💥 ¿Contribuyen los jueces a la polarización?
Según nuestra encuesta, más de la mitad de la izquierda dice que sí.
En la derecha, la mayoría cree que no contribuyen.

📉 La percepción de independencia judicial cae desde finales de los 80, y la caída es mucho mayor entre la izquierda.

La derecha apenas se mueve.

📈 La confianza en los tribunales aumenta… pero solo en la derecha.
En la izquierda está prácticamente estancada.

En 2009 no había brecha; en 2025 se ha agrandado.

Thanks for asking. I do not find any differences among Vox voters regarding political interest, talking about politics, or following the political campaigns between April and November.

Thank you! The availability of variables does not allow for direct control of political efficacy, but I do control for political interest. Moreover, among Vox's voters, there are no differences in talking about politics, political interest, or following the campaigns between April and November.

Surveys can be shaped by stigma, since some voters hide their preferences. But neighborhood-level returns confirm the pattern: Vox was strongest in wealthier areas in April 🏙️, and grew fastest in poorer districts by November 🏚️. Support spread downward as stigma declined.

In April 2019, Vox voters were mostly from higher-income groups 💶. By November, the biggest gains came from poorer voters. Using both post-electoral surveys and panel data, we see the income gap in support narrowed as stigma weakened.

The results fit the expectation. In April 2019, poorer voters were less likely to admit supporting Vox if a third person was present 👀. In online (private) surveys 💻 their support rose. Richer voters showed no gap, and by Nov 2019 the gap had faded. Plus, for other parties, there was no difference.

In my paper, I use the case of Vox in Spain 🇪🇸. The far right stayed marginal for decades, then Vox suddenly broke through in 2018. Two elections just 6 months apart let us see how stigma declined — after Vox entered parliament 🏛️ and the mainstream right struck deals with them 🤝.

Lastly, we tested our argument in a different setting. The Andalusian regional elections in late 2018 marked Vox’s first success. We observe more people admit to having voted for Vox after the Christmas holidays 🎄🗳️

Our findings:
1️⃣ Destination: Visits from areas with higher normalization increased normalization.
2️⃣ Origins: Travelers returning from normalized areas spread these perceptions back home, especially when other travelers come from regions with higher normalization.

We used anonymized mobile phone data to track internal mobility flows during the summer of 2019. Spaniards moved extensively, especially to coastal provinces and major cities like Madrid. 🗺️

Our study case is Spain in 2019. In April, the radical right party Vox made its breakthrough into parliament. Some months later, Vox's support grew further in a snap election in November. In between, people went on summer holidays, a period of high mobility. 🏖️🇪🇸

WORKING PAPER: Short-Term Mobility and Changes in Political Norms with @valentimvicente.bsky.social

🌐Link: osf.io/preprints/os...

Our interconnected world fosters unprecedented flows of people, goods, and ideas. Can this also reshape perceptions of what is politically acceptable? 🧵

Having a great time in Chicago and excited to present my work at #MPSA2024 🌆 If you’re in town and up for a chat, let me know!

Here comes my first post in this blue sky. Nothing else than to announce that I will spend the Fall term visiting the LSE. Thanks @florianfoos.bsky.social for hosting me and looking forward to meet other colleagues over a coffee! 🍂☕️