Setayesh Radkani
@setayeshradkani.bsky.social
PhD candidate in Brain and Cognitive Sciences @MIT studying legitimacy, punishment and social learning
Also sharing a beautiful illustration of these ideas by my lovely and talented 👩🎨 friend, Adhara Martellini!
August 8, 2025 at 2:58 PM
Also sharing a beautiful illustration of these ideas by my lovely and talented 👩🎨 friend, Adhara Martellini!
Finding 4️⃣: In a separate study, we found that repeated punishments can fail to close societal divides, and may even polarize initially shared beliefs. Our model predicts when punishment works in reducing polarization and when it backfires!
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August 8, 2025 at 2:04 PM
Finding 4️⃣: In a separate study, we found that repeated punishments can fail to close societal divides, and may even polarize initially shared beliefs. Our model predicts when punishment works in reducing polarization and when it backfires!
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Finding 3️⃣: Our computational model simultaneously captures people’s belief updates about the act and the authority, even in novel prior conditions that the model has never seen before 👀; even better than control models that are fit to predict each belief separately!
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August 8, 2025 at 2:04 PM
Finding 3️⃣: Our computational model simultaneously captures people’s belief updates about the act and the authority, even in novel prior conditions that the model has never seen before 👀; even better than control models that are fit to predict each belief separately!
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Finding 2️⃣: People’s prior beliefs shape their reasoning about punishment. The same punishment can lead to contrasting inferences, depending on the value and uncertainty of prior beliefs about both the act and the authority.
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August 8, 2025 at 2:04 PM
Finding 2️⃣: People’s prior beliefs shape their reasoning about punishment. The same punishment can lead to contrasting inferences, depending on the value and uncertainty of prior beliefs about both the act and the authority.
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Across 3 studies, we used imaginary villages to experimentally control people’s pre-existing beliefs about the target act and the authority. We then measured how observing punishment with different severities moves their beliefs.
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August 8, 2025 at 2:04 PM
Across 3 studies, we used imaginary villages to experimentally control people’s pre-existing beliefs about the target act and the authority. We then measured how observing punishment with different severities moves their beliefs.
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We used an inverse planning framework: people assume authorities plan punishment to achieve their desires based on their beliefs. By inverting this model, people infer the hidden beliefs and desires that most likely produced the observed punishment.
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August 8, 2025 at 2:04 PM
We used an inverse planning framework: people assume authorities plan punishment to achieve their desires based on their beliefs. By inverting this model, people infer the hidden beliefs and desires that most likely produced the observed punishment.
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Finding 2: Credibility isn’t just about unbiasedness
Consistent with other work in political science, authorities seen as biased can still be effective debunkers – if they are seen as biased *in favor* of the perspective they are debunking, although this depends on the uncertainty of beliefs
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Consistent with other work in political science, authorities seen as biased can still be effective debunkers – if they are seen as biased *in favor* of the perspective they are debunking, although this depends on the uncertainty of beliefs
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October 15, 2024 at 6:30 PM
Finding 2: Credibility isn’t just about unbiasedness
Consistent with other work in political science, authorities seen as biased can still be effective debunkers – if they are seen as biased *in favor* of the perspective they are debunking, although this depends on the uncertainty of beliefs
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Consistent with other work in political science, authorities seen as biased can still be effective debunkers – if they are seen as biased *in favor* of the perspective they are debunking, although this depends on the uncertainty of beliefs
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if people are certain, debunking – even by a reasonably unbiased, committed authority – fails:
1) The groups' beliefs about the perspective remain polarized
2) The groups' initially shared beliefs about the authority additionally diverge!
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1) The groups' beliefs about the perspective remain polarized
2) The groups' initially shared beliefs about the authority additionally diverge!
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October 15, 2024 at 6:29 PM
if people are certain, debunking – even by a reasonably unbiased, committed authority – fails:
1) The groups' beliefs about the perspective remain polarized
2) The groups' initially shared beliefs about the authority additionally diverge!
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1) The groups' beliefs about the perspective remain polarized
2) The groups' initially shared beliefs about the authority additionally diverge!
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Using simulations, we capture how three related beliefs evolve: (1) commitment to the initial perspective; (2) views on the bias of the authority; (3) views on the authority’s commitment to the truth
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October 15, 2024 at 6:26 PM
Using simulations, we capture how three related beliefs evolve: (1) commitment to the initial perspective; (2) views on the bias of the authority; (3) views on the authority’s commitment to the truth
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We focus instead on how observers interpret debunking acts (and update their beliefs) based on their intuitive theory of the authority’s motives: degree of bias, commitment to the truth
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October 15, 2024 at 6:22 PM
We focus instead on how observers interpret debunking acts (and update their beliefs) based on their intuitive theory of the authority’s motives: degree of bias, commitment to the truth
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