Was referring to developing a tool to help professors allow students to get answers to their questions easily which many on this platform decided was the end of the world.

I’m an old fashion nationalist. The State of Origin was the only one that made sense.

That makes no sense either.

Bottom line: The paper reveals that some of our most fundamental economic intuitions about information rents and incentive constraints are artifacts of the expected utility assumption.

Step outside EU, and the landscape changes dramatically.

I was always wary about NEU being useful but this!

Technical innovation: Instead of constructing canonical mechanisms (which would require arbitrarily many stages!), they use a geometric approach.

Characterise implementable allocations as fixed points of an operator combining screening + randomisation

Classic example: Monopolist screening a buyer with unknown valuation.

With EU: Must leave info rents or pool types
With quasi-convex preferences: Can sell to each type at exactly their true valuation, extracting nearly full surplus

The economic implication: Sophisticated agents with non-EU preferences earn NO information rents.

This overturns a fundamental principle: that private information commands rents. Turns out this principle is critically dependent on EU assumptions.

How? By exploiting time-inconsistency inherent in non-EU preferences.

The designer constructs dynamic mechanisms where the agent's future self won't align with their current preferences—creating "temptation menus" they'll pay to avoid.

But here's where it gets truly shocking...

For agents with strictly quasi-convex preferences (think: aversion to randomisation, common in many behavioural models), designers can extract ALL private information at ZERO COST.

Yes. Zero. Cost.

This means dynamic, randomised mechanisms become strictly more powerful the moment you step outside EU theory.

The classic "there's no loss restricting to direct mechanisms" result? Only true in the EU world.

First bombshell: The revelation principle—a cornerstone of mechanism design—holds if and only if ALL agents are expected utility maximisers.

Not just sufficient. NECESSARY.

If even ONE type has non-EU preferences, static mechanisms can't capture everything.