I don’t think I would have believed it without seeing it, so here’s the relevant part of the EEOC memo: storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

I prefer Holmes’s Anatomy of Antiliberalism, which was underappreciated when it was published and has to be essential reading now.

3. Religious antiliberalism and antisemitism have deep historical connections. @richschragger.bsky.social and I traced one line through T.S Eliot, whose framing of culture wars as Christians v pagans is now advanced by Schmittian integralists and various adjacents. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

2. There are other strains of religious antiliberalism. @richschragger.bsky.social and I catalogued some of them here. A law review editor told us this piece had a “tone” problem, which seems rather quaint now.

papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

Mazel!

From his post — minimal epistemic and moral commitments necessary for legitimate participation in politics? Turns out we have a concept that covers this …

A more complete evaluation of appeasement as a judicial strategy, whether by one or more justices, needs to take a broader view of the costs (and the audiences). But at least we’re now asking these sorts of questions, which is a good reason to be discussing @jodikantor.bsky.social's article. /end

— this analysis doesn’t account for all the costs, esp. those stemming from signals sent to the majority. As we argued in our paper, appeasement classically mistakes the benefits of making concessions, invites further aggression, and moves the goalposts in terms of political/legal legitimacy. /4

The case for conciliation is framed in rhetorical and reputational terms. Concessions are said to be attractive to liberal institutionalists. But setting aside the speculative nature of this claim — eg, which “liberal institutionalists” were enthused about Kagan’s vote in Masterpiece Cakeshop? … /3

In this post, @richardre.bsky.social argues that strategies of conciliation/dissent are not either/or. Even with a minority of 3, the liberal justices can specialize and, through division of labor, do both. But the argument against a unified strategy doesn't specify all the costs of appeasement. /2

Mazel!