Zach Bleemer
@zbleemer.bsky.social
Assistant Professor of Economics at Princeton and NBER | Education and Economic Mobility
Altogether, changes in institutional returns (30%), major composition (25%), and two-year and for-profit composition (20%) explain most of the regressivity trend.
This is why going to college has become less valuable for poor students.
This is why going to college has become less valuable for poor students.
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
Altogether, changes in institutional returns (30%), major composition (25%), and two-year and for-profit composition (20%) explain most of the regressivity trend.
This is why going to college has become less valuable for poor students.
This is why going to college has become less valuable for poor students.
The for-profit sector peaked in the 2000s and has dramatically shrunk. But recent growth of the community colleges disproportionately holds poor students back.
Poor students' diversion to these lower-value colleges explains about 20% of the rise in collegiate regressivity.
Poor students' diversion to these lower-value colleges explains about 20% of the rise in collegiate regressivity.
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
The for-profit sector peaked in the 2000s and has dramatically shrunk. But recent growth of the community colleges disproportionately holds poor students back.
Poor students' diversion to these lower-value colleges explains about 20% of the rise in collegiate regressivity.
Poor students' diversion to these lower-value colleges explains about 20% of the rise in collegiate regressivity.
Trend 3️⃣ explaining the rise of collegiate regressivity is the growth of community colleges and the for-profit sector.
Students who attend these schools derive lower value-added from them. Since the 1980s, those students have been disproportionately poor.
Students who attend these schools derive lower value-added from them. Since the 1980s, those students have been disproportionately poor.
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
Trend 3️⃣ explaining the rise of collegiate regressivity is the growth of community colleges and the for-profit sector.
Students who attend these schools derive lower value-added from them. Since the 1980s, those students have been disproportionately poor.
Students who attend these schools derive lower value-added from them. Since the 1980s, those students have been disproportionately poor.
We all know that the humanities are shrinking. It turns out that most of that decline is coming from rich students.
Possibly for the first time ever, poor students are now more likely to be humanities majors than rich students.
That's bad for economic mobility.
Possibly for the first time ever, poor students are now more likely to be humanities majors than rich students.
That's bad for economic mobility.
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
We all know that the humanities are shrinking. It turns out that most of that decline is coming from rich students.
Possibly for the first time ever, poor students are now more likely to be humanities majors than rich students.
That's bad for economic mobility.
Possibly for the first time ever, poor students are now more likely to be humanities majors than rich students.
That's bad for economic mobility.
Sometimes, like in the 1920s or the 1990s, poor and rich college students earn similar-value majors.
Today, though, poor students earn much lower-paying majors than the rich. This explains 25% of regressivity.
Two disciplines are most at fault: humanities and computer science.
Today, though, poor students earn much lower-paying majors than the rich. This explains 25% of regressivity.
Two disciplines are most at fault: humanities and computer science.
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
Sometimes, like in the 1920s or the 1990s, poor and rich college students earn similar-value majors.
Today, though, poor students earn much lower-paying majors than the rich. This explains 25% of regressivity.
Two disciplines are most at fault: humanities and computer science.
Today, though, poor students earn much lower-paying majors than the rich. This explains 25% of regressivity.
Two disciplines are most at fault: humanities and computer science.
Trend 2️⃣ driving collegiate regressivity is the most surprising. This one is about college majors.
There are huge differences in wage value across majors. They haven't changed much over time.
Humanities at the bottom. Engineering at the top. The gap has widened.
There are huge differences in wage value across majors. They haven't changed much over time.
Humanities at the bottom. Engineering at the top. The gap has widened.
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
Trend 2️⃣ driving collegiate regressivity is the most surprising. This one is about college majors.
There are huge differences in wage value across majors. They haven't changed much over time.
Humanities at the bottom. Engineering at the top. The gap has widened.
There are huge differences in wage value across majors. They haven't changed much over time.
Humanities at the bottom. Engineering at the top. The gap has widened.
If colleges' value-added hadn't changed since 1960, rich and poor students would have always attended similar-value schools.
But using current value-added, poor students attend lower-value uni's.
Teaching-oriented publics' deterioration explains 30% of collegiate regressivity.
But using current value-added, poor students attend lower-value uni's.
Teaching-oriented publics' deterioration explains 30% of collegiate regressivity.
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
If colleges' value-added hadn't changed since 1960, rich and poor students would have always attended similar-value schools.
But using current value-added, poor students attend lower-value uni's.
Teaching-oriented publics' deterioration explains 30% of collegiate regressivity.
