Absolutely agree on BMWE, though there the radio silence is not only on China but pretty much on everything, including pressing intra-German reform issues. 🤷‍♀️

To sum it up: in my view, the mistake is not in the SPD side. It is a problem that - as legitimate as the reasons may be - there was still not official visit to China. Here I absolutely agree with what @maximilianiras.bsky.social wrote in China.Table:
table.media/en/china/opi...

Not to mention that the people he wanted to meet in Beijing except Wang Yi are physically not there these dates, but are either meeting Trump or EU-counterparts in Brussels - meeting whom is clearly (and understandably) deemed more important than meeting the German FM.

Here, I disagree, again. Diplomacy is sometimes like a thread mill: you don’t get anywhere but it’s still a good exercise. As for Wadephul, it’s a legitimate question why an FM to FM meeting at this point was apparently unacceptable (Bluesky is not an ideal platform to discuss this).

I disagree and believe that a multi-leveled and multi-stakeholder approach that utilizes a broad instrument toolkit serves German interests best. I see no benefit and a lot of harm in lack of direct high-level communication with China. I also think it was wrong for Wadephul to cancel the tip.

It was long known in German policy circles. The party dialogue is always in autumn, taking turns. Germany last year, China this year.
But also, since 2 days in German news, e.g.

archive.is/xXfP8

www.thepioneer.de/originals/ha...

Why the conclusion that party-to-party talks mean a risk to become a “pawn”? The people who lead the dialogue on the SPD side are neither naive nor stupid. More so, especially now, closing (or destroying) a long-standing and working communication mechanism would be no most unwise thing to do.

Why is this a scoop? It was planned and known for a long time.

Aber wenn das Manuskript dann mal abgegeben ist… 🕺🏼💃🏼☀️

These trends clearly indicate that Chinese companies are increasingly cautious, fearing possible secondary sanctions. However, this does not mean they will refrain from finding ways to circumvent them — for example, through third countries.

Overall, in the first eight months of 2025, trade between the two countries decreased by almost 9%, amounting to around US$145 billion. Russian exports to China fell by 8.8%, while Chinese imports to Russia declined by 8.2%.

At the same time, China has quietly halted deliveries of high-precision machine tools from China, Moscow Times reports (lnkd.in/emRQrU5r). According to Chinese Customs, in August 2025 Chinese exports to Russia fell by 16.4% year-on-year — twice the decline recorded in July, when the drop was 8.6%.

The answer is that China is, ultimately, on its own side. It will support Russia just enough to ensure the war in Ukraine continues—but not enough for Russia to win. In that sense, the Chinese envoy to the Un was right to note that if China had fully supported Russia, the war would already be over.

🔋 Beijing’s recent decision to restrict exports of critical materials—such as graphite and rare earth magnets used in electric vehicles—has added to the anxiety.