Oskar Pietrewicz
opietrewicz.bsky.social
Oskar Pietrewicz
@opietrewicz.bsky.social
Senior Analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Korean Peninsula, East Asia
Private opinions
For example, China can use an economic carrot to keep North Korea within its sphere of influence. The North Korean authorities are happy to eat this carrot, but they will not allow Chinese influence to turn into control.
March 10, 2025 at 7:34 PM
Of course, an important piece of the puzzle remains China, which will not be passive in this situation. The experience of the 2018-2019 U.S.-DPRK talks shows that China may intensify contacts with North Korea for fear of being left out.
March 10, 2025 at 7:34 PM
with the Americans again, hoping that this will lead, for example, to a weakening of the U.S. alliance with South Korea. Would they use Russian support to achieve this? Absolutely. Would they let themselves be led by the Russians? Definitely not.
March 10, 2025 at 7:31 PM
diminish with the rebuilding of the Russian military. Moreover, I believe that both the Koreans and the Russians are aware that, depending on how the situation evolves, they may trade themselves in talks with the U.S. I think that at some point the Koreans will try to negotiate
March 10, 2025 at 7:30 PM
the U.S.; 2) demand more political, economic, military-technological support from Russia in exchange for military support. However, there is no certainty that such close cooperation between Russia and North Korea will continue after the war in Ukraine - the DPRK’s importance may
March 10, 2025 at 7:30 PM
remain passive and fully align itself with the Russian idea. But the fact remains that it has been reaping tangible benefits from cooperation with Russia since 2022. As long as it can, North Korea will 1) use Russian support to strengthen its position in possible talks with
March 10, 2025 at 7:30 PM
From Russia’s point of view, it would be necessary to convince the U.S. that its talks with the DPRK would help the process of weaning partners/allies away from China.

I do not believe that North Korea coordinates all its actions with Russia. I also doubt that North Korea will
March 10, 2025 at 7:30 PM
development of a new security architecture in Northeast Asia - initially as a state guaranteeing, for example, a nuclear and missile arms control agreement between the U.S. and the DPRK. If I were Russia, I would adapt my proposal to the American idea of a 'reverse Nixon'.
March 10, 2025 at 7:29 PM
Thanks to the increased cooperation over the past three years, Russia can present itself to the U.S. as an important player on the Korean Peninsula, ready to bring North Korea to the negotiating table and play an indirect role in it. And perhaps be willing to participate in the
March 10, 2025 at 7:29 PM
with the U.S., and then to offer to withdraw North Korean forces.

Second, the Russian proposal to engage in negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK. The Russian ambassador in Pyongyang has already supported the idea of resuming talks between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un.
March 10, 2025 at 7:29 PM
North Korean troops are crucial to the success of the Russian counter-offensive in the Kursk Oblast. It would therefore be in Russia’s interest first to retake the Kursk Oblast with the support of North Korean troops, which would strengthen Russia’s negotiating position in talks
March 10, 2025 at 7:19 PM
First, Russia’s proposal to withdraw North Korean troops from the frontline as a concession. This would require an explicit acknowledgement that such forces are fighting at all, which Russia and North Korea have so far denied. At the moment, such a proposal seems unlikely because
March 10, 2025 at 7:19 PM
February 12, 2025 at 7:39 PM
Reposted by Oskar Pietrewicz
Here's the English text of the joint statement.

www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/...
www.mofa.go.jp
February 7, 2025 at 10:32 PM