Mark Joseph Stern
@mjsdc.bsky.social
150K followers 690 following 1.9K posts
Senior writer at Slate covering courts and the law. Co-host of the Amicus podcast. Dad.
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mjsdc.bsky.social
By a 6–3 vote, the Supreme Court refuses to consider whether the 6th Amendment was violated when a juror completely lost her mind and viciously coerced other jurors to return a death verdict even though they opposed it and voted 11-1 for life without parole. www.supremecourt.gov/orders/court...
On the second day of deliberations, “even when the other
eleven jurors . . . voted for life without parole” in an internal
poll, “Chancey would not even consider it.” Id., at 71a–72a.
At that point, the foreperson wrote a note to the trial court
explaining that the jurors were “‘unable to come to a
unanimous decision on either death or life imprisonment
without parole as a sentence.’ ” Id., at 9a. Chancey,
believing the note as written would result in a mistrial,
revised the note to say that the jurors were “‘currently
unable to come to a unanimous decision.’” Id., at 9a–10a.
The court instructed the jury to continue deliberating.
Chancey then “snapped.” Humphreys v. Sellers, No.
1:18–cv–02534 (ND Ga., Sept. 19, 2018), ECF Doc. 42–7, p.
443. She yelled, cursed, and screamed that she would “stay
[t]here till forever if ” that is what it took “for [Humphreys]
to get death.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. She threw the
victims’ photos across the table and demanded, “‘[D]o you
want this to happen to someone you know?’” Ibid. She
reminded the jurors of the similar details of her own attack,
and told them that “‘they had to reach a unanimous
decision or [Humphreys] would be paroled,’” which was not
true under Georgia law. Ibid. She then levied personal attacks against the jurors and refused to engage in any
debate.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, jury deliberations almost
completely broke down. Screaming could be overheard from
the courtroom. One juror “‘took a swing’” at Chancey and
punched a hole in the wall. Ibid. Jurors were seen crying
on several occasions. A juror later recalled that “it was as
if an evil force took over . . . Chancey.” ECF Doc. 33–12,
p. 13. The foreperson even wrote a note asking to be
removed from the jury because of the “‘hostile nature of one
of the jurors.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a. The court instead
gave an Allen charge and instructed the jury to deliberate
further. See Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492 (1896). It
also rejected defense counsel’s renewed motion for a
mistrial. On the third morning of deliberations, the jury
returned a unanimous verdict of death.
The above facts constitute a likely violation of
Humphreys’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
The problem for Humphreys is that these facts came to light
largely through juror affidavits and juror testimony
obtained after the trial. The Georgia courts held this
evidence inadmissible under Georgia’s no-impeachment
rule, which generally prohibits the use of juror testimony to
impeach a verdict, even in death penalty cases. See App. to
Pet. for Cert. 325a (citing Spencer v. State, 260 Ga. 640, 643,
398 S. E. 2d 179, 184 (1990)). The no-impeachment rule,
however, is not an absolute shield, and in extreme cases it
must give way to constitutional guarantees.
mjsdc.bsky.social
It is odd that the Supreme Court hasn't incorporated the 7th Amendment's civil jury trial guarantee against the states. It has applied almost every other part of the Bill of Rights to states, so this is an outlier.

I just question Gorsuch's motives for doing so. www.supremecourt.gov/orders/court...
mjsdc.bsky.social
Gorsuch wants to apply the 7th Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases to the states. Right now it only applies to the federal government.

I'm not opposed in theory, but after Jarkesy I fear this court would primarily wield the civil jury trial right to shield corporations from penalties.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CORRINE MORGAN THOMAS, ET AL. v. HUMBOLDT
COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–1180. Decided October 14, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of JUSTICE GORSUCH respecting the denial of
certiorari.
 In Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S.
211, 217 (1916), this Court held that the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury trial right is not enforceable against the
States. Petitioners ask us to reconsider that decision. But
a number of “vehicle” problems make it unlikely that we
could do so in this case. See Brief in Opposition 21–44. Accordingly, I agree with the Court’s decision to deny review.
At the same time, I do not doubt that Bombolis warrants a
second look.
As petitioners observe, Bombolis is something of a relic.
There, the Court dismissed as “strange” the notion that the
Seventh Amendment—or, for that matter, any of the Bill of
Rights—might be enforceable against the States. 241 U. S.,
at 217–218. But what once might have seemed strange almost goes without saying today. In the years since Bombolis, this Court has “shed any reluctance” about the idea
that the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporate[s]” against
the States many of the liberties enshrined in the Bill of
mjsdc.bsky.social
The good news is that the Supreme Court still refused to hear this case.

