Gianluca Benigno
@gianlucabenigno.bsky.social
Professor of Economics at the University of Lausanne. Former Head of the International Studies Department at the NYFed and a tenured Professor at the LSE.
https://gianlucabenigno.substack.com/
https://sites.google.com/view/gianlucabenigno/home;
https://gianlucabenigno.substack.com/
https://sites.google.com/view/gianlucabenigno/home;
Understanding this monetary–fiscal nexus is key to grasping what “sustainability” really means
November 6, 2025 at 11:33 AM
Understanding this monetary–fiscal nexus is key to grasping what “sustainability” really means
What truly matters is the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy. When a government issues debt in its own currency, and the central bank stands behind it, the constraints it faces are not those of a household or a firm.
November 6, 2025 at 11:33 AM
What truly matters is the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy. When a government issues debt in its own currency, and the central bank stands behind it, the constraints it faces are not those of a household or a firm.
Hi, apologies for the delayed reply. Since June, perceptions of the labor market have shifted, and it now seems likely that we’ll see at least two rate cuts by the end of 2025, possibly three. The next SEP is out next week, so we’ll have a clearer view of the new median then.
September 12, 2025 at 4:42 PM
Hi, apologies for the delayed reply. Since June, perceptions of the labor market have shifted, and it now seems likely that we’ll see at least two rate cuts by the end of 2025, possibly three. The next SEP is out next week, so we’ll have a clearer view of the new median then.
Committee Dynamics:
Potential split: There may be a growing divide between the voting members (12 FOMC) and the full committee (19 participants) about the pace and direction of policy.
Future decisions, especially from September on, are likely to hinge on the inflation outlook.
Potential split: There may be a growing divide between the voting members (12 FOMC) and the full committee (19 participants) about the pace and direction of policy.
Future decisions, especially from September on, are likely to hinge on the inflation outlook.
June 18, 2025 at 6:30 PM
Committee Dynamics:
Potential split: There may be a growing divide between the voting members (12 FOMC) and the full committee (19 participants) about the pace and direction of policy.
Future decisions, especially from September on, are likely to hinge on the inflation outlook.
Potential split: There may be a growing divide between the voting members (12 FOMC) and the full committee (19 participants) about the pace and direction of policy.
Future decisions, especially from September on, are likely to hinge on the inflation outlook.
Stagflation risks noted:
End of 2025-GDP growth (2025 median) drops from 1.7% to 1.4% (central tendency narrows from 1.5–1.9% to 1.2–1.5%)
End of 2025-PCE inflation (2025 median) rises from 2.7% to 3.0% (central tendency shifts from 2.6–2.9% to 2.9–3.4%)
End of 2025-GDP growth (2025 median) drops from 1.7% to 1.4% (central tendency narrows from 1.5–1.9% to 1.2–1.5%)
End of 2025-PCE inflation (2025 median) rises from 2.7% to 3.0% (central tendency shifts from 2.6–2.9% to 2.9–3.4%)
June 18, 2025 at 6:30 PM
Stagflation risks noted:
End of 2025-GDP growth (2025 median) drops from 1.7% to 1.4% (central tendency narrows from 1.5–1.9% to 1.2–1.5%)
End of 2025-PCE inflation (2025 median) rises from 2.7% to 3.0% (central tendency shifts from 2.6–2.9% to 2.9–3.4%)
End of 2025-GDP growth (2025 median) drops from 1.7% to 1.4% (central tendency narrows from 1.5–1.9% to 1.2–1.5%)
End of 2025-PCE inflation (2025 median) rises from 2.7% to 3.0% (central tendency shifts from 2.6–2.9% to 2.9–3.4%)
Decline in interest rates would mitigate the cash-flow channel (associated with higher mortgage payments) and support aggregate demand, but overall, it is hard to see how all this would lead to inflation in a low-growth context with lack of fiscal support
May 20, 2025 at 8:36 AM
Decline in interest rates would mitigate the cash-flow channel (associated with higher mortgage payments) and support aggregate demand, but overall, it is hard to see how all this would lead to inflation in a low-growth context with lack of fiscal support
Thanks for your comment, I agree that there are structural factors in explaining pressures in the rental market, but what is striking about the UK and also Canada is how rent inflation started rising as interest rates increased and now has recently declined in Canada as they cut interest rates more.
