Drag0nR3b0rn
@drag0nr3b0rn.bsky.social
An opinionated geek. Believes a better world is a possibility. Not afraid of revolutions. Willing to embrace chaos. A jack of many trades, a master of some.
5/5 Read the full article at www.lawfaremedia.org/article/offe...
Offensive Cyber Operations as Relief for Citizens Under Internet Blackout
Precisely targeted cyber operations can remove blocking rules or disable network-blocking equipment.
www.lawfaremedia.org
September 16, 2025 at 10:28 AM
5/5 Read the full article at www.lawfaremedia.org/article/offe...
4/5 Finally, I examine the Internet blackout in Iran during the June 2025 war with Israel as a case study to examine the efficacy, legitimacy, and possible implications of such an action.
Offensive Cyber Operations as Relief for Citizens Under Internet Blackout
Precisely targeted cyber operations can remove blocking rules or disable network-blocking equipment.
www.lawfaremedia.org
September 16, 2025 at 10:28 AM
4/5 Finally, I examine the Internet blackout in Iran during the June 2025 war with Israel as a case study to examine the efficacy, legitimacy, and possible implications of such an action.
3/5 To this effect, I adopt the third-party countermeasures approach and propose implementing such countermeasures in the form of offensive cyber operations to disrupt internet blackouts.
Offensive Cyber Operations as Relief for Citizens Under Internet Blackout
Precisely targeted cyber operations can remove blocking rules or disable network-blocking equipment.
www.lawfaremedia.org
September 16, 2025 at 10:28 AM
3/5 To this effect, I adopt the third-party countermeasures approach and propose implementing such countermeasures in the form of offensive cyber operations to disrupt internet blackouts.
2/5 Specifically, I propose that the efforts made to date to mitigate Internet connectivity interference, such as censorship-resistant communication channels and Starlink's global Internet connectivity, are good to have but are not robust enough.
Offensive Cyber Operations as Relief for Citizens Under Internet Blackout
Precisely targeted cyber operations can remove blocking rules or disable network-blocking equipment.
www.lawfaremedia.org
September 16, 2025 at 10:28 AM
2/5 Specifically, I propose that the efforts made to date to mitigate Internet connectivity interference, such as censorship-resistant communication channels and Starlink's global Internet connectivity, are good to have but are not robust enough.
@percepticon.bsky.social might also interest you ;-)
July 1, 2025 at 5:18 PM
@percepticon.bsky.social might also interest you ;-)
Also, I understand that it is currently being pitched around to other states (you need to finance the project somehow, I guess...<>). At least this is the context in which the Israeli media covers the remarks about cyber security cooperation during Germany's Dobrindt visit.
July 1, 2025 at 2:18 PM
Also, I understand that it is currently being pitched around to other states (you need to finance the project somehow, I guess...<>). At least this is the context in which the Israeli media covers the remarks about cyber security cooperation during Germany's Dobrindt visit.
When Israeli officials talk about "Iron Dome for cyberspace" - they don't aim for a dome, but mean a solution based on the logic deterrence by denial against cyber incidents, with "Cyber Dome" being a specific national active cyber defense solution by the INCD (the Israeli cyber defense agency).
July 1, 2025 at 2:18 PM
When Israeli officials talk about "Iron Dome for cyberspace" - they don't aim for a dome, but mean a solution based on the logic deterrence by denial against cyber incidents, with "Cyber Dome" being a specific national active cyber defense solution by the INCD (the Israeli cyber defense agency).
There is a bit of context that needs to be added here. "Domification" (i.e., calling defensive solutions "Iron Dome for X" or "Y Dome") is a quite obscure and funny facet of Israeli flavor of securitization.
July 1, 2025 at 2:18 PM
There is a bit of context that needs to be added here. "Domification" (i.e., calling defensive solutions "Iron Dome for X" or "Y Dome") is a quite obscure and funny facet of Israeli flavor of securitization.
Better to read as "An Israeli cybersecurity company providing WAF and DDoS mitigation solutions says its Israeli customers experienced a 700% increase in events detected by its products." Which is an Ok newswire, but way less sexy and newsworthy (even though it might be due high-profile customers).
June 16, 2025 at 1:45 PM
Better to read as "An Israeli cybersecurity company providing WAF and DDoS mitigation solutions says its Israeli customers experienced a 700% increase in events detected by its products." Which is an Ok newswire, but way less sexy and newsworthy (even though it might be due high-profile customers).
