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adulau.infosec.exchange.ap.brid.gy
ML-KEM Mythbusting

"There have been some recent concerns about ML-KEM, NIST’s standard for encryption with Post-Quantum Cryptography, related standards of the IETF, and lots of conspiracy theories about malicious actors subverting the standardization process. "

#pqc #pqcrypto #cybersecurity […]
Original post on infosec.exchange
infosec.exchange
December 5, 2025 at 5:30 AM
kommunikationsliebe.org
"Consensus means whatever the people in power want to do." -- djb

https://blog.cr.yp.to/20251123-dodging.html

#ietf #crypto #pqcrypto
cr.yp.to: 2025.11.23: NSA and IETF, part 3
blog.cr.yp.to
November 24, 2025 at 4:35 PM
NSA and IETF, part 3

cr.yp.to: 2025.11.23: NSA and IETF, part 3 Table of contents (Access-I for index page) 2025.11.23: NSA and IETF, part 4: An example of censored dissent. #pqcrypto/hashtag/pqcrypto" class="hover:underline text-blue-600 dark:text-sky-400 no-card-link">#pqcrypto #hybrids"/hashtag/hybrids" class="hover:underline text-blue-600 dark:text-sky-400 no-card-link">#hybrids #nsaref="/hashtag/nsa" class="hover:underline text-blue-600 dark:text-sky-400 no-card-link">#nsa #ietf #scope 2025.11.23: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand. #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa…
NSA and IETF, part 3
cr.yp.to: 2025.11.23: NSA and IETF, part 3 Table of contents (Access-I for index page) 2025.11.23: NSA and IETF, part 4: An example of censored dissent. #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #scope 2025.11.23: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand. #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #dodging 2025.11.23: NSA and IETF, part 2: Corruption continues. #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #corruption 2025.10.05: MODPOD: The collapse of IETF's protections for dissent. #ietf #objections #censorship #hybrids 2025.10.04: NSA and IETF: Can an attacker simply purchase standardization of weakened cryptography? #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #antitrust 2025.09.30: Surreptitious surveillance: On the importance of not being seen.
cnznews.com
November 24, 2025 at 12:30 PM
freehandle.bsky.social
@anthropic.com LOL Claude

● Great! pqcrypto.sign.ml_dsa_65 is available. Now let me check if it supports seed-based
key generation:

● ...

● Damn! pqcrypto also doesn't support seed-based generation. Let me check if there's a
_derand or seeded variant:
November 18, 2025 at 5:39 PM
thoreandan.bsky.social
2025.10.04: NSA and IETF: Can an attacker simply purchase standardization of weakened cryptography?
blog.cr.yp.to/20251004-wea...
#PQcrypto #hybrids #NSA #IETF #antitrust
It's normal for post-quantum cryptography to be rolled out as an extra layer of security on top of traditional pre-quantum cryptography, rather than as a replacement. For example, Google's CECPQ1 experiment was double encryption with traditional pre-quantum ECC (specifically X25519) and post-quantum NewHope1024. CECPQ2, a joint experiment between Google and Cloudflare, was ECC+NTRUHRSS701. CECPQ2b was ECC+SIKEp434. Ten SSH implementations support ECC+sntrup761. Today's usage of post- quantum cryptography by browsers is approaching half of the connections seen by Cloudfiare, where 95% of that is ECC+MLKEM768 and 5% is ECC+Kyber768 If post-quantum cryptography is designed to be super-strong, so strong that it even survives future quantum computers, then why are we keeping the ECC layer? Same reason that you wear your seatbelt: in the real world, cars sometimes crash, and seatbelts reduce the damage.
October 13, 2025 at 9:14 PM
thomasfricke.bsky.social
Is Post Quantum Crypto dead on arrival. At least there is a strange smell!

@djb

"Can an attacker simply purchase standardization of weakened cryptography? #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #antitrust

It's normal for post-quantum cryptography to be rolled out as an extra… https://23.social/@thomasfr…
October 12, 2025 at 12:00 PM
thomasfricke.23.social.ap.brid.gy
Is Post Quantum Crypto dead on arrival. At least there is a strange smell!

