PDF can be found here: rdcu.be/d4U8M

In terms of co-partisans, although it was cognitively satisfying to see belief reinforcing-information, there was a limit: individuals recognized norm-defying incivility and punished it accordingly.

We see that incivility is consequential, but not always in the ways we expected. In terms of the out-partisans online, ppl likely have some expectation of civility, absent other information, and their expectations can be violated with minimal exposure.

Interestingly, we find that people do punish the incivility of co-partisans. The presence of the control here suggests that respondents rewarded co-partisans for being critical of the out-party, but this benefit is extinguished when they are expressed in an uncivil manner.

We do, however, see some effect of the uncivil treatment on broader out-party evaluations (feeling thermometer).

Point allocation difference between uncivil out-party profiles and civil ones were not significant. Comparison with the control (no tweets) suggests that ppl may punish out-partisans for any opposing views, regardless of how they are stated.

All participants were Player 1 in our trust game. Participants were assigned to either control (demographics + no Tweets), civil condition (demographics + civil Tweets), or uncivil condition (demographics + uncivil Tweets). They played 2 rounds of the game (out-party & in-party).