The takeaway: NZ's foreign policy independence isn't exceptional - it's circumstantial. As regional geopolitics become more constrained, expect NZ to align more closely with traditional allies, regardless of which party is in power. (8/8)

This challenges the idea that NZ is inherently an "independent power." Instead, NZ has been fortunate to reside in a geopolitically calm region for decades - a "blessing of distance" that's now shrinking as great power competition intensifies. (7/8)

The theoretical insight: When regional geopolitics are "permissive," NZ can afford to be independent. When they become "restrictive" (like today's Indo-Pacific competition), systemic pressures override domestic preferences for independence. (6/8)

Case 2: Today's AUKUS consideration.

The Sixth National Government is exploring joining AUKUS Pillar II - a major shift toward alignment with US/Australia. Why? Because the regional security environment has become much more restrictive. (5/8)

Case 1: The 1980s nuclear ban.

Yes, NZ stood up to the US - but this happened during a period of relative geopolitical calm in the Asia-Pacific. Cold War tensions had eased, China was opening up, and there were few external threats to NZ. (4/8)

Using a type II neoclassical realist framework, I argue that NZ's regional geopolitical setting is the PRIMARY driver of its foreign policy - not its "independent" role identity.

The independence is real, but it's dependent on having geopolitical room to maneuver. (3/8)

The common narrative: NZ has maintained an independent foreign policy since the 1980s, standing up to superpowers when needed (like banning nuclear ships despite US pressure).

But this misses the bigger picture about what drives NZ's foreign policy choices. (2/8)

6/6 Main contribution: showing how RSCT can handle mega-concepts like Indo-Pacific without losing its regional focus. Macrosecuritization bridges the gap between local and global security dynamics! 🌉

5/6 The framework helps explain why some states (New Zealand) got pulled in, others (China) actively resist, and still others (ASEAN, Pacific Islands) try alternative framings. Different responses to the same macrosecuritization 🔄

4/6 This produces what we call a "macrosecuritized constellation" - not erasing existing regional dynamics, but overlaying them with higher-order security competition. Think Cold War but more complex 🌟

3/6 We argue the Indo-Pacific represents macrosecuritization in action: a coordinated effort by major powers to securitize China as an existential threat to international order, creating pressure on other states to choose sides 📡

2/6 Our solution: dust off Buzan & Wæver's concept of "macrosecuritization" - securitization that happens above the regional level, targeting foreign policy elites in other countries rather than just domestic publics 🎭