Federico Trombetta
@icotrombetta.bsky.social
Economist. Political Economy theory & applied game theory (accountability, selection, populism). PhD Warwick Econ,
AP-TT Universita' Cattolica. #firstgen #inter
AP-TT Universita' Cattolica. #firstgen #inter
Details, and robustness in the full draft (ieb.ub.edu/publication/...). Happy to hear your feedback. 🙌
2025/03: Jumping without parachutes. revolving doors and political incentives – IEB
ieb.ub.edu
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
Details, and robustness in the full draft (ieb.ub.edu/publication/...). Happy to hear your feedback. 🙌
Big picture: Not all “more value to political careers” policies are alike. A wage reduction and a PCO cut both change expected returns, but they hit different politicians differently—so they can have opposite selection effects. Design matters.
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
Big picture: Not all “more value to political careers” policies are alike. A wage reduction and a PCO cut both change expected returns, but they hit different politicians differently—so they can have opposite selection effects. Design matters.
Takeaways:
1. Cooling-off periods can improve candidate human capital (education ↑).
2. But they can strengthen short-term pandering among lower-HC incumbents (taxes ↓). Anti-revolving-door rules can be a double-edged sword.
1. Cooling-off periods can improve candidate human capital (education ↑).
2. But they can strengthen short-term pandering among lower-HC incumbents (taxes ↓). Anti-revolving-door rules can be a double-edged sword.
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
Takeaways:
1. Cooling-off periods can improve candidate human capital (education ↑).
2. But they can strengthen short-term pandering among lower-HC incumbents (taxes ↓). Anti-revolving-door rules can be a double-edged sword.
1. Cooling-off periods can improve candidate human capital (education ↑).
2. But they can strengthen short-term pandering among lower-HC incumbents (taxes ↓). Anti-revolving-door rules can be a double-edged sword.
Who drives this? Exactly who the model predicts: non-graduate, non-term-limited mayors show the strongest tax cuts; graduate or term-limited mayors don’t move. That’s classic pandering under higher loss costs.
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
Who drives this? Exactly who the model predicts: non-graduate, non-term-limited mayors show the strongest tax cuts; graduate or term-limited mayors don’t move. That’s classic pandering under higher loss costs.
In-office behavior: among mayors elected before 2013 (so selection is held constant), the reform increases the cost of losing. We see lower local income-tax revenues after 2013 in treated municipalities—consistent with avoiding unpopular tax hikes.
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
In-office behavior: among mayors elected before 2013 (so selection is held constant), the reform increases the cost of losing. We see lower local income-tax revenues after 2013 in treated municipalities—consistent with avoiding unpopular tax hikes.
Selection result: the reform raises education. Average education of both mayoral candidates and elected mayors increases by ≈ +2 years around the threshold (~+13% vs. a ~15-year mean). “Pay peanuts, get monkeys”? Maybe—but how you pay matters.
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
Selection result: the reform raises education. Average education of both mayoral candidates and elected mayors increases by ≈ +2 years around the threshold (~+13% vs. a ~15-year mean). “Pay peanuts, get monkeys”? Maybe—but how you pay matters.
Also, high education mayors are less likely to take up positions in a SOE immediately after the end of their mandate.
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
Also, high education mayors are less likely to take up positions in a SOE immediately after the end of their mandate.
First check: does the law bite? Yes. The reform cuts the chance that mayors land top SOE posts by ~5 percentage points around the threshold, with no effect on firms where the state holds only a minority (placebo).
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
First check: does the law bite? Yes. The reform cuts the chance that mayors land top SOE posts by ~5 percentage points around the threshold, with no effect on firms where the state holds only a minority (placebo).
Empirical setting & policy shock: Italy’s Severino Law (2013) introduced 1–2 year cooling-off periods for local politicians moving into top jobs at SOEs/bureaucracy; it applies only above a 15,000-inhabitant threshold—perfect for a difference-in-discontinuity design.
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
Empirical setting & policy shock: Italy’s Severino Law (2013) introduced 1–2 year cooling-off periods for local politicians moving into top jobs at SOEs/bureaucracy; it applies only above a 15,000-inhabitant threshold—perfect for a difference-in-discontinuity design.
• But PCOs are especially valuable to lower human-capital politicians → reducing them deters those candidates more. Overall: reduction in PCO value and in wage can have opposite effects.
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
• But PCOs are especially valuable to lower human-capital politicians → reducing them deters those candidates more. Overall: reduction in PCO value and in wage can have opposite effects.
Theory result in a nutshell:
• Conditional on holding office, lowering the value of PCOs raises the cost of losing—similar to a wage increase while in office → more incentive to avoid unpopular policies.
• Conditional on holding office, lowering the value of PCOs raises the cost of losing—similar to a wage increase while in office → more incentive to avoid unpopular policies.
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
Theory result in a nutshell:
• Conditional on holding office, lowering the value of PCOs raises the cost of losing—similar to a wage increase while in office → more incentive to avoid unpopular policies.
• Conditional on holding office, lowering the value of PCOs raises the cost of losing—similar to a wage increase while in office → more incentive to avoid unpopular policies.
First, we build a model. Ingredients: standard accountability + endogenous entry + PCOs available to politicians kicked out from office. Assumption: PCOs more attractive for low human capital politicians.
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
First, we build a model. Ingredients: standard accountability + endogenous entry + PCOs available to politicians kicked out from office. Assumption: PCOs more attractive for low human capital politicians.
