Judas Everett is a researcher on the history and contemporary issues of Central Eastern Europe. He lives in Odesa.
You can read Judas’ first article for Tochnyi here:
tochnyi.info/2025/11/the-... 11/11

Cracks will first show in the regions. Falling payouts and squeezed budgets put Russia’s recruitment model in peril.
Russia’s recruitment challenges won’t start in Moscow - but in provinces that can’t afford to meet recruitment targets. 10/11

The Kremlin’s choices are all destructive:
– Seize more oligarch wealth
– Mobilise unwilling men
– Return to hybrid war
– Or accept “peace” and give up on their earlier war goals. 9/11

Crucially, bonuses are currently being slashed: Bashkortostan ₽1.6m→₽1m, Yamalo-Nenets ₽3.1m→₽1.9m, Samara ₽3.6m→₽2.1m, Belgorod ₽3m→₽0.8m.
Some regions have suspended payments, others look set to follow. The recruitment machine is under threat and could break down. 8/11

Regional bonuses of up to ₽3 million make “volunteering” irresistible. Regional budgets are now straining under this recruitment model. Despite being in the black in 2024, deficits in 2025 have reached ₽724.8 billion - a huge burden for provinces funding an illegal war. 7/11

Before the war, 3.5m Russians were unemployed and 17.8m lived below the poverty line. A 1.4m₽ sign-up bonus is life-changing. Poverty, especially in the regions, has been a key factor in keeping Russia’s army supplied for nearly four years. 6/11

Unlike its earlier wars, Russia now fights with contract soldiers who signed up voluntarily. They’re signing up for cash to invade a neighbour and commit war crimes. This model rests on decades of inequality and poverty. 5/11

Russian military pay isn’t life-changing. The real draw is the bonuses: 400k₽ (about 5,147 US dollars) from Moscow plus millions from regions. For “economically unproductive” Russians with no prospects, that’s hard to turn down. 4/11

Russia’s centralised decision-making hides a crucial truth: its recruitment model relies on impoverished regions, where, along with the ideological motivation to kill Ukrainians, economic hardship drives enlistment. 3/11

Russia’s recruitment model relies on regional poverty and financial coercion. Life-changing sums maintain the flow of men into the military. If regional budgets cannot support recruitment, Moscow’s ability to pay men to kill and commit war crimes will be greatly reduced. 2/11

And on top of that, he’s not just analyzing sanctions, hehe helps enforcing them.

▶️ Erlend Bollman Bjørtvedt works directly with authorities to shut down RU sanction evasion networks and choke its war economy.

3/ What’s next? Together with @warunitobserver.bsky.social we’re building a public, contribution-friendly platform for RU/UA military unit data - Our goal is to collect as much available data as possible about the units, their soldiers and their equipment

2/ The article - written by @geschlittert.bsky.social - offers a glimpse into 14 months of work tracking the force structure of Russia and Ukraine:
• 36,000+ unit positions
• 8,356+ military units (since early 2024)
• The focus is on units directly involved in the war