But using current value-added, poor students attend lower-value uni's.
Teaching-oriented publics' deterioration explains 30% of collegiate regressivity.
College quality varies widely: e.g. research-oriented publics have 2x the per-student revenue of teaching-oriented publics.
That money buys value. We measure colleges' "value-added": the degree to which they increase future wages.
Poor students' colleges' value has fallen.
That money buys value. We measure colleges' "value-added": the degree to which they increase future wages.
Poor students' colleges' value has fallen.
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
College quality varies widely: e.g. research-oriented publics have 2x the per-student revenue of teaching-oriented publics.
That money buys value. We measure colleges' "value-added": the degree to which they increase future wages.
Poor students' colleges' value has fallen.
That money buys value. We measure colleges' "value-added": the degree to which they increase future wages.
Poor students' colleges' value has fallen.
Number 1️⃣ is about changes in colleges' quality.
Rich students have always mostly attended private and research public universities. Poor students mostly go to teaching-oriented publics.
That's still true. But the teaching-oriented publics have deteriorated in value.
Rich students have always mostly attended private and research public universities. Poor students mostly go to teaching-oriented publics.
That's still true. But the teaching-oriented publics have deteriorated in value.
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
Number 1️⃣ is about changes in colleges' quality.
Rich students have always mostly attended private and research public universities. Poor students mostly go to teaching-oriented publics.
That's still true. But the teaching-oriented publics have deteriorated in value.
Rich students have always mostly attended private and research public universities. Poor students mostly go to teaching-oriented publics.
That's still true. But the teaching-oriented publics have deteriorated in value.
We first plot the slope of the college-going premium by parental income over time. Positive numbers mean the premium is regressive.
Between 1920 and 1960, the premium was equal for the rich and poor. It's been getting more regressive since then.
Three factors explain the trend:
Between 1920 and 1960, the premium was equal for the rich and poor. It's been getting more regressive since then.
Three factors explain the trend:
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
We first plot the slope of the college-going premium by parental income over time. Positive numbers mean the premium is regressive.
Between 1920 and 1960, the premium was equal for the rich and poor. It's been getting more regressive since then.
Three factors explain the trend:
Between 1920 and 1960, the premium was equal for the rich and poor. It's been getting more regressive since then.
Three factors explain the trend:
To identify and trace the causes of rising collegiate regressivity, we combine dozens of nationally-representative survey and admin datasets spanning 1900-2023.
The data include the parental income, college, major, and early-30s wages of hundreds of thousands of Americans.
The data include the parental income, college, major, and early-30s wages of hundreds of thousands of Americans.
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
To identify and trace the causes of rising collegiate regressivity, we combine dozens of nationally-representative survey and admin datasets spanning 1900-2023.
The data include the parental income, college, major, and early-30s wages of hundreds of thousands of Americans.
The data include the parental income, college, major, and early-30s wages of hundreds of thousands of Americans.
In the early 1900s, the wage premium for going to college was the same for sons from both rich and poor families : +10 ranks (+15%) in the wage distribution.
Today, the wage premium has grown for the rich but sharply fallen for the poor. We call this "collegiate regressivity".
Today, the wage premium has grown for the rich but sharply fallen for the poor. We call this "collegiate regressivity".
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
In the early 1900s, the wage premium for going to college was the same for sons from both rich and poor families : +10 ranks (+15%) in the wage distribution.
Today, the wage premium has grown for the rich but sharply fallen for the poor. We call this "collegiate regressivity".
Today, the wage premium has grown for the rich but sharply fallen for the poor. We call this "collegiate regressivity".
New study: The relative wage premium for going to college has halved for low-income Americans since 1960.
What is to blame? Rising selectivity? Tuition hikes? State disinvestment? We decompose changes in the premium since 1900 to find out.
🧵#EconTwitter nber.org/papers/w33797
What is to blame? Rising selectivity? Tuition hikes? State disinvestment? We decompose changes in the premium since 1900 to find out.
🧵#EconTwitter nber.org/papers/w33797
May 19, 2025 at 11:24 AM
New study: The relative wage premium for going to college has halved for low-income Americans since 1960.
What is to blame? Rising selectivity? Tuition hikes? State disinvestment? We decompose changes in the premium since 1900 to find out.
🧵#EconTwitter nber.org/papers/w33797
What is to blame? Rising selectivity? Tuition hikes? State disinvestment? We decompose changes in the premium since 1900 to find out.
