1\ I asked what the trend in Russian:Ukraine KIA ratio would look like if major open source databases + the new Frontelligence assessment were correct. They imply under 1:1 at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, but about 5.3:1 in late 2024.
Bear in mind: Russia often changes the bond types it offers each week. Different term lengths, maybe different taxation (principal Vs coupon). So look at the trend over months rather than week-to-week noise.
This is the data for Russia's borrowing for Q3 2025 that @tochnyi.info prepared.If you want to keep up with Russia's domestic debt we cover it every week on the live stream. You can also listen to us talking about the gasoline shortage.
2\ Unless Ukraine knocks out 80-90% of diesel output then production doesn't look like a bottleneck.
Frontline supply wise... They seemingly deliver a similar mass of 122/152 mm ammo. So while fuel supplies are tempting targets, I'm not sure they're unstoppable.
There's been a bit of an argument: some saying Russia can't/won't use armour again, versus Ukrainian military and evidence-based OSINT (e.g. Jompy) saying Russia still has enough armour for another offensive.
~100 AFVs now reported used in the past ~4 days. Worth watching to see if it continues.
"If you don't end your war I will continue to block Ukraine aid funding and I will also continue ending Biden's policy of sanctioning your tankers... So if you don't stop I'll keep making it easier for you to kill Ukrainians and fund your war!"
Ukraine and Britain are launching joint production of interceptor drones to manufacture around 2,000 drones monthly specifically for Ukraine to counter Russian drones, UK Defense Secretary Luke Pollard said.
Iirc the main pension fund is pay as you go, 22% tax rate with the gap covered by the federal budget. If the economy struggles the tax take should drop and the deficit could worsen in 2026. Nice.
Important sources are explained, and it's all written very well *in English*, so I don't have to rely on weird AI translations. Thank you to the authors.
Our exclusive report on Russia’s tank production is out. Using internal files and state contracts, we show production plans for the next decade and current output. A short thread will follow soon, but for now, you can read the report
6\ I think this means we can believe Ukraine's *relative* numbers, e.g. when they say Russia is suffering more/fewer casualties than last month, it's probably true.
However, it's hard to know the *absolute* accuracy of Ukraine's claims. Are they correct? A bit too high? A lot too high? Dunno.
5\ Because so many "new" obituaries are actually old deaths now, the fact the numbers go up is no longer telling us whether e.g. deaths now are higher than last month.
However, Ukraine's claims month-to-month did correlate well with Poteru.
2\ Here's a fit to the monthly data. Are Ukraine's claims too high? I don't know. Mediazona found 1.6-2.1 deaths from Russian inheritance cases for each IDd Russian. There are also tens of thousands of missing, likely dead. Add in force-mobilised Ukrainians and real deaths are maybe 2-2.5x Poteru.
4\ This means we're now finally getting a more complete picture of the absolute butchery that Russians are accepting to continue their unprovoked barbaric war against Ukraine.
However, I think it also means we can't really use the Poteru data to do recent trend analysis.
They explain how rules changes mean that many commanders now need to report soldiers they lose before they can get a replacement. So they're finally reporting lots of men they lost ages ago.
