Lennard Welslau
@lennardwelslau.bsky.social
PhD Fellow, University of Copenhagen and Danmarks Nationalbank
https://lennardwelslau.github.io/
https://lennardwelslau.github.io/
Reposted by Lennard Welslau
Muss Deutschland jetzt viel mehr in den EU-Haushalt zahlen und ist Deutschland gar der Angeschmierte beim Vorschlag der EU-Kommission zum neuen Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen? Die Antwort darauf ist kompliziert - aber schlecht kommt Deutschland sicher nicht weg.
Warum? Stay with me:
Warum? Stay with me:
July 21, 2025 at 3:41 PM
Muss Deutschland jetzt viel mehr in den EU-Haushalt zahlen und ist Deutschland gar der Angeschmierte beim Vorschlag der EU-Kommission zum neuen Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen? Die Antwort darauf ist kompliziert - aber schlecht kommt Deutschland sicher nicht weg.
Warum? Stay with me:
Warum? Stay with me:
Reposted by Lennard Welslau
Because it fears a change of the EU fiscal rules, the Commission is resorting to a very far-reaching interpretation of the rules to make room for much more defense spending. This is a shortsighted mistake because it risks accidentally killing the rules altogether at the worst moment.
Here is why:
Here is why:
March 19, 2025 at 3:04 PM
Because it fears a change of the EU fiscal rules, the Commission is resorting to a very far-reaching interpretation of the rules to make room for much more defense spending. This is a shortsighted mistake because it risks accidentally killing the rules altogether at the worst moment.
Here is why:
Here is why:
Reposted by Lennard Welslau
I published a short note on the implications of a proposed constitutional amendment in Germany, which includes an 11% of GDP fund for infrastructure and permission to fund most military spending outside the debt brake’s maximum deficit of 0.35% of GDP (Thread, 1/9): www.bruegel.org/analysis/can...
Can Germany afford to take most defence spending out of its debt brake?
Higher German defence spending would be fiscally sustainable, but would require cuts elsewhere and would breach EU fiscal rules
www.bruegel.org
March 12, 2025 at 8:20 AM
I published a short note on the implications of a proposed constitutional amendment in Germany, which includes an 11% of GDP fund for infrastructure and permission to fund most military spending outside the debt brake’s maximum deficit of 0.35% of GDP (Thread, 1/9): www.bruegel.org/analysis/can...
Reposted by Lennard Welslau
Good outcome at the #EuCo on EU fiscal rules: National escape clause is branded as „immediate measure“ but the Commission is asked to explore further options (read: opening the rules). The insight seems to have kicked in that a prolonged use of the escape clause is probably not a good idea.
European Council conclusions on European defence, 6 March 2025
On 6 March, the European Council adopted conclusions on European defence.
www.consilium.europa.eu
March 6, 2025 at 7:41 PM
Good outcome at the #EuCo on EU fiscal rules: National escape clause is branded as „immediate measure“ but the Commission is asked to explore further options (read: opening the rules). The insight seems to have kicked in that a prolonged use of the escape clause is probably not a good idea.
Do EU fiscal rules prevent a reform of the German constitutional debt brake? In a new paper @nilsredeker.bsky.social and @lucasguttenberg.bsky.social show that EU rules should leave more fiscal space. I calculated how much more and find that the difference is substantial. Short thread 1/5
Verhindern die EU-Fiskalregeln eine Reform der Schuldenbremse in Deutschland?
@nilsredeker.bsky.social und ich haben uns das im Detail angeschaut und kommen zum Ergebnis: Die Regeln lassen systematisch Spielraum für eine Reform. Aber er ist an Voraussetzungen geknüpft.
Thread:
@nilsredeker.bsky.social und ich haben uns das im Detail angeschaut und kommen zum Ergebnis: Die Regeln lassen systematisch Spielraum für eine Reform. Aber er ist an Voraussetzungen geknüpft.
Thread:
Luft nach oben: Wieso die EU-Fiskalregeln Spielraum für eine Reform der Schuldenbremse lassen
Die gerade reformierten europäischen Schuldenregeln enthalten an vielen Stellen mehr Spielraum als die deutsche Schuldenbremse. Damit stehen sie einer Reform der Schuldenbremse nicht im Weg. Das gilt ...
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
December 23, 2024 at 4:54 PM
Do EU fiscal rules prevent a reform of the German constitutional debt brake? In a new paper @nilsredeker.bsky.social and @lucasguttenberg.bsky.social show that EU rules should leave more fiscal space. I calculated how much more and find that the difference is substantial. Short thread 1/5
Consumption-based diff. btw inflation faced by low- and high-income HHs reduced over recent months due to disinflation in energy and food prices. I built a data app presenting joint work with Bruegel colleagues: inflation-inequality.onrender.com (feedback welcome, original article: t.co/mi5hbR8dqU)
February 10, 2024 at 3:44 PM
Consumption-based diff. btw inflation faced by low- and high-income HHs reduced over recent months due to disinflation in energy and food prices. I built a data app presenting joint work with Bruegel colleagues: inflation-inequality.onrender.com (feedback welcome, original article: t.co/mi5hbR8dqU)
Our assessment of yesterday's Council compromise on on the reform of the EU fiscal rules: A reasonable outcome overall, in some respects better, in others worse than the Commission’s April proposal:
December 21, 2023 at 9:40 AM
Our assessment of yesterday's Council compromise on on the reform of the EU fiscal rules: A reasonable outcome overall, in some respects better, in others worse than the Commission’s April proposal: