... and support and funding of civil society organisations has become a controversial topic in the EP and the democratic parties are not exactly pulling together here. 8/8

Its focus on foreign online information manipulation and disinformation is outsized and rather ineffective; the strict enforcement of the EU’s digital rules against big tech is stifled by pressure from the US government; ... 7/

Overall, I think there are a lot of useful ideas in the Democracy Shield, especially in the part on strengthening free media and increasing funding. However, in the execution of these ideas, I could see the Commission running into the same problems we have seen in the past: 6/

But given that 1) a number of relevant laws have just entered into force or are still negotiated (DSA, TTPA, Foreign Lobbying), 2) the EU has limited competence here and 3) Member States seem to not want new mandatory initiatives, the Commission has actually found quite a lot of areas for action. 5/

...(rising foreign interference; disruption of the information environment through social media and dependency on foreign big tech companies; polarization and rise of extremist political parties); and on the other side a number of little steps and tweaks as a solution. 4/

The lack of hard measures has already copped some criticism. I think there is a perceived mismatch here between on one side the big problems for European democracy the Commission is ostensibly trying to address ... 3/

Over the 3 priority areas (situational awareness and information space integrity; media and elections; societal resilience and citizens’ engagement), I counted at least 43 action points. A lot of them, however, are framed as “we will support/ strengthen/ reinforce” and rely on voluntary measures. 2/

If the EU delivers on substantial and effective funding for independent media and civil society, this could be a meaningful step – though much will depend on whether those funds survive the MFF negotiations which is highly uncertain at the moment. 13/13

Overall, the Democracy Shield carries high expectations. Focusing on effective cooperation between Member States against foreign interference could make sense if it goes beyond duplicating existing systems and offers a platform for better coordination on hybrid threats generally. 12/

Funding is an important issue for CSOs, especially after USAid and OSF have withdrawn much of their support from Europe. Whereas the previous MFF allocated ~1,56bn Euros (not adjusted for inflation), ~3,6bn are currently proposed for CERV+ in the next MFF which could be a meaningful boost. 11/

On the 3rd strand: How COM wants to foster citizens’ participation remains vague, we just know that they are looking for *innovative* tools. The Civil Society Strategy is set to include an exchange platform between COM and civil society actors, modelled on the Fundamental Rights Platform. 10/

The previous MFF allocated ~1,47 bn Euros for Media (under Creative Europe)(not adjusted for inflation). A jump to ~3,2bn for Media+ as proposed for the next MFF would be significant. What matters most here is *how* the money is spent to support a resilient, independent media sector. 9/

On the 2nd strand: Supporting independent, quality journalism with substantial funding could be a meaningful step given the media’s role for healthy democracy and the sector’s generally meager financial outlook. 8/

Also noteworthy: there appear to be no reform plans for EU institutions themselves, even though Brussels attracts plenty of foreign attention. 7/

If it is just a loose structure to facilitate exchange between national units such as France's Viginum, its impact might hinge largely on how much Member States invest in their own agencies. 6/

Regarding the proposed “European Centre for Democratic Resilience”, I would be interested to see some evidence or explanation in the Commission’s communication on what added value this Centre would provide, and how it is different from existing structures such as the Rapid Alert System. 5/

On the 1st strand: The Commission continues its focus on Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference (FIMI) and disinformation. This could come at the expense of addressing internal threats but also other foreign interference aspects like illicit financial flows or sabotage. 4/

There is no new EU legislation planned. Instead, the focus appears to be on improving cooperation and coordination between Member States. I think this is a sensible choice after a lot of new laws (DSA, EMFA, TTPA) just entered into force. It makes sense to wait and see how effective they are. 3/

As visualised, the Democracy Shield will likely rest on three pillars: 1) foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) & disinformation, 2) elections & media 3) citizens’ engagement and societal resilience. 2/