it is correct, and (b) am inclined to think that, however contingent it is, there is some consensus on what is and is not central and I want to locate myself with respect to it.

so here's my stance: if that's correct, then the hesitation I feel about proposing we don't have any analytic epistemology in the "core curriculum" is easily dismissed; it can be justified via my lack of desire to teach any of it. But I (a) wonder what can be said to my colleagues who do not think

I've never spent much time on it, or had any interest. It's hard enough to get more than a handful interested in the analysis of knowledge--hence why I stopped even trying a few years ago.

(I also think there are better ways of teaching the methodology--my favourite class to teach is one on philosophical problems where you need to put together your own "solution" to some classic problems and paradoxes).

Part of the context here is we're finding out students don't seem to want to use this methodology, at least based on their choices, dissertation topics, etc; they go for something more interdisciplinary (lot of joint honours students) or--when a class permits it--something more continental.

the thought was that it is based on an idea that you really don't find in the historical figures you would be covering (eg. Descartes). But perhaps I'm wrong about that, and in any case we've never really taught anything that advanced as is.

the latter, or so he claims

Thanks to @aidanmcglynn.bsky.social @ale1808.bsky.social @oldjerryfodor.bsky.social @neillevy.bsky.social @tays95.bsky.social @msimion.bsky.social as well as Heather Battaly, Ian James Kidd, Marie van Loon, Anne Meylan, Veli Mitova, and to my co-editor Gerry Dunne.