@djb

"Can an attacker simply purchase standardization of weakened cryptography? #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #antitrust

It's normal for post-quantum cryptography to be rolled out as an extra layer of security on top […]
Original post on 23.social
23.social
October 12, 2025 at 11:49 AM
eprint.ing.bot
Olingo: Threshold Lattice Signatures with DKG and Identifiable Abort (Kamil Doruk Gur, Patrick Hough, Jonathan Katz, Caroline Sandsbråten, Tjerand Silde) ia.cr/2025/1789
Abstract. We present Olingo, a framework for threshold lattice signatures that is the first to offer all desired properties for real-world implementations of quantum-secure threshold signatures: small keys and signatures, low communication and round complexity, non-interactive online signing, distributed key generation (DKG), and identifiable abort. Our starting point is the framework of Gur, Katz, and Silde (PQCrypto 2024). We change the underlying signature scheme to Raccoon (Katsumata et al., Crypto 2024), remove the trapdoor commitments, and apply numerous improvements and optimizations to achieve all the above properties. We provide detailed proofs of security for our new framework and present concrete parameters and benchmarks. At the 128-bit security level, for up to 1024 parties and supporting 2⁶⁰ signatures, our scheme has 2.6 KB public keys and 9.7 KB signatures; while signing requires communication of 953 KB per party. Using the LaBRADOR proof system (Beullens and Seiler, Crypto 2023), this can be further reduced to 596 KB. An optimistic non-interactive version of our scheme requires only 83 KB communication per party. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
October 3, 2025 at 7:25 AM
cosic.bsky.social
🎥 Just released! Watch the COSIC Seminar "FRIttata: Distributed Proof Generation of FRI-based SNARKs" by Hua Xu (KU Leuven): www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMHf...
📄 Read the full paper on #eprint: eprint.iacr.org/2025/1285
#FRIttata #SNARKs #PostQuantum #PQCrypto
COSIC Seminar "FRIttata: Distributed Proof Generation of FRI-based SNARKs" (Hua Xu, KU Leuven)
YouTube video by COSIC - Computer Security and Industrial Cryptography
www.youtube.com
July 28, 2025 at 2:52 PM
eprint.ing.bot
Quantum-Safe Hybrid Key Exchanges with KEM-Based Authentication (Christopher Battarbee, Christoph Striecks, Ludovic Perret, Sebastian Ramacher, Kevin Verhaeghe) ia.cr/2025/1228
Abstract. Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) between any two entities is one of the most important security protocols available for securing our digital networks and infrastructures. In PQCrypto 2023, Bruckner, Ramacher and Striecks proposed a novel hybrid AKE (HAKE) protocol dubbed Muckle+ that is particularly useful in large quantum-safe networks consisting of a large number of nodes. Their protocol is hybrid in the sense that it allows key material from conventional, post-quantum, and quantum cryptography primitives to be incorporated into a single end-to-end authenticated shared key. To achieve the desired authentication properties, Muckle+ utilizes post-quantum digital signatures. However, available instantiations of such signatures schemes are not yet efficient enough compared to their post-quantum key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) counterparts, particularly in large networks with potentially several connections in a short period of time. To mitigate this gap, we propose Muckle# that pushes the efficiency boundaries of currently known HAKE constructions. Muckle# uses post-quantum key-encapsulating mechanisms for implicit authentication inspired by recent works done in the area of Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols, particularly, in KEMTLS (CCS’20). We port those ideas to the HAKE framework and develop novel proof techniques on the way. Due to our KEM-based approach, the resulting protocol has a slightly different message flow compared to prior work that we carefully align with the HAKE framework and which makes our changes to Muckle+ non-trivial. Lastly, we evaluate the approach by a prototypical implementation and a direct comparison with Muckle+ to highlight the efficiency gains. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
July 9, 2025 at 1:22 AM
soatok.bsky.social
furry.engineer/@soatok/1147...

#crypto #pqc #pqcrypto #shitpost
Soatok Dreamseeker (@[email protected])
Old: MPC-in-the-Head cryptosystems Bold: Tulpa cryptosystens
furry.engineer
July 3, 2025 at 11:31 AM
cyberlensnews.bsky.social
Fortifying the Future: Explore advanced developmental frameworks shaping the Post-Quantum Cybersecurity era.

#Cybersecurity #PostQuantum #PQCrypto #TechFuture #BlueskyTech #QuantumResistance

cyberlens.beehiiv.com/p/fortifying...
Fortifying the Future: Advanced Developmental Frameworks for the Post-Quantum Cybersecurity Era
How Global Security Architects Are Building Agile, Cryptographically Resilient Systems to Withstand the Quantum Storm
cyberlens.beehiiv.com
June 18, 2025 at 2:27 AM
n0ahallen.bsky.social
🔐 Explore the future of digital security with the Post-Quantum Cryptography Market Research Report. Get insights on trends, growth drivers & key players shaping next-gen encryption. Stay ahead in cybersecurity!