The bad news is that three justices seem eager to force every public school in the country to out trans kids to their parents, and it only takes one more vote to put a future case on the docket that lets the court do so.
mjsdc.bsky.social
It's also disturbing that Gorsuch joined this opinion. He has clearly disavowed any interest in protecting trans rights five years out from Bostock. It was evident after he joined Skrmetti, and it's obvious today. He's just another anti-trans culture warrior now. Never explained the about-face.
mjsdc.bsky.social
The only Supreme Court case Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch cite to support their mandatory-outing view is Troxel v. Granville, which held that parents' control over their children is an unenumerated right protected by due process.

But Thomas says such unenumerated due process rights do not exist!
mjsdc.bsky.social
It's especially rich for Clarence Thomas to suggest that the Constitution requires public schools to obtain parental consent before acknowledging trans students' identity.

Such a right would be rooted in substantive due process—a concept Thomas dismissed as completely illegitimate in Dobbs.
mjsdc.bsky.social
Another good example of how the Republican-appointed justices wield the Constitution to take sides in the culture wars.

There's a vigorous democratic debate about whether public schools should out trans kids to their parents. Three justice want to use the Constitution to mandate outing nationwide.
mjsdc.bsky.social
Alito, joined by Thomas and Gorsuch, suggest that public schools violate the Constitution when they help a student transition (by acknowledging them as trans) without their parents' knowledge or consent.

Would force schools to out trans kids to their parents. www.supremecourt.gov/orders/court...
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JONATHAN LEE, ET AL. v. POUDRE
SCHOOL DISTRICT R–1
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 25–89. Decided October 14, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE
THOMAS and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, respecting the denial
of certiorari.
I concur in the denial of certiorari because petitioners do
not challenge the ground for the ruling below. But I remain
concerned that some federal courts are “tempt[ed]” to avoid
confronting a “particularly contentious constitutional questio[n]”: whether a school district violates parents’ fundamental rights “when, without parental knowledge or consent, it encourages a student to transition to a new gender
or assists in that process.” Parents Protecting Our Children, UA v. Eau Claire Area School Dist., 604 U. S. ___,
___–___ (2024) (ALITO, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 1–2) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U. S.
57, 70 (2000) (plurality opinion)). Petitioners tell us that
nearly 6,000 public schools have policies—as respondent allegedly does—that purposefully interfere with parents’ access to critical information about their children’s genderidentity choices and school personnel’s involvement in and
influence on those choices. Pet. for Cert. 24. The troubling—and tragic—allegations in this case underscore the
“great and growing national importance” of the question
that these parent petitioners present. Parents Protecting
Our Children, 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1).
Reposted by Mark Joseph Stern
dcattorneygeneral.bsky.social
Long before becoming the District of Columbia, these lands were home to indigenous peoples.

Native American artifacts have been found all over DC, including Rock Creek Park, Anacostia, the Arboretum, Van Ness, the Palisades, Capitol Hill, and even the White House.
Drawn map of indigenous sites in Washington, DC.
mjsdc.bsky.social
Going on @theweekendmsnbc.bsky.social shortly to talk about the Supreme Court’s ongoing reign of terror over our constitutional democracy
mjsdc.bsky.social
This arrest appears to be in direct violation of a temporary restraining order prohibiting DHS officers from arresting journalists. The officers here may well be subject to contempt of court. protectdemocracy.org/wp-content/u...
It is hereby ORDERED that Defendants,' their officers, agents, assigns, and all
persons acting in concert with them (hereafter referred to as "Federal Agents"), are temporarily
ENJOINED in this judicial district from:
a.
Dispersing, arresting, threatening to arrest, threatening or using physical
force against any person whom they know or reasonably should know is a Journalist, unless Defendants have probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a crime.
mjsdc.bsky.social
Washington Supreme Court Justice Mungia has an extraordinary opinion condemning "the underlying racism and prejudices that are woven into the very fabric" of SCOTUS opinions about Native people.

