So as far as impact what we're really talking about is that the people voting for the sub-15% candidates would have their votes reallocated — but not quickly enough to matter in the national conversation, and making only a minor impact on delegate allotment

The lengthy time to tally reallocated RCV results would likely render any "narrative" value from winning a reallocated vote null.

And unlike winner-take-all elections, the Dem pres. primary already has an incentive for candidates to stay in — if they hit 15% they get delegates

CNN floats one possibility

www.cnn.com/2025/11/20/p...

Who convened this grand jury and how long will they keep their job now that this story is out?

The public's dismal view of the Biden Admin was a fundamental faced by Harris between July - Nov 2024.

In the discourse, though, "fundamentals" is often used to argue "there's nothing Democrats could have done differently."

But they could have made different governance choices earlier!

One reason to think fundamentals don't determine the decisive margin in close races is that political scientists have not, in fact, figured out how to determine how races will play out with pinpoint accuracy beforehand.

Good fundamentals models can put them in the ballpark but aren't precise

It is possible that "fundamentals" — a slippery concept that sometimes includes objective metrics on the economy (but which metrics?), and sometimes includes presidential approval which is harder to nail down — determine *most* of how an election will go.

Do they determine the decisive margin?

Trump is underwater on many issues but he is truly, epically underwater on inflation/prices (-34)

d3nkl3psvxxpe9.cloudfront.net/documents/ec...

Or, the things they disliked about the Biden economy (high prices and high interest rates) haven't gone away in the Trump II economy

In particular Republicans *loved* the Trump I pre-Covid economy and even many Dems liked it.

Today Republicans are much less positive on the Trump II economy (though few blame Trump for it).

Seems like people don't like high prices and high interest rates

www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/...

It seems to me that the persistence of public pessimism on the Biden/Trump II economy argues against a vibes-first theory of the economy and public opinion.

People liked the Trump I pre-Covid economy and they don't like this one.

The report also mentions that people liked getting stimulus and thought that if inflation happened later in the year it would be "a temporary increase"

bsky.app/profile/devi...

I agree that it doesn't really make sense to govern this way and then hope that, if you talk about other things in your campaign messaging for a few months, voters with opposing views on these topics somehow won't notice

Voters' belief in that poll that Dems focus too much on climate is of course a matter of opinion.

But climate was a huge policymaking priority for four years of the Biden Administration and Harris going "light" on it in campaign messaging doesn't retroactively erase that.

On crime specifically it is worth dwelling on that this is actually a recent disadvantage for Dems.

The summer of "defund the police" in 2020 was followed by Biden winning.

The parties were evenly matched re: trust on crime in 2021.

Then things took a turn.

www.langerresearch.com/wp-content/u...

A @gelliottmorris.com point is that voters aren't making up their minds based on a policy laundry list.

I agree — they're looking for signals about who they should trust and who's on "their side."

In the 2020s Dems sent mixed signals on crime. It was an awkward issue that split their coalition