Vlad Surdea-Hernea
banner
vladsurdea.bsky.social
Vlad Surdea-Hernea
@vladsurdea.bsky.social
Ph.D. in (Historical) Political Economy at the Central European University. Master of Public Policy at the Hertie School of Governance.

https://vladsurdea.com/
18/18 You can read the full working paper here (Appendix to come very soon):

www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/c8hwa...
www.dropbox.com
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
17/18 These (preliminary) findings suggest we need to rethink how authoritarian legacies work.

It is not just the violence that leaves a mark. By providing public goods, extremist movements can build a consensual legacy that lies in wait, ready to be weaponized by the right political entrepreneur.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
16/18 But was this legacy always active, and did all far-right candidates benefit from it? Using the 2000 election, I show Georgescu unlocked a unique effect. His specific neo-legionary framing activated dormant sympathies that previous nationalists like Vadim Tudor failed to fully tap.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
15/18 The key question, that we sometimes forget to ask in legacy studies, is then how did this memory survive for 80 years? I find three local carriers/mechanisms: Orthodox churches, nationalist NGOs, and street names. Places that hosted camps have significantly more of these "physical anchors".
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
14/18 Finally, extensive checks confirm the robustness of the main findings. The results hold when dropping any single spatial grid cell or trimming outliers. A placebo test using distance to 1936 universities shows no relationship, ruling out broad developmental confounders.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
13/18 But could unobservable factors explain this? Unlikely. Selection on unobservables would need to be 3x stronger than observables to nullify the result. I also control for key rival explanations, including interwar economic development and agrarian party strength, without altering the findings.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
12/18 I address spatial interference thoroughly. Beyond a "donut" design that excludes immediate neighbors, I run placebos on untreated rings and control for the average political leanings of the neighborhood. The camp effect remains distinct, ruling out diffusion as the alternative explanation.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
11/18 But is this just a boost to the general far-right sentiment? No. When comparing Georgescu to rival George Simion (who avoided Iron Guard symbolism), camp localities specifically broke for Georgescu. Voters recognized and responded to the specific historical signal over generic populism.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
10/18 Some tests for heterogeneity further supports my theory. The effect of the camps is concentrated in rural areas, where face-to-face networks preserve memory best. In urban centers, where populations churn and narratives dilute, the legacy effect fades significantly.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
9/18 The results are quite telling (and robust!). Localities that hosted Iron Guard camps showed 1.06 to 1.19 percentage points higher support for Georgescu compared to their direct neighbors. In a tight race, this legacy vote translated to over 100,000 votes, quite a decisive margin.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
8/18 Nevertheless, I employ entropy balancing to address selection bias. I reweight neighbor localities to match camp sites on traits like interwar far-right voting, university distance, Greek-Catholic counts, imperial history, early schooling, trade routes, ethnicity, borders & battles.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
7/18 Why does this comparison work? The 1931 borders were drawn by decentralized commissions for land registries, not political sorting. These boundaries had low salience, making it implausible that camp placement was targeted relative to the inter-locality border line itself.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
6/18 To isolate the causal effect of the public goods provided by the far-right in the 1930s, I compiled data on 274 Iron Guard camps. I use a boundary-matched design with grid-cell fixed effect to compare camp localities strictly to their immediate neighbors within the same spatial block.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
5/18 Fast forward to 2024, when Călin Georgescu acted as a mnemonic entrepreneur for the far-right, explicitly mimicking the Iron Guard template. He praised their leaders, quoted their manifestos, and even staged visuals—like riding a white horse in peasant clothes—to mirror their propaganda.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
4/18 I further theorise that such memories are dormant until activated. Thus, the infrastructure built in the 1930s doesn't automatically generate far-right votes. Instead, it makes these communities "activatable" when a politician connects those specific historical symbols to modern grievances
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
3/18 I claim this created a "mnemonic infrastructure" of the movement as builders and helpers, not just criminals. Between 1932 and 1937, these camps operated nationwide. You can see the density of this network in the map below, showing where the Iron Guard established a physical footprint.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
2/18 Most research on the legacy of fascism focuses on violence and repression. However, we often overlook that these movements also provided public goods to gain legitimacy. In the 1930s, the Iron Guard ran education and work camps that (re)built churches and roads, and provided food to the poor.
November 19, 2025 at 1:38 PM
The article is (now) published in Comparative Political Studies:

journals.sagepub.com/eprint/CAN8D...

End of 🧵
Sage Journals: Discover world-class research
Subscription and open access journals from Sage, the world's leading independent academic publisher.
journals.sagepub.com
September 27, 2025 at 10:37 AM
Process tracing, followed by a survey of Revolution participants provides further proof. A vast majority stated they were motivated by a "duty to participate" and it being the "right thing to do", while most did not believe regime change was possible at the outset.

11/🧵
September 27, 2025 at 10:37 AM
They were also more likely to vote against neo-communist presidential candidates in the 1992 and 2004 elections.

10/🧵
September 27, 2025 at 10:37 AM
These anti-communist norms persisted long after 1989. In the early 1990s, "Gulag localities" saw more anti-government protests against the communist successors.

9/🧵
September 27, 2025 at 10:37 AM
We also provide preliminary evidence for our norm-based mechanism. First, exposure to the Gulag is linked to lower membership in the Romanian Communist Party. People in these areas were less likely to join the party, even when it was beneficial to do so.

8/🧵
September 27, 2025 at 10:37 AM