Dr. Salah Ben Hammou
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salahbhpolisci.bsky.social
Dr. Salah Ben Hammou
@salahbhpolisci.bsky.social
Postdoctoral Associate for the Center of the Middle East at Rice University's Baker Institute of Public Policy.

Former USIP Peace Scholar.

Ph.D. from the University of Central Florida.

www.salahbenhammou.com
All in all, we hope this paper offers a fresh lens on the contagion debate. With the recent cascade of coups, it seems more relevant now than ever to understand how and when coups spread.

Link to accepted version here: salahbenhammou.com/wp-content/u... (10/10)
salahbenhammou.com
November 17, 2025 at 1:40 PM
The Free Officers case is often considered a canonical case of coup contagion.

But its real value is in showing how conditional contagion can actually be: unfolding slowly and unevenly, as shifts in disposition and capacity take time to align, and as plots are disrupted before they surface. (9/)
November 17, 2025 at 1:35 PM
In other words, contagion was happening — but being contained before it reached the surface.

Previous efforts to study contagion only counted successful or attempted coups. But throughout this period, vulnerable regimes were uncovering, disrupting, and preempting coup plots (8/)
November 17, 2025 at 1:29 PM
Importantly, leaders weren't idle. They:

— purged officers
— restructured commands
— coup-proofed institutions
— enlisted foreign backers

These actions suppressed ability and disposition — often so effectively that many plots were never able to come to fruition. (7/)
November 17, 2025 at 1:26 PM
Only later, once Nasser solidified power, survived Suez, and reshaped regional politics, did would-be plotters begin to:

1. See a compelling, revolutionary model (disposition)
2. Come into positions to develop the capacity to move (ability)

Contagion emerges — but often on an uneven timeline. (6/)
November 17, 2025 at 1:25 PM
We demonstrate the framework through an analysis of the 1952 Free Officers coup in Egypt. Despite its eventual iconic status, it did not trigger an immediate wave. Why?

Because immediate post-1952 Egypt was uncertain and divided. It hadn’t yet adequately raised disposition elsewhere. (5/)
November 17, 2025 at 1:22 PM
We bring the ability-disposition framework - long used in the study of coups - to the question of contagion.

Disposition — whether would-be plotters are willing to intervene
Ability — whether they possess the capacity to do so

A coup abroad becomes meaningful if it alters these conditions (4/)
November 17, 2025 at 1:18 PM
We argue the problem lies not in the absence of contagion, but the lens through which it's been viewed. There's a tendency to treat contagion as rapid-fire, visible imitation - tied to narrow time windows.

But there's more nuance here than one might assume. (3/)
November 17, 2025 at 1:15 PM
The idea that coups “spread” isn’t new — it’s been debated for 50+ years.

But the evidence is all over the place:
• some studies find evidence of contagion
• others reject it entirely
• large-N work often concludes there’s no effect at all

So what’s going on? (2/)
November 17, 2025 at 1:06 PM
Thank you!
November 14, 2025 at 11:15 AM
Thank you, Reda! We should connect some time soon, I'd love to hear how things at Princeton are going
September 12, 2025 at 12:46 PM
It was a difficult choice to leave the country I grew up in, but no alternatives were left. But I'm happy to start anew here while I finish my book project and navigate the job market beyond the U.S.
September 12, 2025 at 12:43 PM