Jakub Stauber
@stauberj.bsky.social
Political Science @fsv.charlesuni.cuni.cz
Political Parties | Information Flows | Defence Spending
https://jstauber.github.io/
Political Parties | Information Flows | Defence Spending
https://jstauber.github.io/
7/7 🚩
European NATO can stop Russia without U.S. ground forces—if it acts decisively and prepares.
Our full open-access paper here:
📄 www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
European NATO can stop Russia without U.S. ground forces—if it acts decisively and prepares.
Our full open-access paper here:
📄 www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
Don’t count on the U.S.: can Russia achieve a rapid breakthrough in central Europe?
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has significantly worsened the European security outlook. Simultaneously, concerns are growing over the United States’ willingness to commit substantial forces ...
www.tandfonline.com
July 4, 2025 at 7:40 AM
7/7 🚩
European NATO can stop Russia without U.S. ground forces—if it acts decisively and prepares.
Our full open-access paper here:
📄 www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
European NATO can stop Russia without U.S. ground forces—if it acts decisively and prepares.
Our full open-access paper here:
📄 www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
6/
Why does it matter?
With U.S. focus shifting to China and political will declining, Europe must prepare to defend itself.
Our work shows this is possible—but only if Europeans invest now in troops, reserves, and logistics.
Why does it matter?
With U.S. focus shifting to China and political will declining, Europe must prepare to defend itself.
Our work shows this is possible—but only if Europeans invest now in troops, reserves, and logistics.
July 4, 2025 at 7:40 AM
6/
Why does it matter?
With U.S. focus shifting to China and political will declining, Europe must prepare to defend itself.
Our work shows this is possible—but only if Europeans invest now in troops, reserves, and logistics.
Why does it matter?
With U.S. focus shifting to China and political will declining, Europe must prepare to defend itself.
Our work shows this is possible—but only if Europeans invest now in troops, reserves, and logistics.
5/
🗝️ Key findings:
Numbers & readiness > technology alone
Deep, well-prepared defenses lower risks
Rapid NATO reinforcement is critical
Tech helps but can’t replace manpower
🗝️ Key findings:
Numbers & readiness > technology alone
Deep, well-prepared defenses lower risks
Rapid NATO reinforcement is critical
Tech helps but can’t replace manpower
July 4, 2025 at 7:40 AM
5/
🗝️ Key findings:
Numbers & readiness > technology alone
Deep, well-prepared defenses lower risks
Rapid NATO reinforcement is critical
Tech helps but can’t replace manpower
🗝️ Key findings:
Numbers & readiness > technology alone
Deep, well-prepared defenses lower risks
Rapid NATO reinforcement is critical
Tech helps but can’t replace manpower
4/
In the larger Russian force scenario (with conscripts):
⚠️ Europe would need ~20+ brigades, stretching its capabilities.
Even then, success is uncertain without deep defenses & low troop exposure.
In the larger Russian force scenario (with conscripts):
⚠️ Europe would need ~20+ brigades, stretching its capabilities.
Even then, success is uncertain without deep defenses & low troop exposure.
July 4, 2025 at 7:40 AM
4/
In the larger Russian force scenario (with conscripts):
⚠️ Europe would need ~20+ brigades, stretching its capabilities.
Even then, success is uncertain without deep defenses & low troop exposure.
In the larger Russian force scenario (with conscripts):
⚠️ Europe would need ~20+ brigades, stretching its capabilities.
Even then, success is uncertain without deep defenses & low troop exposure.
3/
In the smaller Russian force scenario:
✅ ~10–13 European brigades (beyond Poland’s) are enough to prevent a breakthrough if deployed quickly.
But:
If Poland fights alone, Russia’s chances of success rise fast.
In the smaller Russian force scenario:
✅ ~10–13 European brigades (beyond Poland’s) are enough to prevent a breakthrough if deployed quickly.
But:
If Poland fights alone, Russia’s chances of success rise fast.
July 4, 2025 at 7:40 AM
3/
In the smaller Russian force scenario:
✅ ~10–13 European brigades (beyond Poland’s) are enough to prevent a breakthrough if deployed quickly.
But:
If Poland fights alone, Russia’s chances of success rise fast.
In the smaller Russian force scenario:
✅ ~10–13 European brigades (beyond Poland’s) are enough to prevent a breakthrough if deployed quickly.
But:
If Poland fights alone, Russia’s chances of success rise fast.
2/
We simulate a Russian attack on northeastern Poland (Suwalki Gap) in the late 2020s.
Two scenarios:
🇷🇺 ~120k troops (professionals)
🇷🇺 ~200k troops (with conscripts)
We test how many NATO brigades are needed to stop a breakthrough in 3–4 weeks.
We simulate a Russian attack on northeastern Poland (Suwalki Gap) in the late 2020s.
Two scenarios:
🇷🇺 ~120k troops (professionals)
🇷🇺 ~200k troops (with conscripts)
We test how many NATO brigades are needed to stop a breakthrough in 3–4 weeks.
July 4, 2025 at 7:40 AM
2/
We simulate a Russian attack on northeastern Poland (Suwalki Gap) in the late 2020s.
Two scenarios:
🇷🇺 ~120k troops (professionals)
🇷🇺 ~200k troops (with conscripts)
We test how many NATO brigades are needed to stop a breakthrough in 3–4 weeks.
We simulate a Russian attack on northeastern Poland (Suwalki Gap) in the late 2020s.
Two scenarios:
🇷🇺 ~120k troops (professionals)
🇷🇺 ~200k troops (with conscripts)
We test how many NATO brigades are needed to stop a breakthrough in 3–4 weeks.