"We must clearly, loudly, and unequivocally state that was wrong.”
www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf...
MUNGIA, J. (concurring)—I concur with the majority’s opinion.1
 And yet I
dissent. Not from the majority’s opinion, but I dissent from the racism embedded in the
federal case law that applies to this dispute.
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IS A PRODUCT OF THE RACIST BELIEFS ENDEMIC IN OUR SOCIETY
AND OUR LEGAL SYSTEM
While it is certainly necessary to follow federal case law on issues involving
Native American tribes and their members, at the same time it is important to call out that
the very foundations of those opinions were based on racism and white supremacy. By
doing this, readers of our opinions will have no doubt that the current court disavows, and
condemns, those racist sentiments, beliefs, and statements. Since the founding of our country, the federal government has characterized
Native Americans as “savages”: They were “uncivilized.” They had little claim to the
land upon which they lived. At times, the federal government attempted to eradicate
Native Americans through genocidal policies. At other times, the federal government
employed ethnic cleansing by forcibly removing children from their parents’ homes to
strip them from their culture, their language, and their beings.2
Federal Indian case law arises from those racist underpinnings.
The majority correctly cites to Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 8
L. Ed. 25 (1831), which is one of the foundational cases involving tribal sovereignty.
That opinion is rife with racist attitudes toward Native Americans. Chief Justice John
Marshall, writing for the majority, describes a tribe’s relationship to the federal
government as one of “ward to his guardian.” Id. at 17. In effect, the opinion presents
tribal members as children, and the federal government as the adult. That theme would
follow in later opinions by the United States Supreme Court—as would the theme of
white supremacy.
Cherokee Nation began with the premise that Native American tribes, once strong
and powerful, were no match for the white race and so found themselves “gradually
sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our arms.” Id. at 15. The white man
was considered the teacher, the Native Americans the pupils: Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
Id. at 17.
This characterization of superior to inferior, teacher to student, guardian to ward,
was repeated in later United States Supreme Court opinions.
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 23 S. Ct. 216, 47 L. Ed. 299 (1903),
often characterized as the “American Indian Dred Scott,”
3
the Court used that rationale to
justify ruling that the United States could break its treaties with Native American tribes.
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities
dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food.
Dependent for their political rights. . . . From their very weakness and
helplessness . . . there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.
Id. at 567 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84, 6 S. Ct. 1109, 30 L.
Ed. 228 (1886)).
Our court also carries the shame of denigrating Native Americans by using that
same characterization: “The Indian was a child, and a dangerous child, of nature, to be
both protected and restrained.” State v. Towessnute, 89 Wash. 478, 482, 154 P. 805
(1916), judgment vacated and opinion repudiated by 197 Wn.2d 574, 486 P.3d 111
(2020).
3 See A Returning to Cherokee Nation, Justice William Johnson’s separate opinion was
less tempered in how he considered the various Native American tribes:
I cannot but think that there are strong reasons for doubting the
applicability of the epithet state, to a people so low in the grade of
organized society as our Indian tribes most generally are.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 21. Native Americans were not to be treated as “equals to
equals” but, instead, the United States was the conqueror and Native Americans the
conquered. Id. at 23.
In discussing Native Americans, Justice Johnson employed another racist trope
used by judges both before and after him: Native Americans were uncivilized savages.
[W]e have extended to them the means and inducement to become
agricultural and civilized. . . . Independently of the general influence of
humanity, these people were restless, warlike, and signally cruel.
. . . .
But I think it very clear that the constitution neither speaks of them as states
or foreign states, but as just what they were, Indian tribes . . . which the law
of nations would regard as nothing more than wandering hordes, held
together only by ties of blood and habit, and having neither laws or
government, beyond what is required in a savage state.
Id. at 23, 27-28.
This same characterization was used by Justice Stanley Matthews in Ex parte KanGi-Shun-Ca (otherwise known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 3 S. Ct. 396, 27 L. Ed. 1030
(1883). Justice Matthews described Native Americans as leading a savage life.
mjsdc.bsky.social
I think we need to be crystal clear about how Trump's creation of a nationwide police force—loyal only to him—threatens to create a feedback loop of lawlessness in which our constitutional right to dissent may vanish. slate.com/news-and-pol...
It is now beyond debate that one of Donald Trump’s key goals is the creation of a national police force that is loyal to him alone. To that end, the president has repeatedly federalized the National Guard—often over governors’ objections—and deployed troops to invade blue cities whose residents oppose his administration. He has also transformed Immigration and Customs Enforcement into a kind of secret police that targets, with especially sadistic brutality, journalists, protesters, and others exercising their First Amendment rights. Trump’s multifaceted attack on the Constitution creates a feedback loop of lawlessness: He first erodes the structural limits on his authority, then exploits his newly unchecked power to trample the people’s freedom to dissent.
Reposted by Mark Joseph Stern
lawrencehurley.bsky.social
A law professor is probably writing an article right now explaining how Trump has the authority to fire the Nobel Committee.
mjsdc.bsky.social
DC grand juries stand alone🫡
mjsdc.bsky.social
Good piece, but all you REALLY need to know about the indictment is that it was personally secured by Lindsey Halligan, the wildly unqualified Trump lackey who was installed (illegally, it seems) for the lone purpose of bringing these bogus charges.