The #GGE norms, which weren't aimed at confidence and capacity building measures, narrowed what IHL/LOAC allowed - and thus were doomed from day one. Some will even claim they did some damage along the way. This doesn't mean there no place for "Cyber norms". Just not for this set of formal ones.
June 16, 2025 at 1:41 PM
The #GGE norms, which weren't aimed at confidence and capacity building measures, narrowed what IHL/LOAC allowed - and thus were doomed from day one. Some will even claim they did some damage along the way. This doesn't mean there no place for "Cyber norms". Just not for this set of formal ones.
That looks interesting! Is any more info about the methodology behind those score available?
June 4, 2025 at 9:38 AM
That looks interesting! Is any more info about the methodology behind those score available?
From a short exploration I can already see how it can be useful for my own research, which makes me eager to explore it further and hope that more MDR vendors would follow suit and make the data underlying their yearly report openly available. 6/6
April 8, 2025 at 1:28 PM
From a short exploration I can already see how it can be useful for my own research, which makes me eager to explore it further and hope that more MDR vendors would follow suit and make the data underlying their yearly report openly available. 6/6
5/6 Finally, as a researcher engaged with quantitative research into cyber security, it is great to see some of the data underlying the report publicly available (github.com/sophoslabs/A...), even though, unfortunately, only the data for the latest report is available.
github.com
April 8, 2025 at 1:28 PM
5/6 Finally, as a researcher engaged with quantitative research into cyber security, it is great to see some of the data underlying the report publicly available (github.com/sophoslabs/A...), even though, unfortunately, only the data for the latest report is available.
4/6 The data hints that better default configurations, especially enabling MFA and reducing exposed services, brute-force protection, and better internet facing appliances patching mechanisms might go a long way for improving cyber resilience against Ransomware attacks and generally.
April 8, 2025 at 1:28 PM
4/6 The data hints that better default configurations, especially enabling MFA and reducing exposed services, brute-force protection, and better internet facing appliances patching mechanisms might go a long way for improving cyber resilience against Ransomware attacks and generally.
3/6 This thread (and report), on the other hand, suggest that at least as far as ransomware is concerned it might indeed be a quite simple technical problem - that we should focus our resilience policy efforts on finding proactive technical solution for.
April 8, 2025 at 1:28 PM
3/6 This thread (and report), on the other hand, suggest that at least as far as ransomware is concerned it might indeed be a quite simple technical problem - that we should focus our resilience policy efforts on finding proactive technical solution for.
2/6 It makes it seems that while many cyber security thinkers moved from treating it as a technical problem, i.e., something that should be fixed after the fact, to treating it as a political issue.
April 8, 2025 at 1:28 PM
2/6 It makes it seems that while many cyber security thinkers moved from treating it as a technical problem, i.e., something that should be fixed after the fact, to treating it as a political issue.
Read the full article at lawfaremedia.org/article/the-... 5/5
The ‘Pacific Rim’ Campaign: Corporate Norm Entrepreneurship and Active Cyber Defense
Sophos’s account of its recent active cyber defense campaign can help shape norms of “responsible behavior” in cyberspace.
lawfaremedia.org
March 18, 2025 at 3:57 PM
Read the full article at lawfaremedia.org/article/the-... 5/5
4/5 Finally, we draw some lessons on the scope and expected efficacy of private-sector CCO/ACD, extending beyond the common "hacking back" debate, norms of responsible behavior in cyber operations, and the importance of communications for fostering both.
March 18, 2025 at 3:57 PM
4/5 Finally, we draw some lessons on the scope and expected efficacy of private-sector CCO/ACD, extending beyond the common "hacking back" debate, norms of responsible behavior in cyber operations, and the importance of communications for fostering both.
3/5 We call out significant practices evident and language used to juxtapose with some previously published examinations and attempts to define responsible behavior in cyber operations and industry practices.
March 18, 2025 at 3:57 PM
3/5 We call out significant practices evident and language used to juxtapose with some previously published examinations and attempts to define responsible behavior in cyber operations and industry practices.
2/5 We do so by analyzing the texts published by Sophos, especially the blog posts by Sophos's CEO Joe Levy and CISO @rossmckerchar.bsky.social
March 18, 2025 at 3:57 PM
2/5 We do so by analyzing the texts published by Sophos, especially the blog posts by Sophos's CEO Joe Levy and CISO @rossmckerchar.bsky.social