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lessness.bsky.social
@lessness.bsky.social
120 followers 890 following 12 posts
Just trying to get people to care about things
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chrisgeidner.bsky.social
Here is the meat of it:

"Defendants chose to operate a detention facility, so 'they must meet constitutional standards.'"
In the late-filed declaration by Rich, Defendants explain that in-person visits are operationally challenging and pose safety risks. Rich explains that there are rooms available, but non-law enforcement is not allowed in this area, and it "would create a significant safety risk to provide access to these rooms" to attorneys. (Rich Decl. I 7.) Any change to standard operating procedures "would require significant resources." (Id.) And there are other rooms available, but they are in disuse because of "a lack of security functions" and because the master key does not work to these rooms. (Id. I 8.) They would need more funds to renovate these rooms and to station additional officers near these rooms. (Id.) The Court is underwhelmed by this evidence. The record shows that Whipple allowed in-person visits before Operation Metro Surge, and Defendants make no effort to explain why in-person visits suddenly strain their resources. The record also shows that during Operation Metro Surge, the rooms are not used. Putting these evidentiary concerns aside, forbidding in-person visits based on a generic and unspecified risk to safety and lack of resources is excessive. Defendants chose to operate a detention facility, so "they must meet constitutional standards." Campbell o. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 508 (8th Cir. 1980). Defendants allocated substantial resources to sending thousands of agents to Minnesota, detaining thousands of people, and housing them in their facilities. Defendants cannot suddenly lack resources when it comes to protecting detainees' constitutional rights. Likewise, Defendants practice of rapidly transferring detainees out of state without an opportunity to consult with counsel is unconstitutionally excessive. The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that enjoining transfer may be appropriate if transferring the detainee would interfere with an existing attorney-client relationship such that access to counsel is effectively denied. Cent. Am. Refugees v. I.N.S., 795 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir.), amended, 807 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986). That reasoning seemingly tees up a distinction between detainees who have already retained counsel and those who have not. But other courts have concluded that a detainee's right to access counsel can still be violated even if they do not yet have an attorney. For example, in Torres v. D.H.S., the court countenanced "extensive allegations regarding conditions so restrictive as to prevent them from forming any attorney-client relationship to begin with." 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2019). The same is true here.
February 13, 2026 at 12:25 AM
lessness.bsky.social
I did a double take when I saw the docket
February 12, 2026 at 2:45 AM
Reposted
chrisgeidner.bsky.social
Judge Dana Douglas's dissent sets up the unusual circumstances of this appeal, the stakes of this case, and the error of the majority very well from the start.

"Straining at a gnat, the majority swallows a camel."
Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) was passed in part out of a desire to equalize the treatment of noncitizens presenting at ports of entry for inspection and those apprehended in the interior after effecting an unlawful entry. It pursued this aim in several ways, most prominently by deeming both classes of noncitizens “applicants for admission” subject to the same removal procedures and excluding noncitizens detained based on certain criminal offenses from eligibility for bond. The Congress that passed IIRIRA would be surprised to learn it had also required the detention without bond of two million people. For almost thirty years there was no sign anyone thought it had done so, and nothing in the congressional record or the history of the statute’s enforcement suggests that it did. Nonetheless, the government today asserts the authority and mandate to detain millions of noncitizens in the interior, some of them present here for decades, on the same terms as if they were apprehended at the border.1 No matter that this newly discovered mandate arrives without historical precedent, and in the teeth of one of the core distinctions of immigration law. The overwhelming majority of courts in this circuit and elsewhere have recognized that the government’s position is totally unsupported. Undeterred, the majority and the government distort the statutory text, abstract it from its context and history, ignore the Supreme Court’s clearly stated understanding of the statutory scheme, and wave away the agency’s previous failure to detain millions of noncitizens as if it were a rounding error. And for what? The majority stakes the largest detention initiative in American history on the possibility that “seeking admission” is like being an “applicant for admission,” in a statute that has never been applied in this way, based on little more than an apparent conviction that Congress must have wanted these noncitizens detained—some of them the spouses, mothers, fathers, and grandparents of American citizens. Straining at a gnat, the majority swallows a camel. I dissent. 1 Despite the long period of undisturbed interpretation of the statutory provisions at issue here, the government has insisted that we take up this issue with unprecedented urgency, in a manner that does not reflect the gravity of the outcome Petitioners face. After our court granted the government’s request to expedite this case, the government requested that we further expedite our disposition of the case by issuing an order resolving the appeal with a notation that the opinion would follow. This request appears to be virtually unprecedented in this circuit. Notably, as of February 5, 2026, the government has not made a similar request in its case pending before the Seventh Circuit, the only other circuit that thus far has heard the government’s argument on this statutory issue. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:18-cv-03757 (7th Cir.), docket.
February 7, 2026 at 3:23 AM
Reposted
tylermcbrien.com
Martinez ends her testimony with this:

"If there's not justice for the people, let there be no peace for the government."
February 3, 2026 at 9:04 PM
lessness.bsky.social
#2 is probably Profit
January 25, 2026 at 11:52 PM