Yohsuke Murase
@yohm.bsky.social
Team director of the Mathematical Social Science team at RIKEN iTHEMS.
Interested in complex systems, network science, computational social science, and evolutionary game theory.
https://yohm.github.io/
Interested in complex systems, network science, computational social science, and evolutionary game theory.
https://yohm.github.io/
This is awesome! Very natural and engaging.
September 22, 2025 at 12:21 AM
This is awesome! Very natural and engaging.
The call is closed. We appreciate a lot of applications. Thank you!
September 12, 2025 at 12:28 AM
The call is closed. We appreciate a lot of applications. Thank you!
This suggests punishment plays a bigger role in indirect reciprocity than previously thought, especially in noisy environments where deception is common. Please check out our paper for more details.
sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
Costly punishment sustains indirect reciprocity under low defection detectability
Cooperation is fundamental to human societies, and indirect reciprocity, where individuals cooperate to build a positive reputation for future benefit…
sciencedirect.com
January 21, 2025 at 1:52 AM
This suggests punishment plays a bigger role in indirect reciprocity than previously thought, especially in noisy environments where deception is common. Please check out our paper for more details.
sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
Free riders naturally try to hide defection, making detection harder. Our analysis shows that in such cases, punishment is the most efficient evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) to maintain cooperation.
January 21, 2025 at 1:52 AM
Free riders naturally try to hide defection, making detection harder. Our analysis shows that in such cases, punishment is the most efficient evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) to maintain cooperation.
Our study challenges this by showing that costly punishment can be highly effective when detecting free riders is difficult. If defectors can disguise their actions, punishment becomes the best strategy to sustain cooperation.
January 21, 2025 at 1:52 AM
Our study challenges this by showing that costly punishment can be highly effective when detecting free riders is difficult. If defectors can disguise their actions, punishment becomes the best strategy to sustain cooperation.
When reputation assessment is prone to errors, punishment can suppress free riders. But the earlier studies argued that frequent punishment lowers overall payoffs, making it less effective than ALLD. Its usefulness was thought to be very limited.
January 21, 2025 at 1:52 AM
When reputation assessment is prone to errors, punishment can suppress free riders. But the earlier studies argued that frequent punishment lowers overall payoffs, making it less effective than ALLD. Its usefulness was thought to be very limited.
For instance, Ohtsuki et al. (Nature, 2009) found punishment ineffective in indirect reciprocity. When reputations are accurately assessed, simply refusing to cooperate deters free riders—costly punishment isn't needed.
January 21, 2025 at 1:52 AM
For instance, Ohtsuki et al. (Nature, 2009) found punishment ineffective in indirect reciprocity. When reputations are accurately assessed, simply refusing to cooperate deters free riders—costly punishment isn't needed.