#PostQuantum #CyberSecurity #Encryption #TechTrends #PQCrypto 🔒
Sample Request | Global Post -Quantum Cryptography Market Share, Size, Trends, Industry Analysis Report, By Solution, By Service, By Organization Size, By Vertical, By Region, Segment Forecast, 2024 -...
Post-quantum cryptography Market, including historical market sizes from 2019 to 2022 and forecasts for 2024 to 2031. The market is estimated to be valued at USD 357 Million in 2023 and is projected t...
www.statsandresearch.com
June 12, 2025 at 10:16 AM
craiggidney.bsky.social
Samuel Jacques has a quite timely and quite good talk at PQCrypto on the costs of quantum factoring and speculating about the future growth of quantum computers ( www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJxE... ).

My preprint fills in the "????" entry in his slides at 43:27 of the video.
Expected and Unexpected Developments in Quantum Computing
YouTube video by PQCrypto conference videos
www.youtube.com
May 23, 2025 at 2:11 PM
feistyduck.com
The PQCrypto 2025 conference was held in Taipei, and the videos and slides are now available. For most readers, the three invited talks will be of special interest: NIST PQC Standardization Moving Forward (video www.youtube.com/watch?v=XD3t..., slides pqcrypto2025.iis.sinica.edu.tw/slides/Invit...),
The End of the Beginning: NIST PQC Standardization Moving Forward
Video from PQCrypto 2025 conferencehttps://pqcrypto2025.iis.sinica.edu.tw/program.php
www.youtube.com
May 7, 2025 at 10:05 AM
campuscodi.risky.biz
Talks from the PQCrypto 2025 security conference, which took place in early April, are now available on YouTube

www.youtube.com/@PQCrypto-ut...
May 1, 2025 at 3:49 PM
eprint.ing.bot
Don’t Use It Twice: Reloaded! On the Lattice Isomorphism Group Action (Alessandro Budroni, Jesús-Javier Chi-Domínguez, Ermes Franch) ia.cr/2025/516
Abstract. Group actions have emerged as a powerful framework in post-quantum cryptography, serving as the foundation for various cryptographic primitives. The Lattice Isomorphism Problem (LIP) has recently gained attention as a promising hardness assumption for designing quantum-resistant protocols. Its formulation as a group action has opened the door to new cryptographic applications, including a commitment scheme and a linkable ring signatures. In this work, we analyze the security properties of the LIP group action and present new findings. Specifically, we demonstrate that it fails to satisfy the weak unpredictability and weak pseudorandomness properties when the adversary has access to as few as three and two instances with the same secret, respectively. This significantly improves upon prior analysis by Budroni et al. (PQCrypto 2024). As a direct consequence of our findings, we reveal a vulnerability in the linkable ring signature scheme proposed by Khuc et al. (SPACE 2024), demonstrating that the hardness assumption underlying the linkable anonymity property does not hold. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
March 21, 2025 at 1:07 AM
eprint.ing.bot
Reducing the Number of Qubits in Solving LWE (Barbara Jiabao Benedikt) ia.cr/2025/394
Abstract. At Crypto 2021, May presented an algorithm solving the ternary Learning-With-Error problem, where the solution is a ternary vector s ∈ {0,  ± 1}^(n) with a known number of (+1) and (−1) entries. This attack significantly improved the time complexity of 𝒮^(0.5) from previously known algorithms to 𝒮^(0.25), where 𝒮 is the size of the key space. Therefore, May exploited that using more representations, i.e., allowing ternary interim results with additional (+1) and (−1) entries, reduces the overall time complexity. Later, van Hoof et al. (PQCrypto 2021) combined May’s algorithm with quantum walks to a new attack that performs in time 𝒮^(0.19). However, this quantum attack requires an exponential amount of qubits. This work investigates whether the ternary LWE problem can also be solved using only 𝒪(n) qubits. Therefore, we look closely into Dicke states, which are an equal superposition over all binary vectors with a fixed Hamming weight. Generalizing Dicke states to ternary vectors makes these states applicable to the ternary LWE problem. Bärtschi and Eidenbenz (FCT 2019) proposed a quantum circuit to prepare binary Dicke states deterministically in linear time 𝒪(n). Their procedure benefits from the inductive structure of Dicke states, i.e., that a Dicke state of a particular dimension can be built from Dicke states of lower dimensions. Our work proves that this inductive structure is also present in generalized Dicke states with an underlying set other than {0, 1}^(n). Utilizing this structure, we introduce a new algorithm that deterministically prepares generalized Dicke states in linear time, for which we also provide an implementation in Qiskit. Finally, we apply our generalized Dicke states to the ternary LWE problem, and construct an algorithm that requires 𝒪(n) qubits and classical memory space up to 𝒮^(0.22). We achieve 𝒮^(0.379) as best obtainable time complexity. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
March 4, 2025 at 8:19 AM
nono2357.bsky.social
PQCrypto 2025 Registration - Post-quantum cryptography conference
https://pqcrypto2025.iis.sinica.edu.tw/registration.php
February 26, 2025 at 8:15 PM
altinucgen.bsky.social
Have you ever tried to click on “forgot your password?” option on PQCrypto registration webpage to receive your password by e-mail?🤡👹
February 25, 2025 at 5:09 PM
eprint.ing.bot
Asymptotic improvements to provable algorithms for the code equivalence problem (Huck Bennett, Drisana Bhatia, Jean-François Biasse, Medha Durisheti, Lucas LaBuff, Vincenzo Pallozzi Lavorante, Philip Waitkevich) ia.cr/2025/187
Abstract. We present several new provable algorithms for two variants of the code equivalence problem on linear error-correcting codes, the Linear Code Equivalence Problem (LCE) and the Permutation Code Equivalence Problem (PCE). Specifically, for arbitrary codes of block length n and dimension k over any finite field 𝔽_(q), we show: 1) A deterministic algorithm running in 2^(n + o(n+q)) time for LCE. 2) A randomized algorithm running in 2^(n/2 + o(n+q)) time for LCE and PCE. 3) A quantum algorithm running in 2^(n/3 + o(n+q)) time for LCE and PCE. The first algorithm complements the deterministic roughly 2^(n)-time algorithm of Babai (SODA 2011) for PCE. The second two algorithms improve on recent work of Nowakowski (PQCrypto 2025), which gave algorithms with similar running times, but only for code equivalence on codes and only over fields of order q ≥ 7.
February 10, 2025 at 2:09 AM
jurrevanbergen.nl
Cryptographers working on PQCrypto:

