@markuskollberg.bsky.social und @ivobantel.bsky.social zeigen, dass vor allem über Parteigrenzen hinweg koordinierte Botschaften einer 'common front' die affektive Abgrenzung der Wähler*innen gegenüber der extremen Rechten stärken. Dieser Effekt nutzt sich allerdings ab.
doi.org/10.1080/0140...

That sounds super interesting, Fabian! Very much looking forward to reading it!

Thanks, Linda! I think the answer is "We don't know". But @valentindaur.bsky.social's recent paper suggests that once a PRR has entered the mainstream, it is hard to undo!
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...

We are really grateful to @markuswagner.bsky.social and @lucasleemann.bsky.social for their support in pursuing this project and to @ipz.bsky.social, @uclspp.bsky.social, @karstendonnay.bsky.social for supporting the experimental component of this study.

2) A common front involves difficult trade-offs. While polarization towards radical right parties and elites may be desirable to prevent normalizing extreme positions, negative rhetoric also affects citizens' dislike of radical right voters - with potentially detrimental effects for social cohesion.

This has important implications:

1) Creating a common front (or, "firewall" / "cordon sanitaire") against a radical right challenger requires a mainstream-party consensus. Once one party leaves this broad coalition, the effects of elite messaging weaken significantly.

We document that:

1) Mass- and elite-level polarization towards the radical right are strongly correlated.
2) The effects of coordinated mainstream-party rhetoric outweigh those of individual parties.
3) The effects of individual parties' attacks against the radical right are (surprisingly) small.