Very kind of you, Harry, thanks. As we discussed on the podcast, however--and as I told my students--it's really the sort of brief that anyone might have written had they ... simply checked out the statute and its history, which is something all lawyers should do as a matter of course.

Hardly surprising given that the standards for granting a stay are almost impossible to ... oh, wait ...

Do you think that's what you'll be saying 3, 5, 10 years from now?

Sorry: Forgot to link to the SG brief: [12]

www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25...

... when it comes to questions concerning the judiciary's ability to look behind obviously pretextual (and in this and some other cases, nonexistent) presidential "findings." [11]

And, sure enough, the SG apparently believes that five or more Justices might be receptive to such an argument. I certainly hope he's wrong about that, but the very fact that he thinks it's in play should tell you all you need to know about just how aggressive DOJ and some Justices are ... [10]

... I figured there was no way the SG would run it in the SCOTUS ... but, just in case, I addressed it at pages 24-25 of my supplemental brief.

www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25.... [9]

... based upon a conclusion that that Trump didn't make and almost surely *wouldn't* make that using the military, instead of the Texas National Guard, would "significantly impede" efforts to enforce immigration laws. [7]

When DOJ floated this argument a couple of weeks ago in Oregon ... [8]

In other words, the SG is asking the Court to hold that even if Trump asked and answered the wrong legal question, the Court nevertheless must defer to a decision that the POTUS did *not,* in fact make about the *proper* legal question, ... [6]

... and that "there was ample basis for the President to determine that execution of both the immigration laws and the laws proscribing violence against federal personnel and property would be 'significantly impeded' if he were forced to use the standing military." [5]

So, in the alternative, the SG argues that even if the Court holds that I'm right that "the regular forces" means the standing military, the courts nevertheless must presume Trump has already determined that the military would be "unable" to ensure law execution ... [4]

The SG argues that Trump was right--i.e., that "the regular forces" refers to the executive actors who ordinarily execute the underlying laws (here, DHS personnel). He cites no evidence that anyone ever used the term that way, however. Therefore the Court probably won't accept his reading. [3]

... Trump has not made the finding that's a necessary precondition to using the National Guard--namely, that he's unable to execute federal law in Chicago with "the regular forces." Instead, Trump purported to find that *ICE and FPS* were "unable" to ensure faithful execution of the law. [2]

Darn! Wish I'd thought to add that to my supplemental brief (which actually cites the provision for another purpose). It's an excellent point that Illinois should make in its reply brief.

www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25...

Obviously more likely than not the Court declares that IEEPA doesn't authorize at least the "reciprocal" tariffs. But I need to ponder further how far *beyond* 50%.

82

yes

"Apart form Manchin, Sinema, perhaps Fetterman etc.,"

oh, is that all?

Justice Gorsuch offers a much more vivid, historically based answer than Gutman did. One thing, though: Were there really a lot of pirates in 18th Century America? [20]