🧵#EconTwitter nber.org/papers/w33797
Insurer consolidation alone explains a $1,200 increase in per-worker premiums since 2000. A simple models shows that killed 200,000 non-college jobs.
Premiums rose even faster than that, though; up $5k in inflation-adjusted dollars. That killed a million jobs in all.
Premiums rose even faster than that, though; up $5k in inflation-adjusted dollars. That killed a million jobs in all.
November 25, 2024 at 7:54 PM
Insurer consolidation alone explains a $1,200 increase in per-worker premiums since 2000. A simple models shows that killed 200,000 non-college jobs.
Premiums rose even faster than that, though; up $5k in inflation-adjusted dollars. That killed a million jobs in all.
Premiums rose even faster than that, though; up $5k in inflation-adjusted dollars. That killed a million jobs in all.
But the big story is in employment. Firms that were exposed to rising premiums saw a 4% employment decline, mostly among workers earning 20-60k.
Some of those workers find work at less-exposed competitor firms, but half remain unemployed or turn to self-employment.
Some of those workers find work at less-exposed competitor firms, but half remain unemployed or turn to self-employment.
November 25, 2024 at 7:54 PM
But the big story is in employment. Firms that were exposed to rising premiums saw a 4% employment decline, mostly among workers earning 20-60k.
Some of those workers find work at less-exposed competitor firms, but half remain unemployed or turn to self-employment.
Some of those workers find work at less-exposed competitor firms, but half remain unemployed or turn to self-employment.
Jess links her premium estimates to firms and employees using detailed Census data in the LEHD.
She finds that current employees' wages were unaffected. New employees took a 5% pay cut, but this is still only a 20% pass-through of the additional premiums.
She finds that current employees' wages were unaffected. New employees took a 5% pay cut, but this is still only a 20% pass-through of the additional premiums.
November 25, 2024 at 7:54 PM
Jess links her premium estimates to firms and employees using detailed Census data in the LEHD.
She finds that current employees' wages were unaffected. New employees took a 5% pay cut, but this is still only a 20% pass-through of the additional premiums.
She finds that current employees' wages were unaffected. New employees took a 5% pay cut, but this is still only a 20% pass-through of the additional premiums.
Jess identifies over 100 insurer mergers since 1999. Some occurred between firms that had previously competed against each other in local markets.
After those mergers, annual healthcare premiums in those markets rose by over $400 per enrollee, or 10%. Quality did not improve.
After those mergers, annual healthcare premiums in those markets rose by over $400 per enrollee, or 10%. Quality did not improve.
November 25, 2024 at 7:54 PM
Jess identifies over 100 insurer mergers since 1999. Some occurred between firms that had previously competed against each other in local markets.
After those mergers, annual healthcare premiums in those markets rose by over $400 per enrollee, or 10%. Quality did not improve.
After those mergers, annual healthcare premiums in those markets rose by over $400 per enrollee, or 10%. Quality did not improve.
Employer healthcare premiums have more than doubled since 2000.
This doesn't matter for low-wage employment; they don't get health benefits. And it's only a small share of the wage bill of high-wage employees.
But the relative cost of middle-income workers has skyrocketed.
This doesn't matter for low-wage employment; they don't get health benefits. And it's only a small share of the wage bill of high-wage employees.
But the relative cost of middle-income workers has skyrocketed.
November 25, 2024 at 7:54 PM
Employer healthcare premiums have more than doubled since 2000.
This doesn't matter for low-wage employment; they don't get health benefits. And it's only a small share of the wage bill of high-wage employees.
But the relative cost of middle-income workers has skyrocketed.
This doesn't matter for low-wage employment; they don't get health benefits. And it's only a small share of the wage bill of high-wage employees.
But the relative cost of middle-income workers has skyrocketed.
Non-college US employment has declined by over 1,000,000 since 2000 because average employer healthcare premiums have doubled, making middle-income workers not worth hiring.
A great new (job market!) paper by Jessica Min tells the story. 🧵
jessica-min.com
#EconTwitter
A great new (job market!) paper by Jessica Min tells the story. 🧵
jessica-min.com
#EconTwitter
November 25, 2024 at 7:54 PM
Non-college US employment has declined by over 1,000,000 since 2000 because average employer healthcare premiums have doubled, making middle-income workers not worth hiring.
A great new (job market!) paper by Jessica Min tells the story. 🧵
jessica-min.com
#EconTwitter
A great new (job market!) paper by Jessica Min tells the story. 🧵
jessica-min.com
#EconTwitter