Please read DRI and ICCL’s opening statement and submission here ➡️ www.iccl.ie/news/nationa...

Finally, watch @tjmcintyre.com recommend to the committee that, moving forward, the sections of the Bill that are not required under NIS2 should be dropped to allow for the straightforward transposition of NIS2 and then the State can consider what else is necessary. (15/15)

Here @tjmcintyre.com explains why it’s so problematic that the Bill is putting the NCSC - which is being given very broad powers - under the direct political control of the Minister. (14/15)

In short, they agreed. (13/15)

Senator Lynn Ruane asked attendees if they believed the powers provided under the Bill cross the line from cybersecurity measures into surveillance powers. (12/15)

Dept of Justice officials told the committee this Head 3 section refers to a function as opposed to a power. @tjmcintyre.com highlights that the powers under Head 7 (to block access and issue an internet death penalty) do not require a court order or independent oversight. (11/15)

Solicitor Sean McElligott earlier highlighted how Head 3(1)(d) suggests the NCSC could essentially 'unplug' anyone and do whatever they want, to whomever they want, whenever they want, without any regulatory supervision whatsoever. (10/15)

Watch @tjmcintyre.com explain why having no definition of 'national security' anywhere in Irish law means this could lead the NCSC to have a very open-ended power, left to the discretion of the Minister, to order the surveillance of the communications of everyone in the State. (9/15)

In that same clip, @tjmcintyre.com explains how the issues of Head 6, 7, 8 and 9 are compounded by Head 10 because of the power it gives to the NCSC to share data for (again) undefined “national security” reasons without clear limits or safeguards. (8/15)

He also explains how Head 9 would allow the NCSC to compel communications providers, such as WhatsApp and iMessage, to install surveillance devices on their networks to scoop up metadata of every user of the service on the basis of ‘national security’. (7/15)

In the same clip, @tjmcintyre.com explains how Head 8 would also give the NCSC powers to scoop up the metadata about private communications on public networks such as mobile phone, home broadband providers and even messages sent via social media - and store it for 18 months. (6/15)

Watch @tjmcintyre.com explain how Head 7 would give the NCSC very wide powers to block access to websites and how 8 would give it the unprecedented power to scan and store the entirety of the network traffic in public sector bodies, which could include the contents of politicians’ emails. (5/15)

Here @tjmcintyre.com explains why allowing the NCSC to scan in this way is so problematic. (4/15)

Watch @tjmcintyre.com tell the committee how Head 6 would allow the NCSC to scan any publicly accessible network or information system for vulnerabilities - without their knowledge or consent - including small businesses, NGOs, homes, or politicians’ offices. (3/15)

DRI and ICCL’s concerns relate to Heads 6-10 of the Bill. Notably, the NCSC is not an independent body as Head 3 explicitly provides that it is ‘under the authority of the Minister’, and there is no definition of “national security” in Irish law. This context is important for this thread. (2/15)

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You can help us by downloading our #KnowYourRights guide on the ECHR in Ireland ➡️ www.iccl.ie/your-rights/