. 5/x
Reagan even described the Strategic Defense Initiative as meant to achieve a "truly lasting stability" in his 1983 address on the new space-based missile defense project. Arms control theory generally sees missile defenses as destabilizing, because they undermine mutual vulnerability. 4/x
April 22, 2025 at 12:00 PM
Reagan even described the Strategic Defense Initiative as meant to achieve a "truly lasting stability" in his 1983 address on the new space-based missile defense project. Arms control theory generally sees missile defenses as destabilizing, because they undermine mutual vulnerability. 4/x
Under criticism of its nuclear policies, the Reagan administration adopted the language of strategic stability. However, its version emphasized the stabilizing characteristics of new US strategic systems (such as survivability), while downplaying their destabilizing first-strike capabilities. 3/x
April 22, 2025 at 11:49 AM
Under criticism of its nuclear policies, the Reagan administration adopted the language of strategic stability. However, its version emphasized the stabilizing characteristics of new US strategic systems (such as survivability), while downplaying their destabilizing first-strike capabilities. 3/x
In the early 60s, arms control theorists Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin argued that the superpowers should cooperate to preserve both side's ability to ride out a first strike and retaliate. The resulting secure second-strike forces would form the basis of strategic stability. 2/x
April 22, 2025 at 11:38 AM
In the early 60s, arms control theorists Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin argued that the superpowers should cooperate to preserve both side's ability to ride out a first strike and retaliate. The resulting secure second-strike forces would form the basis of strategic stability. 2/x
The partisan gap on NATO predates Trump. If anything, it looks like Trump increased the popularity of NATO among Democrats more than he decreased it among Republicans. www.pewresearch.org/2025/04/17/h...
April 18, 2025 at 3:13 PM
The partisan gap on NATO predates Trump. If anything, it looks like Trump increased the popularity of NATO among Democrats more than he decreased it among Republicans. www.pewresearch.org/2025/04/17/h...
Today's NYT on Rus nuclear escalation threat of fall 2022 more nuanced than past accounts:
1. 50% chance of nuke use *if Rus forces collapsed*.
2. Washington worried fast Ukr advance might trigger nuke use, but Ukr slowed down. No US deal to let Ru forces escape.
www.nytimes.com/interactive/...
1. 50% chance of nuke use *if Rus forces collapsed*.
2. Washington worried fast Ukr advance might trigger nuke use, but Ukr slowed down. No US deal to let Ru forces escape.
www.nytimes.com/interactive/...
March 30, 2025 at 4:42 PM
Today's NYT on Rus nuclear escalation threat of fall 2022 more nuanced than past accounts:
1. 50% chance of nuke use *if Rus forces collapsed*.
2. Washington worried fast Ukr advance might trigger nuke use, but Ukr slowed down. No US deal to let Ru forces escape.
www.nytimes.com/interactive/...
1. 50% chance of nuke use *if Rus forces collapsed*.
2. Washington worried fast Ukr advance might trigger nuke use, but Ukr slowed down. No US deal to let Ru forces escape.
www.nytimes.com/interactive/...
We don't know exactly how NATO nuclear release procedures work today, but this account of the Able Archer 83 exercise from an official SHAPE historian indicates how central SACEUR was to NATO nuclear decision-making in the 1980s. nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEB...
March 19, 2025 at 9:10 AM
We don't know exactly how NATO nuclear release procedures work today, but this account of the Able Archer 83 exercise from an official SHAPE historian indicates how central SACEUR was to NATO nuclear decision-making in the 1980s. nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEB...