WE SHALL OUTLAST THEM features interviews with activists & ambassadors; former prime ministers & former resistance fighters; Russians in exile & Russians who wage their country's struggle from Moscow.

Out with @wwnorton.com in summer 2026.

The book blends analysis with my reportage from a dozen countries: Armenia, Finland, Georgia, the Gulf Arab states, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Turkey, the UK and the US. I spent time in the capitals of international diplomacy: Geneva, Vienna, New York. /9

My book is neither about the war in Ukraine, nor about the domestic changes that have swept across Russia since 2022.

Rather, it tells the story of a more combative Russian statecraft and how it has manifested in the world—and it reflects on the consequences for global order /8

... veterans of South Africa’s anti-apartheid fight who still extol Russia as "anti-imperial"; Soviet refuseniks in Israel, divided over Russia's war; a Wagner Group whistleblower from Africa; Finnish border guards who watched Russia push migrants across in winter of 2023 & more /7

You’ll encounter Azat Adamyan, the pub owner displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh; Paula Slier, the (former) RT reporter; Tamar Jakeli, a Georgian LGBTQ activist; Alsu Kurmasheva, the Russian-American journalist imprisoned by Russia …/6

The book analyzes the agendas of Russia’s non-Western partners who've thrown it critical lifelines.

And it tells the stories of everyday people swept up in Russia's agenda. /5

It features the comedy of Russia's extravagant BRICS chairmanship and the drama of Prigozhin's mutiny.

It lets Russia’s agents speak: its diplomats, patriotic intellectuals, propagandists /4

This is a book about Russia’s foreign policy adaptation—with its improvisation (the shadow fleet), innovation (import of Iranian drone technology), radicalization (threats of nuclear escalation) and the occasional restraint (Russia abandoning Syria's Assad to his fall). /3

Putin’s massive strategic gamble—thrusting Russia into a war against Ukraine—generated a host of smaller culs de sac for Russia’s foreign policy, forcing it into contortions, sometimes even retreats.

But Russia also managed to turn adversity into opportunity. /2

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@nukestrat.bsky.social notes: if Trump wants to resume nuclear explosive testing, it wouldn't be possible for another 18 months bsky.app/profile/did:...

So, Putin might not move to order immediate tests - but we might see heightened activity at Novaya Zemlya for signalling at a minimum /END

It remains to be seen how Putin will react to Trump's latest.

Before announcing the Burevestnik & Poseidon tests, Putin had wanted Trump to commit to a 1-year extension of Russia & the US abiding by New START limits after February.
But the US has not given a formal response. /15

Just last month, Russia reiterated it would not conduct nuclear tests if the US, too, refrained from conducting them - but also warned that Novaya Zemlya was "in full readiness".
kommersant.ru/doc/7161533 /14

At the same time, it must be said that Russian reactions to alleged activity at the US Nevada site remained, by and large, measured.

See, for instance, the Russia MFA reaction in May 2024: mid.ru/ru/foreign_p... /13

As Russia more generally moved up the escalation ladder in 2023-24 in an effort to restore the coercive credibility of its nuclear threats - moving from rhetoric to actions - some hawks also called for nuclear tests in that context, for instance: globalaffairs.ru/articles/per... /12

-Oct 2023: "What we can do is act just as the US does." en.kremlin.ru/events/presi...

-March 2024: "If they conduct such tests, we will not necessarily do it, we should think whether we need it or not. However, I do not rule out that we can do the same." en.kremlin.ru/events/presi... /11

Importantly, Russia has always framed its CTBT move (and hints at possible testing) as being about "parity" and "balance" with the US.

The obsession with American precedent to justify Russia's own potential actions has laced Putin's remarks on the issue: /10

In Oct 2023, Putin suggested Russia might indeed withdraw ratification of the CTBT, as a reciprocal response to the absence of US ratification

Weeks later, a law was enacted to that effect

But Russia has since said it remains bound by rights & obligations under the CTBT /9