These countries have adopted specialization strategies focused on controlling key tech nodes, rather than trying to dominate entire value chains.

5/ Finally, to offer a constructive path forward, I told Meredith that the most realistic strategy for the EU is to stop comparing itself to the US and China.

Instead, it should look to “middle technological powers” like Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan.

To truly benefit from spillover effects, we need agreements that include technology, knowledge, and know-how transfer — while also building local innovation ecosystems capable of absorbing Chinese innovation.

4/ That said, there are also opportunities. The EU and China can collaborate in green tech, which carries lower geopolitical risk than other sectors.

However, the current European mindset leans heavily toward securitization and reducing dependencies — a shift that comes with trade-offs and efficiency costs.

3/ The EU faces a competitiveness–security conundrum.

Affordable and efficient Chinese technologies could boost European competitiveness (though how some European incumbents have responded is another story).

2/ Technology from China is generally viewed with fear and suspicion.

The prevailing attitude across most of Europe (with some exceptions) is defensive.

US pressure to block certain technologies also plays a role.

1/ Let’s start with a basic fact: the mood in the EU around tech is one of pessimism and stagnation.

There’s a widespread feeling that the EU has already missed the boat compared to the US and China.

"This [TikTok] licensing path opens the door for more critical, strategic, and advanced technologies to flow from China to the US, e.g. LiDAR, batteries, and rare earths. In other words, technologies that actually matter to national competitiveness."

Here the New York Times piece: www.nytimes.com/2025/09/18/m...

And my article on China's green soft power: www.cidob.org/en/publicati...