Essentially, we provide an overview of social approaches to imagination within phenomenology and, by analysing D&D, we argue that there is room for a more socially robust conception where what is imagined is continuously co-constituted by multiple people and irreducible to an individual's act.

Here, we argue that D&D is a prime example of what we call 'co-constitutive imagination': cases where imagined phenomena emerge intersubjectively through ongoing reciprocal engagement, and where imaginative acts actively shape and are shaped by what is jointly imagined by a group of people.

Concerning non-egoic collective memory, I focus on how what we encounter in the social world may scaffold (narratively and normatively) how we explicitly remember the distant past, as well as how the shared past of a group can structure an implicit body memory that shapes our bodily selfhood.

Concerning egoic collective memory, I mostly focus on how an individual's episodic memory comes to be experienced in the first-person plural ('we' remember) while impacting that individual's social identity at a narrative level.

Building on phenomenological analyses of embodiment, episodic memory, and the intersubjective dimensions of perception, as well as on narrative approaches to social identity, and aspects of Bourdieu's practice theory, I analyse those two forms of collective memory.

I introduce a phenomenological distinction between egoic and non-egoic collective memories: collective memories of past events we lived through and can remember episodically, and collective memories of distant past events we didn't live through.

In case anybody is curious... link.springer.com/article/10.1...

Sad that I missed the labubu on Marx's grave in my attempt to keep away from social media for some time!

It was great to work on this project led by Lars Sandved-Smith, and alongside @hohwy.bsky.social, @jdkiverstein.bsky.social, and @antoinelutz.bsky.social.

The idea is to aim at a disciplined circulation between first and third-person perspectives, using the formalism of deep parametric active inference and the dual information geometry of Bayesian mechanics as a generative passage.

More specifically, we aim to provide a principled methodology for the scientific study of consciousness that, following phenomenological philosophy, focuses not on the contents of experience (i.e., what is experienced) but on its structures (i.e., how it is experienced).

Hi. DM me the details. 650 words sounds short for an article, so I’m a bit confused.

What makes it a bit funnier is that my PhD thesis was also titled 'Life and Mind'. But in my defense, that wasn't the title I wanted. For bureaucratic reasons, I had to submit a 'preliminary title' in a rush for the university to contact potential examiners, and then they didn't let me change it :(

Here is an open-access, pre-print version of the paper: www.researchgate.net/publication/...
But if anybody wants the pdf of the published version, reach out to me and I'll send it over.