Mark Joseph Stern
@mjsdc.bsky.social
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Senior writer at Slate covering courts and the law. Co-host of the Amicus podcast. Dad.
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Reposted by Mark Joseph Stern
![On the second day of deliberations, “even when the other
eleven jurors . . . voted for life without parole” in an internal
poll, “Chancey would not even consider it.” Id., at 71a–72a.
At that point, the foreperson wrote a note to the trial court
explaining that the jurors were “‘unable to come to a
unanimous decision on either death or life imprisonment
without parole as a sentence.’ ” Id., at 9a. Chancey,
believing the note as written would result in a mistrial,
revised the note to say that the jurors were “‘currently
unable to come to a unanimous decision.’” Id., at 9a–10a.
The court instructed the jury to continue deliberating.
Chancey then “snapped.” Humphreys v. Sellers, No.
1:18–cv–02534 (ND Ga., Sept. 19, 2018), ECF Doc. 42–7, p.
443. She yelled, cursed, and screamed that she would “stay
[t]here till forever if ” that is what it took “for [Humphreys]
to get death.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. She threw the
victims’ photos across the table and demanded, “‘[D]o you
want this to happen to someone you know?’” Ibid. She
reminded the jurors of the similar details of her own attack,
and told them that “‘they had to reach a unanimous
decision or [Humphreys] would be paroled,’” which was not
true under Georgia law. Ibid. She then levied personal](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:6h7b2i6ttw3l4t7pvbvxdith/bafkreia3sw2wlcrkvpmqv2wki7s3s22menig7tgpriv47opmytlg7utdrm@jpeg)
![SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CORRINE MORGAN THOMAS, ET AL. v. HUMBOLDT
COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–1180. Decided October 14, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of JUSTICE GORSUCH respecting the denial of
certiorari.
In Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S.
211, 217 (1916), this Court held that the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury trial right is not enforceable against the
States. Petitioners ask us to reconsider that decision. But
a number of “vehicle” problems make it unlikely that we
could do so in this case. See Brief in Opposition 21–44. Accordingly, I agree with the Court’s decision to deny review.
At the same time, I do not doubt that Bombolis warrants a
second look.
As petitioners observe, Bombolis is something of a relic.
There, the Court dismissed as “strange” the notion that the
Seventh Amendment—or, for that matter, any of the Bill of
Rights—might be enforceable against the States. 241 U. S.,
at 217–218. But what once might have seemed strange almost goes without saying today. In the years since Bombolis, this Court has “shed any reluctance” about the idea
that the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporate[s]” against
the States many of the liberties enshrined in the Bill of](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:6h7b2i6ttw3l4t7pvbvxdith/bafkreiecqtltyisrk3y7xih3tnvofxwk3ixzsu767cikxyyomnkdppndme@jpeg)
![SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JONATHAN LEE, ET AL. v. POUDRE
SCHOOL DISTRICT R–1
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 25–89. Decided October 14, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE
THOMAS and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, respecting the denial
of certiorari.
I concur in the denial of certiorari because petitioners do
not challenge the ground for the ruling below. But I remain
concerned that some federal courts are “tempt[ed]” to avoid
confronting a “particularly contentious constitutional questio[n]”: whether a school district violates parents’ fundamental rights “when, without parental knowledge or consent, it encourages a student to transition to a new gender
or assists in that process.” Parents Protecting Our Children, UA v. Eau Claire Area School Dist., 604 U. S. ___,
___–___ (2024) (ALITO, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 1–2) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U. S.
57, 70 (2000) (plurality opinion)). Petitioners tell us that
nearly 6,000 public schools have policies—as respondent allegedly does—that purposefully interfere with parents’ access to critical information about their children’s genderidentity choices and school personnel’s involvement in and
influence on those choices. Pet. for Cert. 24. The troubling—and tragic—allegations in this case underscore the
“great and growing national importance” of the question
that these parent petitioners present. Parents Protecting
Our Children, 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1).](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:6h7b2i6ttw3l4t7pvbvxdith/bafkreibznytltv7mexkfzlraxhxhcwvilqwad7bmgdmbtd643ln7wd375y@jpeg)
Reposted by Mark Joseph Stern
![Returning to Cherokee Nation, Justice William Johnson’s separate opinion was
less tempered in how he considered the various Native American tribes:
I cannot but think that there are strong reasons for doubting the
applicability of the epithet state, to a people so low in the grade of
organized society as our Indian tribes most generally are.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 21. Native Americans were not to be treated as “equals to
equals” but, instead, the United States was the conqueror and Native Americans the
conquered. Id. at 23.
In discussing Native Americans, Justice Johnson employed another racist trope
used by judges both before and after him: Native Americans were uncivilized savages.
[W]e have extended to them the means and inducement to become
agricultural and civilized. . . . Independently of the general influence of
humanity, these people were restless, warlike, and signally cruel.
. . . .
But I think it very clear that the constitution neither speaks of them as states
or foreign states, but as just what they were, Indian tribes . . . which the law
of nations would regard as nothing more than wandering hordes, held
together only by ties of blood and habit, and having neither laws or
government, beyond what is required in a savage state.
Id. at 23, 27-28.
This same characterization was used by Justice Stanley Matthews in Ex parte KanGi-Shun-Ca (otherwise known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 3 S. Ct. 396, 27 L. Ed. 1030
(1883). Justice Matthews described Native Americans as leading a savage life.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:6h7b2i6ttw3l4t7pvbvxdith/bafkreih4usl4xndm4j7udmsbopzsbha4zznbk6ahlemijsxfj77lchvjpy@jpeg)
Reposted by Mark Joseph Stern
