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Mark Youngman

@threatologist.com

560 followers 140 following 1.2K posts

Open-source investigator specialising in Russian security issues. My newsletter unpacks major issues or storie from the world of Russian security — tracing the relationships, trends, and deeper meaning behind them. www.threatologist.com/newsletter

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · Feb 22

The best* book ever written on the Caucasus Emirate’s ideology is now available for pre-order.

The Caucasus Emirate: Ideology, identity and insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus (Manchester University Press)

amzn.eu/d/6QrSQ3h

* and only

Front cover of The Caucasus Emirate: Ideology, identity and insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

The ban applies to media and internet resources, but not to official information.

So I guess it can be considered a variant of the law on discrediting the army, criminalising the publication of anything that doesn't come from officials.

dag.aif.ru/society/deta...

В Дагестане запретили публикацию сведений о терактах и ударах дронов ВСУ

Указ об этом подписал Сергей Меликов.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

Dagestan, meanwhile, has decided to ban the publication of information on terrorist attacks, drone strikes, the location of defence forces and infrastructure, and other security information.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

Without a breakdown of what they’ve included, we really have no idea how many of the 280 were actually a serious threat. But there’s good grounds to think the FSB is inflating its numbers!

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

Nevertheless, the FSB statement really does little more than highlight the limited value of official statistics.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

The security services also have a habit of not telling people about arrests. Sometimes they report on them days, weeks, or even months after the facts, meaning they aren’t tied to a clear ‘incident’. But, if they do that, they certainly don’t report some as well.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

If that explains the difference, it is in itself revealing: It shows how much the ‘war on terrorism’ involves going after low-hanging fruit that makes the FSB look good on paper but has a limited connection to destabilising forms of political violence.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

I, for example, don’t include anything related to social media posts, which are often prosecuted under terrorism-related articles. The FSB itself says ‘justifying terrorism’ is one of the crimes of the 280.

nac.gov.ru/view/f6c3ce8...

Информационный портал национального антитеррористического комитета

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

But can we get to 280 arrests? Not a cats chance in hell. I have 11 recorded. That’s quite a large difference!

Of course, there are some qualifiers that explain SOME of the differences.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

Bear in mind that those 73 include things like drone attacks, successful acts of terrorism, the discovery of old arms caches etc. Could we get to 27 prevented attacks? Maybe, but it probably requires some generous counting and definitions.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

So what does the data show? 73 incidents of all types across the whole region for Jan-Sep.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

Now, the database is multi-source, but it includes the National Antiterrorism Committee’s own reporting on incidents.

It’s therefore reasonable to expect a degree of correlation between the database and the latest statistics offered by FSB and NAK Director Aleksandr Bortnikov.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

I didn’t mention detentions because they weren’t particularly noteworthy.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

I have created a custom incident tracking database for terrorism and insurgency related incidents in the region. Every quarter, I publish a roundup of what’s happening. The latest one is here: newsletter.threatologist.com/posts/north-...

North Caucasus maintains stable instability in third quarter of 2025

Trends in political violence are neither up nor down

newsletter.threatologist.com

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 11h

The FSB claims that it has detained 280 people on terrorism-related charges in the North Caucasus since the start of the year.

It also claims that it has prevented 33 crimes, of which 27 were terrorist attacks.

The problem? These figures bear little relation to developments in the region.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 1d

Four people are to stand trial for the December 2024 murder of Igor Kirillov, the head of Russia’s Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Forces. Two are from Ingushetia, one each Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan oc-media.org/two-natives-...

Two natives of Ingushetia to stand trial over killing of Russian General Kirillov

According to investigators, Ramazan Padiev and Batukhan Tochiev rented a flat for the direct perpetrator of the killing.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 7d

I’ll be unpacking all these figures and what they mean in the next issue of Tracing Patterns. So if you want to find out more, head to my profile and sign up to the newsletter!

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 7d

The casualty figures were much higher in 2024 than 2025, but there’s an easy explanation for that: the major attacks in Dagestan in June 2024, which distort all the figures.

Graphic showing casualties from terrorism-related incidents across the North Caucasus in the first nine months of 2024 and 2025

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 7d

The bigger picture is arguably more revealing: The volume and geographic spread of incidents for the first nine months of 2025 is almost identical to the same period of 2024.

Graphic showing terrorism-related incidents across the North Caucasus in the first nine months of 2024 and 2025

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 7d

The picture is similarly ambiguous when you look at the number of casualties caused by incidents: Here, the last quarter was much less violent than the one that came before it, but more violent than the same period last year. And overall casualty figures are low.

Graphic showing casualties caused by terrorism-related incidents across the North Caucasus by quarter.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 7d

That, however, is offset by a factors such as interconnected incidents and a series of drone attacks (which are really political violence rather than terrorism) inflating the numbers.

Graphic showing terrorism-related incidents by quarter across the North Caucasus

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 7d

For example, the total number of incidents for the last quarter is slightly higher than either the previous quarter or the same period last year.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 7d

What does terrorism- and insurgency-related violence look like thus far in 2025?

The overall picture is really one of continued but quite low-level stability.

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 8d

Plus, at least half of the options will trigger Russian nationalists. Especially the Mother’s Monument — best not remind them that it’s those pesky Muslims who are having all the children!

Vote Groznyy :)

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 8d

It clearly beats the alternatives. Mountains? Could be any mountain! Picture gallery? Boring! A hydroelectric power plant? You cannot be serious!

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 8d

4) If the Russian regime ever collapses, so too will the Chechen regime — and maybe the economy too. The currency could therefore become worthless. The symbolism is almost future proof!