This will not result in a conviction.
annabower.bsky.social
Good time to read @mollyroberts.bsky.social:

“It’s hard to imagine a worse case than the one against James Comey—until you see the one against the attorney general of New York.”

www.lawfaremedia.org/article/next...
Next Up: Letitia James
Molly Roberts
Monday, October 6, 2025, 9:59 AM
Share On: f X in $
It's hard to imagine a worse case than the one against James Comey-until you see the one against the attorney general of New York.
mjsdc.bsky.social
Could the Supreme Court still apply different rules to a Democratic president? Of course. You don't need to remind me of that. But a lightning-fast blitz that repurposes Trump's new powers for good stands the best chance of standing up in court. Democrats need to start thinking about this right now.
mjsdc.bsky.social
This is why I think the next Democratic president needs to use the EXACT tools that SCOTUS has handed Trump. Don't leave room for any distinctions.

Impound funds for deportation. Give ICE the USAID treatment. Refuse to collect government-backed debt. Purge MAGA loyalists from the executive branch.
mjsdc.bsky.social
The best "defense" of SCOTUS' hypocrisy is that there's an asymmetry between how Democrats and Republicans wield executive power. Broadly—Dems want to give things (health care, asylum, foreign aid, loan relief, civil rights) while Republicans want to take things away. SCOTUS makes the latter easier.
mjsdc.bsky.social
I think the Supreme Court and its defenders try to deny this blatant bias toward Trump by highlighting distinctions between cases—oh, you don't understand, student loan forgiveness was illegal while impoundment is permissible because [reasons]. But the big picture tells an undeniably damning story.
mjsdc.bsky.social
When the Supreme Court struck down Biden's policies, it was tempting to think: "At least these limits on executive authority will bind Trump if he comes back into office." But no—the court's skepticism of executive power vanished on Jan. 20, 2025. This dynamic is obvious to anyone paying attention!
mjsdc.bsky.social
It is pretty galling that the Supreme Court spent four years telling Biden "you can't do that without Congress" then allowed Trump to seize a once-unthinkable amount of power from Congress within nine months and concentrate law-making authority almost entirely in the executive branch.
mjsdc.bsky.social
KBJ’s blunt question today about the Supreme Court’s culture war hypocrisy kind of floored me, because it’s the kind of meta-criticism that we aren’t used to hearing from the justices.

It’s the second day of the term, and things are that dire already. slate.com/news-and-pol...
With One Damning Question, Ketanji Brown Jackson Defined the Supreme Court’s New Term
The justice stripped the veneer of constitutional principle from the court’s latest blatant culture war.
slate.com