Honestly, it's not necessarily worse.

Mainly because the hardest part of UG theses and papers is finding an interesting and feasible topic. That's something you (hopefully) no longer have to deal with after 3.5 years of doing a PhD.

My model indicates a potential role of UCAVs in deep strike missions, though their competitive advantage is likely greatest when engaging multiple aimpoints, expected attrition is low, and the best alternative consists of costly one way effectors rather than affordable ones.

3/3

Attrition models for UCAVs used in deep strike missions are more involved, because they can be shot down both on the way to the target and on the return, and because UCAV procurement and operating costs must be amortized across their expected lifespan.

2/3

Depicting STRATCOM as hawkish, emotional hotshots is completely detached from reality.

3/3

The other major issue is how they portray STRATCOM. If you’ve actually interacted with them, you know they’re the most professional bunch of people you will ever meet. They are also among the most cautious actors in the entire nuclear ecosystem, probably for good reason.

2/3

This will make for 'interesting' crisis dynamics, as Russia's vulnerability to conventional counterstrike and countervalue strategies increases exponentially, year over year.

3/3

While Russia currently holds a significant advantage in the missile domain, we are inevitably moving toward a future in which it will be surrounded by neighbors each fielding hundreds, if not thousands, of conventional missiles aimed at high-value Russian military and economic targets.

2/3

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In my view, there is a strong case that instead of spending the $125–200 million European governments would likely need to pay to the US for 50 or so Tomahawks, they should invest that money directly into Ukraine’s missile industrial sector to scale up domestic production.

6/6

The better alternative may be to go after the supply chains that support Russia’s drone and missile production, targeting critical inputs such as electronics, explosives, and composites.

Ukraine is already doing exactly that, including with its indigenous missile systems.

5/6

This approach would also require Ukrainian planners to know exactly which parts of the plant to destroy; i.e., where expensive and hard-to-replace machinery is located, and what parts constitute break rooms and canteens.

It's unclear whether this data is available.

4/6

The problem is that destroying production facilities is far from straightforward.

Destroying around 50% of the Alabuga plant, for example, would require 150 Tomahawks - more than Ukraine would likely receive, and much more than it could launch in a single salvo.

3/6

Tomahawk’s 1,600 kilometer range puts both the Alabuga plant, where Geran-2 and Geran-3 long-range drones are produced, and the Votkinsk plant, which manufactures 9M723 short-range ballistic missiles, within striking distance, both of which would be attractive targets.

2/6