OMG, McEliece has several MB of public keys! How is this ever going to be adopted??

The website of CNN is ~27MB.
January 27, 2025 at 5:42 PM
weetechsolution.bsky.social
Wondering what is Post Quantum Cryptography and how does it work? Check out this post to learn about Post-Quantum Cryptography in detail. Read now! #PostQuantumCryptography #QuantumSafeSecurity #QuantumComputing #PQCrypto #FutureOfSecurity #TechTrends

www.weetechsolution.com/blog/what-is...
What is Post Quantum Cryptography and How Does it Work?
Wondering what is Post Quantum Cryptography and how does it work? Check out this post to learn about Post-Quantum Cryptography in detail. Read now!
www.weetechsolution.com
December 9, 2024 at 12:31 PM
buherator.bsky.social
[RSS] TLS 1.3 Hybrid Key Exchange using X25519Kyber768 / ML-KEM

https://www.netmeister.org/blog/tls-hybrid-kex.html

#cryptoraphy #tls #pqcrypto


Original post
November 4, 2024 at 8:53 AM
eprint.ing.bot
The Role of Message-Bound Signatures for the Beyond UnForgeability Features and Weak Keys (Samed Düzlü, Patrick Struck) ia.cr/2024/1669
Abstract. In the present work, we establish a new relationship among the Beyond UnForgeability Features (BUFF) introduced by Cremers et al. (SP’21). There, the BUFF notions have been shown to be independent of one another. On the other hand, the analysis by Aulbach et al. (PQCrypto’24) reveals that one of the BUFF notions—message-bound signatures (MBS)—is achieved by most schemes. To achieve BUFF security, there is the generic BUFF transform that achieves all the beyond unforgeability features. The BUFF transform works by signing a hash of the public key and the message (rather than just the message), and appending this hash value to the signature. The need for appending the hash comes from the intuitive notion of weak keys that verify all message-signature pairs. We explain that MBS security effectively rules out the possibility of weak keys. This opens the possibility for a more efficient transform to achieve BUFF. We show that this transform, first introduced by Pornin and Stern (ACNS’05), indeed suffices to achieve BUFF security, if the original signature schemes satisfies MBS. Only in the malicious setting of exclusive ownership, we present an attack on UOV, even after applying the PS-3 transform. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
October 18, 2024 at 2:38 AM