Windward
@windward-ai.bsky.social
Predictive intelligence fusing AI, big data, and maritime expertise to enable future forward decisions.
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⚓️ Follow @windward-ai.bsky.social for more #ShipoftheDay insights into the shadow fleet, sanctions evasion, and deceptive shipping practices.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
⚓️ Follow @windward-ai.bsky.social for more #ShipoftheDay insights into the shadow fleet, sanctions evasion, and deceptive shipping practices.
14. Lion 1 shows how fast legitimate fleets can be absorbed into the dark network, and how sanctions enforcement is struggling to keep pace with rapid ownership and flag changes.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
14. Lion 1 shows how fast legitimate fleets can be absorbed into the dark network, and how sanctions enforcement is struggling to keep pace with rapid ownership and flag changes.
13. These tankers have yet to catch the regulators’ eyes. Whether their sanctions-free stint lasts longer than Lion I remains to be seen.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
13. These tankers have yet to catch the regulators’ eyes. Whether their sanctions-free stint lasts longer than Lion I remains to be seen.
12. At least 17 such clean tankers, all sold in the past eight months, were tracked in October loading Russian crude from Baltic and Pacific ports.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
12. At least 17 such clean tankers, all sold in the past eight months, were tracked in October loading Russian crude from Baltic and Pacific ports.
11. Ownership is hidden behind single-ship, special purpose vehicles for registered owner, shipmanager and technical manager in China, Hong Kong or Seychelles making ownership impossible to determine.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
11. Ownership is hidden behind single-ship, special purpose vehicles for registered owner, shipmanager and technical manager in China, Hong Kong or Seychelles making ownership impossible to determine.
10. This new cohort of newly sold tankers have the same sales and ownership pattern. They are bought by anonymous Chinese or Hong Kong entities, or those in the Seychelles and immediately sail for Russia.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
10. This new cohort of newly sold tankers have the same sales and ownership pattern. They are bought by anonymous Chinese or Hong Kong entities, or those in the Seychelles and immediately sail for Russia.
9. Very few tankers that have been deployed exclusively in Russian oil trades over the past three years remain unsanctioned. This has created high demand for so-called “clean” tonnage.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
9. Very few tankers that have been deployed exclusively in Russian oil trades over the past three years remain unsanctioned. This has created high demand for so-called “clean” tonnage.
8. Although quickly singled out by regulators, dozens of tankers like Lion 1 have been sold by European owners this year only to see vessels find their way to Russia’s dark fleet, yet remain under the radar.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
8. Although quickly singled out by regulators, dozens of tankers like Lion 1 have been sold by European owners this year only to see vessels find their way to Russia’s dark fleet, yet remain under the radar.
7. After blacklisting, Lion 1 was deleted from Panama’s registry, briefly signaled the fraudulent flag of Benin, and later reflagged to Gambia on October 7.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
7. After blacklisting, Lion 1 was deleted from Panama’s registry, briefly signaled the fraudulent flag of Benin, and later reflagged to Gambia on October 7.
6. Windward immediately flagged the tanker for dark activities, multiple MMSI changes, and port call risks soon after its sale.
The company structure also appeared irregular, with rapid ownership changes post-sanction, and signs of GNSS manipulation.
The company structure also appeared irregular, with rapid ownership changes post-sanction, and signs of GNSS manipulation.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
6. Windward immediately flagged the tanker for dark activities, multiple MMSI changes, and port call risks soon after its sale.
The company structure also appeared irregular, with rapid ownership changes post-sanction, and signs of GNSS manipulation.
The company structure also appeared irregular, with rapid ownership changes post-sanction, and signs of GNSS manipulation.
5. There, it loaded Urals crude for India’s Nayara refinery, which is under sanctions. A second trip from Primorsk to India followed before the EU blacklisted Lion 1 on July 19 as it returned for a third load. The UK followed on October 16.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
5. There, it loaded Urals crude for India’s Nayara refinery, which is under sanctions. A second trip from Primorsk to India followed before the EU blacklisted Lion 1 on July 19 as it returned for a third load. The UK followed on October 16.
4. Days after the sale was finalized in late February, the vessel changed its name from Saetta, reflagged to Panama, and sailed for Primorsk, Russia.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
4. Days after the sale was finalized in late February, the vessel changed its name from Saetta, reflagged to Panama, and sailed for Primorsk, Russia.
3. Five months and two Russian cargoes later, Lion 1 was sanctioned, compromising its trading. This is one of the fastest transitions from legitimate trade to blacklisting seen in the dark fleet.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
3. Five months and two Russian cargoes later, Lion 1 was sanctioned, compromising its trading. This is one of the fastest transitions from legitimate trade to blacklisting seen in the dark fleet.
2. Lion 1 entered the high-risk world of Russian oil shipping in March after a Greece-based owner sold the 2009-built aframax to an anonymous single-ship company in the Seychelles.
November 11, 2025 at 9:45 AM
2. Lion 1 entered the high-risk world of Russian oil shipping in March after a Greece-based owner sold the 2009-built aframax to an anonymous single-ship company in the Seychelles.
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November 6, 2025 at 10:28 AM
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9. Whether a test, an interference experiment, or a broader information operation, it shows how fragile public AIS networks remain when a single ground station is exploited.
November 6, 2025 at 10:28 AM
9. Whether a test, an interference experiment, or a broader information operation, it shows how fragile public AIS networks remain when a single ground station is exploited.
8. This satellite SAR image confirms only a handful of real vessels were actually present, and serves as the ultimate proof that this was a mass AIS interference event.
November 6, 2025 at 10:28 AM
8. This satellite SAR image confirms only a handful of real vessels were actually present, and serves as the ultimate proof that this was a mass AIS interference event.
7. This was not a system glitch. It appears to be a deliberate, coordinated attempt to flood AIS data with fabricated signals.
November 6, 2025 at 10:28 AM
7. This was not a system glitch. It appears to be a deliberate, coordinated attempt to flood AIS data with fabricated signals.
6. 🔍 What stands out:
• All positions clustered at similar locations.
• Transmissions used dead or decommissioned MMSIs.
• No vessel tracks, names, or IMO data (Type 23 messages missing).
• Event lasted ~30 minutes before vanishing entirely.
• All positions clustered at similar locations.
• Transmissions used dead or decommissioned MMSIs.
• No vessel tracks, names, or IMO data (Type 23 messages missing).
• Event lasted ~30 minutes before vanishing entirely.
November 6, 2025 at 10:28 AM
6. 🔍 What stands out:
• All positions clustered at similar locations.
• Transmissions used dead or decommissioned MMSIs.
• No vessel tracks, names, or IMO data (Type 23 messages missing).
• Event lasted ~30 minutes before vanishing entirely.
• All positions clustered at similar locations.
• Transmissions used dead or decommissioned MMSIs.
• No vessel tracks, names, or IMO data (Type 23 messages missing).
• Event lasted ~30 minutes before vanishing entirely.
5. Signals seem to have been injected directly into the data feed servicing public AIS platforms, producing a large-scale but short-lived interference burst.
November 6, 2025 at 10:28 AM
5. Signals seem to have been injected directly into the data feed servicing public AIS platforms, producing a large-scale but short-lived interference burst.
4. Initial analysis suggests a terrestrial AIS base station in Finland may have been compromised, either through hacking or spoofed VHF transmissions near the station.
November 6, 2025 at 10:28 AM
4. Initial analysis suggests a terrestrial AIS base station in Finland may have been compromised, either through hacking or spoofed VHF transmissions near the station.