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We show reciprocity: Connected city leaders who achieve stronger emissions reductions receive more promotions & fiscal transfers—but only in high-target provinces. Suggests patronage ties sustain cooperation through mutual benefit recognition.

Firms in connected cities reduce SO2 emissions ~10% more than those in unconnected cities post-2006. Effect concentrates in private/foreign firms in Eastern China & increases with provincial abatement targets. Reductions driven by lower emissions intensity, not firm exit.

We use 245k firm-year observations from China's environmental database (covers ~85% of pollution), linked to official biographies & administrative data on 325 cities. We also validate using satellite SO2 concentrations and real-time monitored firms.

We study China's 11th 5 year plan (2006-2011), which assigned SO2 targets to provinces but not cities. We measure patronage using past promotions. Using relative tenure as an IV, we identify causal effects by exploiting frequent leader reshuffles & variation in provincial abatement targets.