May 20, 2025 at 8:31 AM
Thanks for your comment, I agree that there are structural factors in explaining pressures in the rental market, but what is striking about the UK and also Canada is how rent inflation started rising as interest rates increased and now has recently declined in Canada as they cut interest rates more.
From a monetary policy perspective, these factors suggest that more decisive easing by the Bank of England could be appropriate, with relatively limited side effects in the current context. #Inflation #Interestrates #MonetaryPolicy 3/3. open.substack.com/pub/gianluca...
The Flip Side of UK Monetary Policy
This note draws from remarks I delivered as part of the monetary policy outlook panel at the Bank of England Watchers’ Conference.
open.substack.com
May 20, 2025 at 4:56 AM
From a monetary policy perspective, these factors suggest that more decisive easing by the Bank of England could be appropriate, with relatively limited side effects in the current context. #Inflation #Interestrates #MonetaryPolicy 3/3. open.substack.com/pub/gianluca...
I made 3 key points: a)The role of rent inflation in accounting for UK inflation and its persistence b)The rapid and sizeable increase in the policy rate as a driver of UK inflation through higher rent c)The role of wage growth as demand support rather than just an input cost 2/3
May 20, 2025 at 4:56 AM
I made 3 key points: a)The role of rent inflation in accounting for UK inflation and its persistence b)The rapid and sizeable increase in the policy rate as a driver of UK inflation through higher rent c)The role of wage growth as demand support rather than just an input cost 2/3
Reposted by Gianluca Benigno
Finally, in my own paper with @gianlucabenigno.bsky.social and @lucafornaro.bsky.social, we show that the Financial Resource Curse is not merely a theoretical possibility by presenting careful empirical evidence that it is a general phenomenon www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti... 4/n
Large capital inflows, sectoral allocation, and economic performance
This paper describes the stylized facts characterizing periods of exceptionally large capital inflows in a sample of 70 middle- and high-income countr…
www.sciencedirect.com
April 19, 2025 at 1:53 PM
Finally, in my own paper with @gianlucabenigno.bsky.social and @lucafornaro.bsky.social, we show that the Financial Resource Curse is not merely a theoretical possibility by presenting careful empirical evidence that it is a general phenomenon www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti... 4/n
Reposted by Gianluca Benigno
In an AER paper w Martin Wolf (of U.St.Gallen) @gianlucabenigno.bsky.social and @lucafornaro.bsky.social show that the Financial Resource Curse has even larger negative implications when flows go to the world technological leader, I.e. the US (ungated here: www.newyorkfed.org/research/sta...) 3/n
The Global Financial Resource Curse - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK
www.newyorkfed.org
April 19, 2025 at 10:49 AM
In an AER paper w Martin Wolf (of U.St.Gallen) @gianlucabenigno.bsky.social and @lucafornaro.bsky.social show that the Financial Resource Curse has even larger negative implications when flows go to the world technological leader, I.e. the US (ungated here: www.newyorkfed.org/research/sta...) 3/n
Reposted by Gianluca Benigno
I like that Brunnermeier and Merkel at least nod (without citation for some reason) at @gianlucabenigno.bsky.social and @lucafornaro.bsky.social ‘s work on the Financial Resource Curse (e.g crei.cat/wp-content/u...) 3/n
crei.cat
April 19, 2025 at 10:43 AM
I like that Brunnermeier and Merkel at least nod (without citation for some reason) at @gianlucabenigno.bsky.social and @lucafornaro.bsky.social ‘s work on the Financial Resource Curse (e.g crei.cat/wp-content/u...) 3/n