Idea: Politicians often have “politically connected outside options” (PCOs)—post-office jobs in the bureaucracy or state-owned firms (SOEs). Cut their value and you change both selection into politics and behavior in office. Is it just like a reduction in office wages? Not really…
November 19, 2025 at 3:42 PM
Idea: Politicians often have “politically connected outside options” (PCOs)—post-office jobs in the bureaucracy or state-owned firms (SOEs). Cut their value and you change both selection into politics and behavior in office. Is it just like a reduction in office wages? Not really…
Takeaways:
1. Cooling-off periods can improve candidate human capital (education ↑).
2. But they can strengthen short-term pandering among lower-HC incumbents (taxes ↓). Anti-revolving-door rules can be a double-edged sword.
1. Cooling-off periods can improve candidate human capital (education ↑).
2. But they can strengthen short-term pandering among lower-HC incumbents (taxes ↓). Anti-revolving-door rules can be a double-edged sword.
November 19, 2025 at 2:57 PM
Takeaways:
1. Cooling-off periods can improve candidate human capital (education ↑).
2. But they can strengthen short-term pandering among lower-HC incumbents (taxes ↓). Anti-revolving-door rules can be a double-edged sword.
1. Cooling-off periods can improve candidate human capital (education ↑).
2. But they can strengthen short-term pandering among lower-HC incumbents (taxes ↓). Anti-revolving-door rules can be a double-edged sword.
Who drives this? Exactly who the model predicts: non-graduate, non-term-limited mayors show the strongest tax cuts; graduate or term-limited mayors don’t move. That’s classic pandering under higher loss costs.
November 19, 2025 at 2:57 PM
Who drives this? Exactly who the model predicts: non-graduate, non-term-limited mayors show the strongest tax cuts; graduate or term-limited mayors don’t move. That’s classic pandering under higher loss costs.
In-office behavior: among mayors elected before 2013 (so selection is held constant), the reform increases the cost of losing. We see lower local income-tax revenues after 2013 in treated municipalities—consistent with avoiding unpopular tax hikes.
November 19, 2025 at 2:57 PM
In-office behavior: among mayors elected before 2013 (so selection is held constant), the reform increases the cost of losing. We see lower local income-tax revenues after 2013 in treated municipalities—consistent with avoiding unpopular tax hikes.
Selection result: the reform raises education. Average education of both mayoral candidates and elected mayors increases by ≈ +2 years around the threshold (~+13% vs. a ~15-year mean). “Pay peanuts, get monkeys”? Maybe—but how you pay matters.
November 19, 2025 at 2:57 PM
Selection result: the reform raises education. Average education of both mayoral candidates and elected mayors increases by ≈ +2 years around the threshold (~+13% vs. a ~15-year mean). “Pay peanuts, get monkeys”? Maybe—but how you pay matters.
Also, high education mayors are less likely to take up positions in a SOE immediately after the end of their mandate.
November 19, 2025 at 2:57 PM
Also, high education mayors are less likely to take up positions in a SOE immediately after the end of their mandate.
First check: does the law bite? Yes. The reform cuts the chance that mayors land top SOE posts by ~5 percentage points around the threshold, with no effect on firms where the state holds only a minority (placebo).
November 19, 2025 at 2:57 PM
First check: does the law bite? Yes. The reform cuts the chance that mayors land top SOE posts by ~5 percentage points around the threshold, with no effect on firms where the state holds only a minority (placebo).
Empirical setting & policy shock: Italy’s Severino Law (2013) introduced 1–2 year cooling-off periods for local politicians moving into top jobs at SOEs/bureaucracy; it applies only above a 15,000-inhabitant threshold—perfect for a difference-in-discontinuity design.
November 19, 2025 at 2:57 PM
Empirical setting & policy shock: Italy’s Severino Law (2013) introduced 1–2 year cooling-off periods for local politicians moving into top jobs at SOEs/bureaucracy; it applies only above a 15,000-inhabitant threshold—perfect for a difference-in-discontinuity design.
• But PCOs are especially valuable to lower human-capital politicians → reducing them deters those candidates more. Overall: reduction in PCO value and in wage can have opposite effects.
November 19, 2025 at 2:57 PM
• But PCOs are especially valuable to lower human-capital politicians → reducing them deters those candidates more. Overall: reduction in PCO value and in wage can have opposite effects.
Theory result in a nutshell:
• Conditional on holding office, lowering the value of PCOs raises the cost of losing—similar to a wage increase while in office → more incentive to avoid unpopular policies.
• Conditional on holding office, lowering the value of PCOs raises the cost of losing—similar to a wage increase while in office → more incentive to avoid unpopular policies.
November 19, 2025 at 2:57 PM
Theory result in a nutshell:
• Conditional on holding office, lowering the value of PCOs raises the cost of losing—similar to a wage increase while in office → more incentive to avoid unpopular policies.
• Conditional on holding office, lowering the value of PCOs raises the cost of losing—similar to a wage increase while in office → more incentive to avoid unpopular policies.
First, we build a model. Ingredients: standard accountability + endogenous entry + PCOs available to politicians kicked out from office. Assumption: PCOs more attractive for low human capital politicians.
November 19, 2025 at 2:57 PM
First, we build a model. Ingredients: standard accountability + endogenous entry + PCOs available to politicians kicked out from office. Assumption: PCOs more attractive for low human capital politicians.
Idea: Politicians often have “politically connected outside options” (PCOs)—post-office jobs in the bureaucracy or state-owned firms (SOEs). Cut their value and you change both selection into politics and behavior in office. Is it just like a reduction in office wages? Not really…
November 19, 2025 at 2:57 PM
Idea: Politicians often have “politically connected outside options” (PCOs)—post-office jobs in the bureaucracy or state-owned firms (SOEs). Cut their value and you change both selection into politics and behavior in office. Is it just like a reduction in office wages? Not really…